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National Foreign Assessment Center

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File P013-3

اسناد لانه جاسوسی

The Kurdish Problem in Perspective

A Research Paper

کردستان (۲)

شماره (۳۲)

Secret
PA 79-10330D
August 1979
Copy 280

دانشجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

IN THE NAME OF GOD ,

THE MERCIFUL AND THE

COPASSIONATE

TELEGRAM BONN 85481 WAS THE LAST COPY OF ITS ORIGINAL TEXT AND, THUS,VERY DULL IN COLOR, THEREFORE ITS PRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN BOOKS WAS NOT FAVORABLY POSSIBLE. FOR THIS REASON,THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENT WERE RE-TYPED.



5 Aug

S E C R E T I N F O STATE

CITE PARIS

TO: DIRECTOR

WNINTEL ALMAJA

REF: DIRECTOR

1. THANK

STAFFER POOL AND

NOW ARMED HIS

AND RE-ENTER T

ASSISTANCE WHI

SHOULD ALSO BE

AND ALLOW HIM

2. C/O

AND TRAVEL IN

T/1 MAY EXPECT

3. BASE

APPROACH. THAT

THREE WEEKS' D

PURPOSE OF REQ

LOCATE AND GET

HE WOULD ALSO

THE VARIOUS KU

BE PROVIDED WI

STATION(S). T

OTHER THAN THE

24236, T/1 WOU

IBRAHIM AHMED.

DAUGHTER. THE

IS BELIEVED, HE

PERSONALITIES.

REMAIN IN HIS

DISCREETLY THEM.

SUMMONED TO TH

ORY HERE BY TDY ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFFER RODMA

NTERPART LEE REATCHAMP, SDTHROP/1 (T/1) IS

ENTRY PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE

FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RTACTION. THE

ERED ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS

VE SOME OF HIS ANXIETIES OVER THEIR SITUATI

ATE NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

CUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION

T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT

N AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BEHAI

ND T/1 IS IN GERNAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS

AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO

SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED. FOR THE

CH FORMER KURDISH ACQUAINTANCES AS HE CAN

THEM, A LINE ON THEIR WHEREABOUTS OF OTHER

INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

ONS AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD

ENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL

N STOPS IN LONDON, PARIS AND GERMANY.

MENTIONED IN TR/ST 24327 AND FR/ST

OCATE IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF KDP LEADER

ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN, THROUGH HIS

ATION OF ALI QAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY, AS

KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHER KURDS

T/1'S OLD ADDRESS BOOKS AND FILES

EFRAN APARTMENT AND SHE WOULD BE HARD PUT

GGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE

BASSY CONSULAR SECTION ON SOME PRETEXT.

[redacted] 2 YR/SAN [redacted] S E C R E T
[redacted] COULD PASS [redacted] TO A STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING HERE.
[redacted] R TO HQS [redacted] LITY. OTHERWISE, T/1 WILL HAVE TO USE
[redacted] PHONE DI[redacted] OR FREQUENT THE USUAL KURDISH HAUNTS.
[redacted] ED THIS A[redacted] OME SUCCESS DURING HIS 1975 TRIP TO
[redacted] PE ON BEHA[redacted] 'S INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. T/1 HAS BEEN
[redacted] CTED TO ST[redacted] THE PHONE AND TRY IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL
[redacted] STABLISH W[redacted] HIS TARGETS.

4. T/1 H[redacted] IS COVER STORY FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE SHOUL
[redacted] SEVERAL DA[redacted] KELED OFF ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.
[redacted] MOST SUSPE[redacted] OULD BE A STORY OF TRAVEL TO SEE HIS
[redacted] DAUGHTER OR WI[redacted] . THE SECOND LAYER WOULD INVOVE THE STORY
[redacted] THAT HE HAS BE[redacted] WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAZARGAN
[redacted] GOVERNMENT IN T[redacted] THEY HAVE ENLISTED HIM IN AN EFFORT TO
[redacted] ESTABLISH A DI[redacted] KURDISH LEADERS ABROAD. THE MISSION IS
[redacted] TO SOUND OUT LA[redacted] CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE CENTRAL
[redacted] GOVERNMENT. T[redacted] S DELICATE BECAUSE BAZARGAN IS READY FOR
[redacted] CONCESSIONS BUT[redacted] ISSUE WITH KHOMEINI AND HARD LINERS FOR
[redacted] THE MOMENT. T[redacted] STORY IS THAT AFTER GIVING SECOND, T/1
[redacted] ZES UP HIS C[redacted] POSES SOME PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
[redacted] HEN TO SEIZE [redacted] TAGE FROM T/1'S ROLE AS EMISSARY, I.E.
[redacted] TELD THEMSELV[redacted] APS EXTRACT MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM
[redacted] AZARGAN AND C[redacted] UGGESTED TO GO ALTERNATE STORY THAT HE
[redacted] IS IN MEXICO [redacted] OT SOME PROMISES OF HELP FROM PEOPLE ARO
[redacted] IF KURDIS[redacted] PUT TOGETHER TO SUPPORT COMBAT AT
[redacted] FOR CROW[redacted] DOES NOT THINK HIGHLY OF LATTER VERSION
[redacted] USE.

(1) PA[redacted] APPEARS UNLIKELY UNDER ANY CIR-
[redacted] STANCES, AN[redacted]

(2) KU[redacted] KDP CHIEFS CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE
[redacted] BETRAYED [redacted] AT AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT TO REPAT
[redacted] EXPERIENCE

[redacted] REALIZES T[redacted] OUT SHAH HAS MONEY AND CONCEIVABLY COUL
[redacted] PREPARED TO [redacted] HT TO HARASS THOSE WHO KICKED HIM OUT
[redacted] FOR OF PRO-[redacted] FORCE BUILDING IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL
[redacted] ZBAN HAS S[redacted] RRENCY).
5. RE DO[redacted] FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE, T/1 BELIEVES BEST

PAGE 3 WR/SAN FRANCISC 251 S E C R E T
POSSIBLE (AND SUPPORTI OF RAZARGAN EMISSARY COVER STORY) I
IRANIAN PASSPORT IN TRUE NA SINCE PEOPLE TO WILL CONTACT KNOW HI
IN TRUE NAME AND HE WANTS THEM TO KNOW HE IS THERE. THIS IS IN HIS
OPINION BEST APPROACH. NOTE T/1 HAS EXPIRED REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPOR
IN TRUE NAME WHICH MIG OM NEED SOME UPDATING IF NEW IRANIAN NOT
AVAILABLE. IF OCCURS D COMBAT T/1 COULD EVEN TRAVEL ON HIS
NAME U.S. RE-ENTRY PERMIT OFFICE HAS APPEARANCE OF PASSPORT AND HAS
SPACE FOR VISA ENTRIES IF T/1 DOES NOT NEED TO SHOW HIS PASSPORT
TO HIS CONTACTS. HE WOULD N NEED TO EXPLAIN WHY HE IS NOT ABLE TO
OBTAIN AN IRANIAN PASSPORT FROM THE CURRENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT (WHIC
HAS ALLEGEDLY ENTRUSTE IM WITH HIS SENSITIVE COVER MISSION).

6. T/1 TOLD CO T AT H WANTS AND EXPECTS NO SALARY OVER AND
ABOVE TRAVEL AND OPS E ENSES. HE DOES WANT A SOME FUTURE TIME
(AND THE SOONER THE BE TER) TO BE ABLE TO CONVERT REAL FUNDS HELD
BY HIS FAMILY IN IRAN O HIS U.S. ACCOUNT IN DOLLARS. T/1 MENTIONED
HIS DESIRE TO TRANSFER ABOU $10,000 NOW, UP TO $50,000
LATER. CO TOLD T/1 TH WE ARE CURRENTLY CLUTTERED WITH PIARS AND
HE WOULD BEST MAKE HIS SURVEY TRIP AND SHOW US SOME RESULTS BEFORE
MAKING THIS A FORMAL REQUES . (HAD STAFFPOOL NOT WORKED SOME
MINOR MIRACLES IN INSU T/1'S BEHALF, CO BELIEVES T/1 WOULD
HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE FO WARD IN HIS CONVERSION REQUEST. CO BELIEVES
THAT T/1'S PROPOSAL TH T HIS DAUGHTER BRING HIS PERSONAL PAPERS TO
THE TEHRAN CONSULATE MA ALSO HAVE BEEN IN PART CALCULATED TO
ESTABLISH A RIAL/DOLLA COVERSION CHANNEL.)

7. REQUEST HQS COMMENT ON THE ABOVE. NEXT MEETING WITH T/1
WILL BE C/A 15 AUGUST.

8. FILE: 201-8 8995 RVW 04AUG99 DRV DRC.1 BY 033151.
ALL SECRET.

CDS COMMENT: RELAYED I TO TEHRAN PER DIR 491412.
S E C R E T
NF
#7021

9 AUG

E C R E 030015Z AUG 79 STAFF

ITE DIRE OR 491418.

O: PRIO TY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

NINTEL A AJA FORTES CUSCORE SDTHROB SGSWIRL

REF: FR/ AN FRANCISCO 25113 (RELAYING TEHRAN)

1. CASE PROGRESSING NICELY AND BELIEVE WE ARE ON TRACK FO
SDTHROB/1 (T/1) EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE PER PARA 3 PROPOSAL.

2. A. CONCUR DESIRABILITY T/1 TRAVEL IN T/N. RE DOCUME
TION, DI TECH CAN PROVIDE IRANIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C. RET
VALIDATI N CACHET DATED 25 MARCH 79 FOR T/1'S TOURIST PASSPORT.
REVALIDA ION STAMP IS NORMALLY VALID FOR ONE YEAR. NOTE HOWEVE
THAT DUR NG MARCH 79 WASHINGTON EMBASSY WAS STILL USING IMPERIA
STAMP WH CH DOES NOT CONTAIN ISLAMIC OR REVOLUTIONARY REFERENCE
SUGGEST OU MENTION THIS TO T/1 THOUGH WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY PR
WITH USE OF THIS CACHET OUTSIDE IRAN THAT T/1 COULD NOT EXPLAIN
IF T/1 ENABLE TO USE OF THIS ENTRY REQUEST YOU POUCH HER PASS
TO HQS CONFST.

B. U.S. REENTRY PERMIT IS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND DOT
LIMIT T /S ENTERING OR LEAVING U.S. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT
OPERATI ALLY DESIRABLE FOR T/1 TO RELY ON IRANIAN PASSPORT FO
EUROPE/ IDDLE EAST TRAVEL IN ORDER TO LIVE HIS COVER TO THE FU
PLS STR SS TO T/1 THAT U.S. REENTRY PERMIT IS TO BE TREATED AS
RESERVE TO BE USED ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES AND/OR REENTERING THE

3. PARA 3 RAISED ISSUE OF T/1'S ADDRESS BOOKS/NOTES HE S
TO LOCA HIS KURDISH CONTACTS. AGREE IT DESIRABLE TO OBTAIN
THESE I ORDER TO SAVE TIME AND ENSURE T/1'S CONTACT LIST/ITIN
IS THOU GH. HOWEVER FEEL RISK OF T/1'S DAUGHTER ATTEMPTING T
TEHRAN MBASSY COMPOUND WITH DOCUMENTS OUTWEIGHS CONVENIENCE
FACTOR. SINCE EMBASSY CONTINUES TO BE GUARDED BY MUJAHIDIN/R
FORCE D ANYONE ENTERING COMPOUND SUBJECT TO CLOSE SCRUTINY/
SEARCH SUBJECT TO TEHRAN STATION CONCURRENCE, WE PROPOSE A M
BETWEE A MEMBER OF THE STATION AND T/1'S DAUGHTER AWAY FROM

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 491419 S E C R E T [illegible] BE COLLECTED AND DOUCH
EMBASSY, AT WHICH TIME MATERIA[illegible] C[illegible] T/1 TO CONSIDER APPROPRI
FOR PLANNING PURPOSES SUGGEST [illegible] CA[illegible] CONTACT DAUGHTER WITH
VENUE FOR EXCHANGE AND HOW/WHE[illegible] E
INSTRUCTIONS.

4. PER PARA 4, CONCUR T[illegible] COVER IS W[illegible]
TO BE AVOIDED. OTHER "LAYERS" [illegible] T/[illegible] ARE
PRACTICABLE. DEFER TO BASE EXTENT TO WHI[illegible] T/1 SHOULD BE ASKE
EMBELLISH STORY/STORIES AND ASSESSMENT AS TO EXTENT HIS [illegible]PTITU
FINESSE IF CORNERED. (WOULD IMAGIN[illegible] AS O[illegible] RO[illegible] THAT HE CAN TA
CARE OF HIMSELF BUT REQUEST YOU E[illegible]MPHASIZE TO T/1 NEED FOR IRON
PLAUSIBLE COVER STORY WHICH WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR
SUBSEQUENT TRIPS TO IRAQ, ETC.)

5. APPRECIATE BASE'S NON-COMMITTAL STAND ON RIA[illegible] EXCHAN
REQUEST YOU MAINTAIN IT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND A LEAST
T/1 HAS MADE A TRIP IN OUR BEHALF. T/1 ([illegible] FAMILY) HAVE
BENEFITTED GREATLY AS REGARDS NATURALIZATION [illegible]SU[illegible] AND THI[illegible] SHOU
CARRY WEIGHT (FOR NOW AT LEAST) WITH T/1 VIS-A-VIS COMMENTATION
WITH CURRENT RUMORS REGARDING POSSIBLE CURRENCY CHANGE AN[illegible] POSS
DEMONITIZATION IN IRAN, BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO WAIT FOR AT LEAST
A COUPLE OF MONTHS BEFORE CONSIDERING ANY ACCOMMODATION EXCHANG
ESPECIALLY OF THE SCALE T/1 IS SEEKING.

6. PREVIOUS PLANNING IN THIS CASE INCLUDED SCHEDULING T/
FOR SGSWIRL. PLS FACTOR THIS IN TO PRESENT TIMETABLE AND ADVIS
DATE AND ALTERNATE T/1 AVAILABLE FOR TEST.

7. FOR TEHRAN: A. FYI SDTHERBA[illegible] (LEGEND) IS FRENCH FRANC
ASSET WHO FORMER SDJANUS COLONEL AND CHIEF OF [illegible]TS KURDISH
OPERATIONS SECTION. (IT WAS SDTHERBA[illegible] WHO RECRUITED INTRODUCTIO
SDTHERMAL/1 TO BASE.) T/1 RESIDES IN SAN FRANCISCO AREA WHERE HE HAS RECENTL
ATTAINED GREEN CARD (PRA STATUS) AND IS NOW IN POSITION TO FULFILL HIS OFFER
OF FEB 79 TO TRAVEL ON RTACTION'S BEHALF TO RE-CONTACT KURDISH
FRIENDS/ACQUAINTANCES AND REPORT ON ROLE ANY KURDISH ACTIVITIES
GENERAL. T/1 IS KURD HIMSELF AND HAS LONG-STANDING CONTACTS
WITH BARZANI SONS. FR/SAN FRANCISCO HAS DEBRIEFED T/1
EXTENSIVELY ON HIS KURDISH CONTACTS AND ALSO DISCUSSED HIS OFFER
TO RETURN TO IRAN TO SEEK KURDISH LIAISON JOBS WITH PGOI. T/1
ATTEMPTED TO SOUND OUT THE RECEPTIVITY IN TEHRAN TO SUCH AN APPR

PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 42141 S E C R E T
3 T IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONCRETE OFFERS (PLUS INDICATIONS IT
WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR HIM TO RETURN TO IRAN AS AN IMMIGRANT
TRAVELLER) PLAN WAS ADOPTED.

B. PLAN CENTERS ON T/1 TRAVELING TO EUROPE AND THE M
EAST, EXCLUDING IRAN, ON HIS EXPIRED IRANIAN NATIONAL PASSPOR
(SUITABLY UPDATED BY DIRTELCE) IN SEARCH OF THE OLD KURDISH NETWO
HIS PLANNING REACHED AN IMPASSE BECAUSE OF [illegible]'S INABILITY TO
TRAVEL UNTIL RECENT ADJUSTMENT OF HIS STATUS WHICH ALLOWS HIM
LEAVE/ENTER U.S. ON REENTRY PERMIT. WITH A MAJOR HURDLE OVERCOM
WE NOW ANXIOUS TO ACCELERATE CASE AND EXPEDITE T/1 EXPLORATORY
TRIP AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE.

C. PER PARA 3 REF AND PARA 3 ABOVE, SOLICIT COMMENTS
HOW T/1'S MATERIALS COULD BEST BE OBTAINED BY STATION FOR ONWARD
POUCHING TO FR/SAN FRANCISCO. ASSUME STATION CONCURS RISK OF T
DAUGHTER ENTERING COMPOUND EXCESSIVE. SUGGEST ONE SOLUTION MIG
BE FOR JIGAMIAN TO CALL T/1'S DAUGHTER AND ARRANGE INNOCUOUS
MEETING FOR EXCHANGE. FR/SAN FRANCISCO WILL ASK T/1 TO PROVIDE
CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR STATION AND TO ALERT HIS DAUGHTER TO E
A CALL FROM AN AMERICAN FRIEND.

D. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS/ADVICE ON THIS CASE WHIC
FEEL HAS CONSIDERABLY OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL GIVEN T/1'S UNIQUE
ACCESS TO KURDISH LEADERSHIP.

8. FILE: 201-328995. REVIEW 08AUG99 BY DGC.1 ALL SECRE

S E C R E T
BT
#9005

17 Aug 19

S E C R E T 161930Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174 (MADENSKY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORREST SDTHROB SGSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 476512
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25118
C. DIRECTOR 491418
D. TEHRAN 53880

1. SDTHROB/1 (T/1) ADVISED CO 15 AUG 79 THAT IN VISIT SAME DAY TO IRANIAN CONSULATE HERE, VICE CONSUL GHAFFARI TOLD HIME HE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION FROM TEHRAN TO ISSUE NEW, REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT TO T/1. PASSPORT WILL BE READY FOR PICKUP 21 AUGUST. GHAFFARI DID NOT ELABORATE ON APPROVAL MESSAGE FROM MFA AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IN TERMS OF T/1 STATUS WITH PGOI NOT YET CLEAR. IN ANY CASE, THIS DEVELOPMENT OBVIATES NEED TO DOCTOR T/1'S OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT FOR USE IN FOREIGN TRAVEL PER REFS.

2. MEANS OF GETTING T/1'S NOTES FROM DAUGHTER TO TEHRAN STATION OFFICER DISCUSSED WITH T/1. PROPOSE FOLLOWING, WHICH LETS STATION RETAIN CONTROL OF TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING: T/1 WILL CALL HIS DAUGHTER AND ENSURE THAT SHE HAS IDENTIFIED PAPERS OF INTEREST AND HAS THEM IN HAND. IN SECOND, SEPARATE CALL, T/1 WILL INSTRUCT HER TO LOOK FOR CALL FROM EMBASSY OFFICIAL RE A MEETING ON THE VISA PROBLEM. AT SAME TIME, T/1 WILL TELL HER TO TAKE TO THAT MEETING AND SURRENDER THE "PAPERS HE MENTIONED THE PREVIOUS CALL." (BELIEVE THAT IF SECOND CONVERSATION MONITORED, REFERENCE TO PAPERS WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY AMBIGUOUS AS TO BE REASONABLY CONSTRUED BY EAVESDROPPER TO REFER TO CONSULAR FORMS.) DAUGHER (IDEN) SPEAKS AND UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH AT FAIR LEVEL, CERTAINLY ADEQUATE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ACCEPTING CALL FROM STATION OFFICER AND UNDERSTANDING MEETING ARRANGEMENTS. DAUGHTER'S HUSBAND MIGHT BE CURIOUS IF PRESENT WHEN STATION OFFICER'S CALL COMES IN. CALL BEST MADE DURING WORKING HOURS WHEN HE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE IN OFFICE. TO SAVE TIME THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN TWO-WAY POUCHING, PROPOSE WE SCRATCH NOTE OF INSTRUCTION FROM T/1 TO DAUGHTER; HE WILL MAKE HIS WISHES CLEAR IN

PAGE 2 SAN/SAN FRANCISCO 25174 S E C R E T
FIC SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS. HAVE ALREADY INSTRUCTED T/1 TO MAKE FIRST CALL. AWAIT ANY ADDITIONAL REPORT CONCERNING SECOND.

3. APPEARS TO MAKE SENSE THAT T/1 FIRST, EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE CAN BE ANTICIPATED TO TAKE PLACE NO EARLIER THAN MID-SEPTEMBER (CONSIDERING TIME REQUIRED FOR T/1'S PASSPORT, SOSWIRL, AND OTHER PREPARATION. T/1 HAS ALREADY AGREED TO SOSWIRL. PROPOSE THAT SAME SOSWIRL OPERATOR WHO WILL CONDUCT INTERVIEW OF VPTYCOON/1 (SEE MF/SF 15152) IN LATE AUGUST-EARLY SEPTEMBER IN SAN FRANCISCO INTERVIEW T/1 AT SAME TIME. IN ANY CASE, T/1 IS AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME AS OF NOW.

4. WISH TO REJECT IMPRESSION IMPLICIT REF D THAT T/1'S PRINCIPAL ACCESS IS TO BARZANI FACTION. TO CONTRARY, ALTHOUGH T/1 WAS SDJANUS LIAISON MAN WITH MULLAH MUSTAFA AND KNOWS MASUD AND IDRIS WELL, HE PERSONALLY LOATHES BARZANIS AND THIS FEELING IS PROBABLY RECIPROCATED. T/1 WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING SDJANUS LEADERSHIP AND STAFF TO SUPPORT UDP FACTION OF JALAL TALEBANI, VICE BARZANIS, AND THIS WAS PRINCIPAL REASON HE EVENTUALLY LEFT SDJANUS. T/1'S STRONGEST ATTACHMENT AND ACCESS IS WITH UDP FACTION OF JALAL TALEBANI-IBRAHIM AHMED. LATTER HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE IN LONDON AND T/1 IS PRESENTLY TRYING TO OBTAIN HIS LONDON PHONE NUMBER (VIA HIS WIFE) THROUGH AHMED'S BROTHER-IN-LAW IN TEHRAN, AHMED KALEGHI.

5. FOR DIRECTOR: T/1 HAS COPY OF "VISAS 40- TELEGRAM SENT TO INS POS FROM SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE NOTIFYING THEM OF APPROVED IMMIGRATION PETITION BY T/1 SON (CITIZEN) ON BEHALF OF HIS MOTHER (T/1' S WIFE), WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN RELAYED TO TEHRAN CONSULATE. TO DATE, T/1 WIFE HAS NOT BEEN SUMMONED BY CONSULATE IN TEHRAN. IF THERE ANY WAY POS COULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER TELEGRAM ACTUALLY SENT TO TEHRAN VIA STATE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION.

6. FILE: 201-0328995. RVW 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151.
ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3715

17 AUG 79

S E C R E T 161937Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25175 (MADANSKY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

ANIMTSI AJAJA FORRES SDTEROB SOSWIRL

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174

1. IDENTITY IS: MRS. JALEH PORKAR AGHDAM
KH. MOSSADEGH, KH. MANAZ #11 APT 3, TEHRAN
TELE: 293367

2. FILE: 241-0328995. RVW 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151.
ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#9717

/T 31[illegible]130Z AUG 79 STAFF

/SAN FRANCISCO 25280

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

NTEL RAJAJA FORRES SDTHROB

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25215
C. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25233
D. DIRECTOR 499959
E. TEHRAN 54086

1. ON 29 AUGUST SDTHROB/1 (T/1) RECEIVED NEW, REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT FROM HAND OF NEWLY-ARRIVED IRANIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO, FNU KHORRAM. THIS OBVIATES NEED FOR ANY WOLOCK DOCTORING OF OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT BEING HANDCARRIED HQS.

2. IN LENGTHY, CORDIAL CONVERSATION WITH KHORRAM, WHO IS ABOUT 32 AND SAID HE WAS RECENTLY BROUGHT INTO FOREIGN MINISTRY BY YAZDI, T/1 GAVE KHORRAM HIS BACKGROUND. T/1 THEN OUTLINED HIS PREVIOUS, UNAVAILING EFFORTS TO ELICIT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM RESPONSIBLE LEVEL OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT RE HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO IRAN AND SERVE WITH SDJANUS SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION OR OTHERWISE AS KURDISH EXPERT. T/1 ALSO THREW IN FOR INTEREST THAT HE HAD HAD FLEETING ACQUAINTANCE IN THE PAST (IN SECONDARY SCHOOL IN KERMANSHAH AND ONE ENCOUNTER ABOUT TEN YEARS LATER) WITH DR. MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, PRESENT IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE HEAD. KHORRAM EVINCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ALL THIS AND SIAD HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO TEHRAN. (T/1 STILL BELIEVES THAT HE HAS A SLIM CHANCE OF GETTING REHIRED BY THE NEW REGIME AND WILL NOT GIVE UP IF ANY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF.)

3. T/1 HAS MADE SECOND CALL TO DAUGHTER IN TEHRAN INFRA-RED TO LOOK FOR CALL ON VISA MATTER FROM EMBASSY OFFICER. IN [illegible] MENT, HOWEVER, T/1 NOW PLANS TO SEND HIS SON HAMID TO IRAN [illegible] 6 SEPTEMBER FOR TWO-THREE WEEKS WITH HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY TO NEGOTIATE SALE OF T/1'S TEHRAN HOUSE. T/1 WANTS TO USE [illegible] ENTER INTO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PARTNERSHIP HERE WITH [illegible] BUSINESSMAN. (JUST HOW HE INTENDS TO GET PROCEEDS OUT [illegible]



...R/SAN FRANCISCO 35282 S E C R E T
...SON WILL OF COURSE BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS SISTER, JA...H,
...ULD BRIEF HER DIRECTLY ON THE MATTER OF PASSING T/1'S PAPERS TO
EMBASSY OFFICER WHO WILL CALL, AND T/1'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
ON ITS SLOW WAY TO TEHRAN STATION WOULD BE REDUNDANT. BASE
COMMENDS THAT LETTER (NOW ON WAY TO HQS) BE POUCHED ONWARD TO
TATION ANYWAY IN CASE HAMID'S TRIP PLANS CHANGE. ONCE WE KNOW
HAMID HAS ARRIVED IN TEHRAN AND HAS TALKED TO SISTER, HOWEVER,
STATION COULD PLACE CALL TO HER WITHOUT AWAITING ARRIVAL OF POUCHED
LETTER. WILL ADVISE.

4. T/1 RAISED FINANCIAL PROBLEM NEAR END OF MEETING AND ASKED
CASE OFFICER IF ORGANIZATION COULD LEND HIM $5,000 NOW WITH UNDER-
STANDING THAT HE WOULD REPAY AS SOON AS HOUSE SALE PROCEEDS ARE
REPATRIATED. (SEE ABOVE) T/1 SAID HIS PENSION MONEY ($3,000) DID
NOT COME THROUGH IN AUGUST AND HE HAS TAKEN SAVINGS ACCOUNT DOWN TO
DANGEROUSLY LOW LEVEL. CASE OFFICER REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD
MENTION THIS TEMPORARY NEED TO HQS AND SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. IT
APPEARS TO CO IN RETROSPECT THAT T/1 WAS SIDESTEPPING ISSUE OF
ACCOMMODATION TRANSFER IN HIS REQUEST BUT ACTUALLY EXPECTED TO
EVENTUALLY REPAY "LOAN" IN RIALS. ALTHOUGH BASE SHARES HQS VIEW
THAT WE SHOULD NOT LET T/1 GET VERY FAR AHEAD OF US, HE APPEARS
TO HAVE GENUINE CURRENT FINANCIAL PINCH, HAS HIGH POTENTIAL, AND
BELIEVE THAT SOME RESPONSE CALLED FOR WHICH AT SAME TIME WOULD NOT
BE INSULTING. PROPOSE FOR CONSIDERATION A $2,000 PAYMENT WHICH COULD
BE PRESENTED AS A RECRUITMENT BONUS FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL DEBRIEF.
IF T/1 INSISTS ON ULTIMATE REPAYMENT, BASE CAN CARRY AS OPS LOAN
ON BOOKS. PLS ADVISE.

5. RE IMMIGRATION PETITION (VISAS FORTI) CABLE ON WIFE OF T...
NO WAY CALBE COULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO TEHRAN PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST.
CONCLUDE IT NEVER LEFT WASHINGTON AND INQUIRY SHOULD START WITH
INS, WASHINGTON.

6. FILE: 201-0328994. RVW 31AUG99 DRV D/C1 BY 037451.

SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#7210



E C R E T A 17837 SDE 76 TAF

TE DIR PCCD 5867556.

O: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO TO TEHRAN.

NINTEL AJAX A FORRES ADTHOR SGSWIRL

EF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 23230

1. PER PARA B REF, APPROVAL IS GIVEN FOR $2,000 PAYMENT AS RECRUITMENT/SGSWIRL BONUS. HOWEVER, AS ADDED CONDITION WE WOULD SHIP CD FUNDS TO BE PAID WHEN T/1 COMES UP WITH FAIRLY CONCRETE ITINERARY/DATES FOR EXPLORATORY EUROPEAN TRIP. FOLLOWING THIS SHOULD BE FEASIBLE NOW THAT WE HAVE POSITIVE PASSPORT DEVELOPMENTS AND T/1'S GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF PRESENT LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF HIS PRINCIPAL KUDISE CONTACTS. WE CONTINUE TO BE ANXIOUS FOR T/1 TO RECONTACT HIS ACQUAINTANCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WHILE MANIFOLD PROBLEMS IN THIS CASE HAVE REPEATEDLY DELAYED TRIP APPROVAL OF ABOVE PAYMENT WILL AND TRULY OBLIGES T/1 TO FINALIZE TRAVEL PLANS AND PRODUCE FOR US.

2. PLEASED TO NOTE THAT T/1 HAS NOT COMPLETELY ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK KUDISE SPECIALIST POSITION WITH REGIME IN IRAN AND AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD. AS STATED IN PREVIOUS TRAFFIC, "ITINERANT COLLECTOR" PLAN HAS GOOD POTENTIAL BUT IS ESSENTIALLY SECOND CHOICE IN ABSENCE OF T/1'S SECURING GOVERNMENT JOB. PLS ENCOURAGE T/1 TO CONTINUE THINKING ALONG THESE LINES. IN FACT PASSPORT WAS APPROVED AS QUICKLY AS IT WAS MIGHT INDICATE T/1 REMAINS IN GOOD STANDING WITH REGIME AND IN NOT UNREASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THIS ENHANCES POSSIBILITY HE COULD RETURN TO IRAN IN GOVERNMENT POSITION.)

3. SGSWIRL APPROVAL BEING PROCESSED. WILL ADVISE.

4. PER PARA B REF, WE ARE CHECKING INTO THIS WITH ALIEN AFFAIRS OFFICER. WILL ADVISE.

5. TELL 201-[illegible]995. RVW 21SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRE

S E C R E T

BT

#9415

12 Sep 79 03 41 Z

S E C R E T 1123402 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

MSGINTEL AJAJA FORBES SDTHROB SGSWIRLED

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 596755
B. DIRECTOR 568590 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. SDTHROB/1 WAS SGSWIRLED 7 SEPT WITH NO INDICATIONS HE EVER SOVINT AGENT, TUDEH PARTY, OR DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDESTAN MEMBER. TESTING ALSO SUPPORTED HIS DENIAL OF COOPERATING SECRETLY WITH LEADERS OF KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN IRAQ WITHOUT IRANIAN GOVT'S KNOWLEDGE, AS WELL AS THAT HE HAS NOT WORKED FOR RAHAL SINGH RESIDING IN U.S., AND THAT HE HAS HAD NO CONTACTS WITH KURDISH DEMOCRATIC REPS WHILE IN U.S.

2. TESTING LIKEWISE INDICATED THAT OUTSIDE OF HIS FAMILY AND SDTHERMAL/1. HE HAS NOT DISCUSSED HIS SECRET REACTION RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING HIS PERTEST RECOLLECTION THAT MR. KHORRAM HAD ASKED T/1 TO WRITE ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES FOR THE SHAH SO THAT THESE STATEMENTS COULD BE FORWARDED TO TEHRAN. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT T/1 WAS NOT TRUTHFUL AND COMPLETE IN HIS REPORTING OF HIS 29 AUG MEETING WITH MR. KHORRAM. TESTING INDICATED THAT T/1 HAD NO INFO ABOUT SDTHERMAL/1'S CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEHRAN WHICH HE HAS NOT ALREADY TOLD US ABOUT.

3. FINAL TESTING ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER T/1 WAS CONSCIOUSLY OR UNCONSCIOUSLY WITHHOLDING INFO RE IRANIAN POLICE/U.S. EFFORTS AGAINST SOVINT AGENTS AS REPORTED IN REF B, RELATED INDICATED DECEPTION AND THAT T/1 HAS BEEN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. T/1 DID EXPLAIN HE HAD A RESIDUE OF SGSWIRL THAT AT THE TIME HE WAS TOLD RATHER THAN NATIONAL POLICE SHOULD BE WORKING WITH U.S. REPS. IN ADDITION T/1 CLAIMED HE WAS ORDERED BY THE SHAH NO LESS THAN 3 TIMES TO ASSASSINATE GEN. BAKHTIAR, FORMER SAVAK CHIEF, AND THIS HAD PRIORITY OVER THE JOINT OP. WHEN TESTING INDICATED CONTINUED DECEPTION, T/1 BROUGHT UP A PROBLEM WITH U.S. REPS. THAT DID NOT ARRIVE ON TIME FOR A SCHEDULED MEETING WITH T/1 ABOUT THE LATTER OP SO HE SHUNNED THEM BY NOT MEETING THEM.


FRANCISCO 253293 E C R E T
281-852-0005. RVW11SEP99 DRV DOC.1 ALL RI



S E C R E T 1200Z SEP 79 STAFF

12 Sep

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 (SECTION 1 OF 2)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WWENTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB SGSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 598580
B. DIRECTOR 506755
C. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

1. SDTHROB/1 (T/1) WAS AFFORDED SGSWIRL EXAMINATION O
SEPTEMBER WITH RESULTS DESCRIBED REF C. WHEREAS CI FACTO
REQUARTLY RESOLVED, T/1'S WITHHOLDING OF THE QUESTION ON H
1960 LIAISON OPERATION SUGGESTS AT LEAST THAT FUTURE H
BE CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS. BASE IN DAMER PARAGRAPH HAS S
COMMENDATIONS.

2. SGSWIRL TEST SURFACED SOME NEW IN ORMATION. ONE ITE
ADMISSION THAT UPON RETURN FROM HIS 1975 TRIP ABROAD TO
OF KURDISH LEADERS AT THE SHAH'S REQUEST. T/1 WAS ARRESTE
AIRPORT ON ORDERS OF THEN SAVAK CHIEF. T/1 WAS ARRESTE
ED FOR SOME 24 HOURS UNTIL THE SHAH OR GENERAL NASSIRY A
SAID HE BELIEVED THAT MEMBERS OF THE JAF FAMILY WHOM HE H
ED IN EUROPE MUST ALSO HAVE BEEN SAVAK FAMILY WHOM HE H
UNAWARE OF T/1'S HIGHER ORDERS. INFORMANTS AND THA
EVEN, T/1 ADMITTED THAT DESPITE THE SHAH'S ORDER OF
NASSIRI HAD MADE DEPARTMENT FIGHT CHIEF
INVESTIGATION AGAINST T/1. RE TUDEH PARTY GENERAL HASHEMI
(WHICH T/1 PASSED). T/1 SAID THIS WAS OLD CANARD LAUNCHED
MEMBERSHIP
AIMED BY MOULAH MUSTAFA BARZANI.

3. RE T/1'S LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS IN BAGHDAD,
PURPORTED THIS HAD BEGUN WITH CONTACTS WITH U.S.
AND AN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE
SITUATION. SHAH SUBSEQUENTLY SANCTIONED THE RELATIONSHIP
TO COOPERATE (T/1 SAID SHAH HOPED THROUGH
TO OBTAIN FROM U.S. SPECIALIZED WEAPONS AND SOPHISTI-
EQUIPMENT FOR KURDISH ELEMENTS IN COOPERATION WITH IRAN.)



IN HIGH ENCOURAGING TERMS. THAT T/1 COULD LET PERSONA[illegible] LIQU[illegible]
OVERRIDE HIS DUTY IS BELIEVABLE WHEN ONE CONSIDERS T/1[illegible] WAI[illegible]
EGOTISTICAL SIDE. IN ANY CASE, T/1'S "EXPLANATION" RU[illegible] GOU[illegible]
TO TEHRAN STATION'S 1969 DESCRIPTION OF AN ACTIVIE CONP[illegible] TIO[illegible]
AT THAT TIME BETWEEN SAVAK AND THE POLICE IN SOVIET OPS[illegible] T/1
DOES NOT SOUND LIKE ONE OF THE COMPETITORS.

5. INTERVIEW ALSO BROUGHT ADMISSION THAT T/1, DURIN[illegible] HOL[illegible]
PERIOD 1971-1976, WHEN HE WAS SUPPOSEDLY EMPLOYED BY OFFI[illegible] OF
POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE SHAH (GENERAL PAKRAVAN)--NOT RPT [illegible]
GENERAL FARDOUST'S SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU AS PREVIOUS[illegible]
REPORTED. ONLY MISSION HE PERFORMED WAS THE 1975 TRIP TO [illegible]
EUROPE. T/1'S EMPLOYMENT WITH DR. VALIAN'S OFFICE OF HOLY [illegible]RINE
WHICH T/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS HIS COVER, SEEMS TO [illegible]VE
BEEN A REALITY BEING HIS MAIN OCCUPATION (AND WE GUESS A VERY LUC[illegible]TIVE
ONE TOO). T/1 DESCRIBED TRIPS HE HAD MADE TO SOUTH IRAN FOR VAL[illegible] TO
INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION AMONG OFFICIALS HANDLING SHRINE'S ENDO[illegible]
PROPERTY LANDS AND SHRUBBERY WHEN CO SUGGESTED HE HAD REPORTED TO [illegible]
SOMEONE ELSE.

6. SGSVIRL HAS BROUGHT INTO BETTER FOCUS PICUTRE OF [illegible] MA[illegible]HO
HAS RATHER CONSISTENTLY ADVANCED OWN INTERESTS AND WHO CER[illegible]AINL[illegible]
NOT ANY PREVIOUS TIME (AND HE HAD SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES) GO[illegible]
BEYOND HIS WAY TO ADVANCE THOSE OF NVBLAZON.V THAT HE SHOULD [illegible]
HAVE TO DO SO NOW HAS TO BE LOOKED AT FROM BOTH PAST AND PRES[illegible]T
PERSPECTIVE. IT IS NOW FAIRLY CLEAR THAT T/1 HOPES VIA RTACTION[illegible]
TO EXPORT SOME OF HIS REAL HOLDINGS IN IRAN AND THAT THIS MAY HA[illegible]
BEEN A STRONG FACTOR IN HIS SEEKING AN OPERATIONAL ROLE WITH US. [illegible]
THIS MAY HAVE A DEAL HERE, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT CLOSE CONTR[illegible]
WILL HAVE TO BE NECESSARY. THE "ITINERANT COLLECTOR" PLAN, WHERE T[illegible]
WOULD GIVE TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE OU[illegible]
AND FOR TRAVEL OUT OF CONTACT WITH OURSELVES FOR LONG PERIODS[illegible]
SEEMS T/1 PERHAPS A LONGER ROPE THAN DESIRABLE. WERE T/1 OCCUPYING [illegible]
A SIGNIFICANT NICHE IN THE PGOI AND WILLING TO PASS DOCUMENTS FOR [illegible]
THE SITUATION WOULD BE BETTER SUITED TO THE TEMPERAMENT AND [illegible]
NEEDS OF THE MAN AND THE EXIGENCIES OF CONTROL AND SECURITY.

7. [illegible] LUNCHTIME MEETING IN WHICH T/1 WAS TOLD THAT HE [illegible]
HAD PASSED WITH FLYING COLORS, CO DISCUSSED THE [illegible]

[illegible]



S E C R E T 120 1052 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE CIA/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 (FINAL SECTION OF 2)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WINTEL AJAX/A FORTES SDTHROB SOSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 508580
B. DIRECTOR 508755
C. CIA/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

EXPLORATORY TRIP AGAIN WITH T/1, WHO ADMITTED THAT UNLESS
CONTACT KDP LEADER IBRAHIM AHMED IN ADVANCE AND SET UP
WITH HIM IN ENGLAND, CHANCES OF HIS ACQUIRING SIGNIFICA
INTELLIGENCE ON THIS FIRST SWING WERE IN DOUBT. T/1 WAS
PENDING REEVALUATION OF THE SOSWIRL RESULTS, HE SHOULD CON
HIS EFFORTS ON GETTING AHMED'S LONDON PHONE NUMBER FROM AH
REPRESENTATIVE IN TEHRAN ESKANDARI, AND PLACE THAT CALL. T/1 WAS
REF B, THAT CONVERSION OF HIS FUNDS WAS NOT PRESENTLY P
HE WAS A LOAN BUT IF HE COULD SET UP A MEETING WITH AHME
OTHERWISE DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS TRIP WOULD BE WORTHWHILE, TH
UNDER HELPING HIM TO THE EXTENT OF $2,000. K(FII: EVEN
SOSWIRL AND THE FOLLOWING MEETING, T/1 HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA O
BRING HIS SON, HAMID, TO TEHRAN TO SELL HIS HOUSE. T/1 SA
HIS DAUGHTER COULD HANDLE THE TRANSACTION. CO VERIFIED THA
HIS DAUGHTER, JALIFE, WOULD BE IN TEHRAN AT LEAST THROUGH
SEPTEMBER AND LOOKING FOR A CALL FROM AN NVBLAZON OFFICIAL.

[illegible] ALSO DISCUSSED WITH T/1 WAS ADVISABILITY OF HIS RESPON
TO RETIRED GENERAL KHORRAM'S REQUEST FOR A WRITTEN REPORT ON T/1
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES, TO BE SENT BACK TO TEHRAN IN SUPPORT O
HIS REQUEST FOR A SUITABLE JOB IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. T/1 PRE
ALREADY WRITTEN SUCH RESUMES FOR KHORRAM'S PREDECESSORS AND CO
OPINION IS THAT THE POOR SHOULD BY NOW HAVE SUFFICIENT BACKGROUND
RATHER THAN SITTING HERE AND WRITING MORE RESUMES, T/1 IN BASE
VIEW, SHOULD SEE IBRAHIM AHMED IN LONDON SOONEST, NOT WAITING FO
HIS PAPERS FROM TEHRAN, AND RETURN HERE TO REPORT. UNTIL T/1 HA
SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AT LEAST THAT OPERATIONAL MISSION (AND
ANOTHER SOSWIRL WOULD NOT BE A BAD IDEA ON RETURN), WE WILL HAVE
NO BASELINE ON HIS CLANDESTORIAL CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY


AGE 2 FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 S E C R E T
E CONTINUED EXPENDITURE OF TIME AND EFFORT HERE. IF
ABLE SET UP MEETING WITH AHMED WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS,
ROSE TO CUT BAIT AND REMAIN IN LOOSE CONTACT WITH T/
POSE OF MONITORING POSSIBLE RETURN TO IRAN. REQUEST
MENTS.
9. FILE: 201-0328995. RVW11SEP99 DRV D9C1 BT
ET.
R E T



S E C R E T [illegible]

CITE DIRECTOR 515725.

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

1. REGRET DELAY IN RESPONSE. HQS IN FULL AGR[illegible]
BASE'S LATEST ASSESSMENT OF SDTHROB/1 (T/1) CASE IN [illegible]
SGSWIRL RESULTS PER REF A. WHILE IT CLEAR THAT PREVIOUS
MISGIVINGS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, CONCUR THOSE ELEMENTS OF
MAKE-UP WHICH ARE SELF-SERVING AND/OR LESS THAN TOTALLY
FORTHCOMING DICTATE DEVISING A MORE CLOSELY SUPERVISED AGE
ROLE FOR T/1.

2. ACCORDINGLY CONCUR BASE PROPOSAL (PER PARA 5 REF A)
T/1 BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IBRAHIM AHMED AND
TRAVEL EXPEDITIOUSLY TO LONDON WITHOUT WAITING FOR ARRIVAL OF
PACKAGE FROM TEHRAN. WE COULD ADDRESS PROPOSAL FOR SECOND
SGSWIRL FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING T/1 ON THE TRIP.

3. IN VIEW OF OUR DECREASING (THOUGH NOT ABANDONED) INTER
IN T/1 PERFORMING LOOSE-LEASHED ITINERANT COLLECTOR MISSION,
POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT YET BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE TEHRAN JOB WITH
PGOI BECOMES ALL THE MORE ATTRACTIVE. BELIEVE T/1 SHOULD
COOPERATE WITH KHORRAM TO THE FULL IN PROVIDING ANY INFORMATION
ABOUT HIMSELF (WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE NON-INCRIMINATING) IN ORDER
O SATISFY KHORRAM'S REQUESTS (WHICH WE REALIZE ARE BY NOW
COMING REDUNDANT). T/1 SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONVEY IMPRESSION
KHORRAM THAT HE BORED AND LISTLESS IN HIS PRESENT SITUATION
EAGER TO RETURN TO IRAN IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SOON AS
BLE.

FILE: 201-328995. RVW 19 SEP 99 DRV DOC.1 ALL SECRET
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

S E C R E T 272356Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE FR SAN FRANCISCO 25424

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

ZNINTEL LAJAJA FORRES $DTHRO?

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329
C. DIRECTOR 515775

1. FOLLOWING IS INTERIM STATUS REPOR SD H/1 T/1)
AS OF 27 SEPTEMBER T/1 WAS CONTINUING TFFO TO TN LNDON
NUMBER F IBRAHIM AHMED. HE HAD REPEATEDLI NED ED'S BROT
LAW KHALAGHI IN TEHRAN AND EACH TIME GOT R SE LAGE WAS
CASPIAN. T/1 ALSO TRYING TO GET AHMED'S R V NU KAHROM
FORMER SDJANUS OFFICER NOW LIVING IN LONDO T/ ATELY IN
GO THAT KAHROM PASSED THROUGH SAN FRANCIS REE THS AGO T
VISIT RELATIVE HERE. ABOL BOLUGHI, AND T/ H THAT HIS
KAHRO TOLD T/1 THAT ANOTHER FORMER SDJAN FI FNU AMMAN
ALSO LIVES IN LONDON (T/1 REMEMBERS AMMAN OM WHERE BOTH
UN SDJANUS KURDISH DEPARTMENT). T/1 FIGU HE GET TO
THROU KAHROM AND LEARN AHMED'S PARTICUL FRO ANI (E
COMMENT: WE INTEND TO QUIZ T/1 IN DETAIL THE IOUSLY
UNREPORTED CONTACT HERE WITH KAHROM. REQ TR ON KAHROM
AMMAN.)

2. T/1 HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT HIS LTER RTER JAILE
IS TO YIELD CALL FROM STATION RE HIS DOCU $) ODTAINED
VISIT S VISA AND WAS PLANNING TO LEAVE N HBER WITH
MOTHER (IF LATTER GOT IMMIGRANT VISA BY T CE HER MOR
(T/1 WIFE) HAS NOT HEARD FROM CONSULAT GHI ULIKELI TH
OF THEM WILL DEPART FOR U.S. ON 6 OCTOBER ILL UTINUE TO
THAT SITUATION. HOWEVER, AND IF JALEH DE S T E WITHOUT
MILL HAVE T/1 PASS SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS BY SH TO OLDI
DAUGHTER JILA AND ADVISE STATION LATTER ILL . PHONE NU
AND ADDRESS.

3. T/1 IN PROCESS OF DRAFTING CY E OCA SUL GENE


AGE 2 R/SAN FRANCISCO 25424 E C R E
HERE HAS BEEN NO OTHER OFFICIAL NEWS FRO
4- FILE: 201-0328995. RVW27SEP66
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
MORNING OF
OVER OF FATHER'S DOCUMENTS.
DAYS ON WHICH TO MEET, DAUGHTER
THAT AFTERNOON. C/O MET DAUGHTER AND
DIARIES/TELEPHONE BOOKS, AND FOLDER OF NOTES AND
(WRITTEN IN COMBINATION PERSIAN, ARABIC AND KURDISH,
FATHER'S OWN "CODE"). ALL POUCHED HQS 16 OCT VIA
NUMBER 7194. NOT YET RECEIVED IS REPORT, WRITTEN BY MEMBER
AL TALEBANI'S FAMILY, ON CURRENT KURDISH SITUATION.
2. DAUGHTER THEN TRAPPED C/O IN LENGTHY DISCOURSE
N-IRANIAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING
AND COMPANY IN POWER



S E C R E T 261838Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 5404[illegible]3.

TO: FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO F[illegible]/S/S[illegible]

SUBJECT: WNINTEL AJAJA FORREP SDTHROB - STATUS (SDTHROB/1

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 0 255[illegible]9
B. DIRECTOR 525744
C. DIRECTOR 515775
D. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 0 2533[illegible]
E. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 2511[illegible]

1. WITH THE RECEIPT OF REF A, WE HAVE REVIEWED IN DEPTH T[illegible] ALREADY LENGTHY SDTHROB/1 (T/1) FILE AND, IN LIGHT OF OUR OTHER EFFORTS AGAINST THE KURDISH TARGET, WE ARE REASSESSING WHERE WE ARE GOING WITH THIS CASE AND THE OPERATIONAL USEFULNESS WE CAN EXPECT FROM IT. WHEN THE T/1 CASE FIRST SURFACED IN FEBRUARY 1979, WE HAD LITTLE INFORMATION ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES AND FEWER SOURCES. T/1'S BACKGROUND, EXPERTISE, AND CONTACTS WERE VIEWED POTENTIALLY FILLING SEVERAL IMPORTANT GAPS IN BOTH OUR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS AND WE APPRECIATED THEN AND CONTINUE TO APPRECIATE THE BASE'S RAPID AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE TO OUR REQUIREMENTS AND THE T/1 CASE.

2. AS THE BASE IS AWARE, THE PACE OF THIS CASE HAS SINCE SLOWED CONSIDERABLY, DUE TO THE INFLUCTABLE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN TARGET AND DURING THE INTERVENING TIME WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP OTHER SOURCES ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES. THE REPORTING FROM THESE PROVIDES A BEGINNING TO COVERAGE OF KURDISH EVENTS. WHILE THE COVERAGE OF THE TARGET IS NOT WHAT WE WOULD WISH IT TO BE, OUR CONCERN WITH T/1'S POTENTIAL FOR KURDISH REPORTING IS THAT OUR COVERAGE HAS NOT YET REALLY STARTED AND EVEN WHEN HE DOES, IT APPEARS HE WILL BE COVERING MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND AS OTHER SOURCES [illegible] ACTIVE REPORTERS. AS A CASE IN POINT, THE REF E NOTE [illegible] WAS ATTEMPTING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH IDEN A AND THAT HE [illegible] BOOKS AND NOTES FROM TEHRAN TO BE ABLE TO [illegible]



PAGE 2 WASHINGTON [illegible] SECRET
ESTABLISHMENT CONTACT LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT T/1 IS NOT
AS WIRED INTO THESE MOVEMENT AS WE HAD HOPED. IDEN A I
CATHOLIC/18, A KEY CONTACT OF T/1 HEARD FROM OTHER KURDS ARE HAVING
NO DIFFICULTY IN FINDING AND WHO HAS RESUMED HIS REPORTING RE-
LATIONSHIP WITH STATION. MOREOVER, WE ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT
WITH SIJANUS/22 (IDEN [illegible]) WHO T/1 WISHES TO USE AS A SOURCE OF
INFORMATION ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF HIS VARIOUS KURDISH CONTACTS.
SIJANUS/22'S ACCESS TO [illegible] KURDISH COMMUNITY IS MUCH MORE RECENT
THAN T/1'S AND WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST FROM THE SIJANUS ANGLE,
HE WOULD BE A MORE PRODUCTIVE REPORTER. IN SHORT, AT THE PRESENT
TIME, WE THINK T/1 CAN BE MORE USEFULLY DIRECTED INTO OTHER
TARGETS AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE T/1 STAND DOWN ON HIS
EFFORTS TO WORK AGAINST THE KURDISH TARGET.

2. WE STILL WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE BASE TO DIRECT, IF POS-
SIBLE, T/1 INTO THESE OTHER IRANIAN TARGETS. WE ARE STILL VERY
MUCH INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF T/1 REGAINING A POSITION
IN THE EGOI, PARTICULARLY IF NEW [illegible] INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND,
AS REF C INDICATES, WE FIND THIS TASK MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE ALTERNA-
TIVE AND ONE WHICH WOULD GO ALONG WAY TOWARD SATISFYING AN IM-
PORTANT FI REPORTING REQUIREMENT. WE WELCOME BASE COMMENTS ON
HOW WE MAY BEST ACCOMPLISH THIS, RECOGNIZING THAT IN THE END,
T/1'S SUITABILITY FOR SUCH AN OPERATION MAY BE OPEN TO QUESTION.

4. FILE 201-325995. RVW 25OCT9[illegible] DRV DGC.1 ALL SECRET.

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C R E T 2518582 OCT 79 DEFERRED TE EPO

WASHINGTON 540461.

FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAM.

CWE/IRAN INFO IR/3/SE

WAINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROE - STATUS DTHROB/1 CA

WASHINGTON 540443

1. IDEN A: ALI ROMAN QAZI
IDEN B: JAMSHID AMANI.

FILE 201-329995. RYW 250 T99 DR V D .1 SECRET.

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26

17 APR 79 13 15Z

S E C R E T 172004Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 422311.

TO: PRIORITY BONN INTO GERMANY, TEHRAN, VIENNA.

WN INTEL RIBAT AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

REF: BONN 8198 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN)

1. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ALMOST ANY LIGHT CATOMIC/IS (A/IS) (IDENTITY TEHRAN ONLY) COULD SHED ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK), BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT IRAN. PLEASE IDENTIFY SUB-SOURCING. SPECIFICALLY, ON IRAN:

A. WHO HEADS THE DPK IN IRAN AND ANY OTHER IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP?

B. WHAT IS THE PARTY STRUCTURE, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF IRAN?

C. WHAT IS THE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY?

D. WHAT IS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY?

E. IS QASEMLOU A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY? IF SO, DOES HE REPRESENT THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY WITHIN THE DPK?

F. IS THERE A MILITARY WING OF THE DPK? WHO HEADS IT IF THERE IS?

G. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DPK AND THE PLO?

H. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IRANIAN KURDS AND THE TUDEH PARTY?

ON IRAQ:

A. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQI KURDS AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAQ? DO THEY TRY COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH KURDISH GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN AND TURKEY?

B. WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, IS THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMING



PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 420311 S E C R E T
ON THE KURDISH QUESTION
C. WHAT KINDS AND HOW MUCH SUPPORT IS BEING PROVIDED BY
LIBYA TO THE KURDISH GROUPS?

ON TURKEY:

A. WHAT IS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH KURDS
IN GERMANY? ARE THEY ORGANIZED IN ANY WAY?
B. ARE THERE ANY KURDISH ACTIVIST/POLITICAL/
REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS IN GERMANY?
C. ARE THESE GROUPS INVOLVED WITH KURDISH MOVEMENTS/
ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES?
D. WITH WHOM IS A/1D IN CONTACT IN TURKEY?
E. ARE THESE TURKISH KURDS POLITICALLY ACTIVE?
F. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KURDS OF
IRAN, IRAQ, TURKEY AND SYRIA?

2. FOR VIENNA: ABOVE MAY BE DRAWN ON FOR USE WITH
DGAMLER/1.

S E C R E T FILE: 201-0306414. RVW 16 APR 99 DRV DOC.1. ALL SECRET.

11 AUG 7[illegible] 42

C R E T 110316Z AUG 79 STATE

E DIRECTOR 193004.

TEHRAN INFO DCD/HEADQUARTERS, DCD/CHICAGO, SINGAPORE.

INTEL AJAJA

1. AS RESULT OF MEETING BETWEEN HQS OFFICER AND DCD CONCT ROBERT MCK. BURNS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE SURFACE INDIVIDUAL IN TEHRAN WHO STATION MAY FIND USEFUL. WE REALIZE THAT THIS DEPARTURE FROM OUR NORMAL PRACTICE OF NOT BURDENING STATION WITH HQS LEADS BUT WE BELIEVE YOU MAY AGREE THIS ONE HAS UNIQUE POTENTIAL.

2. BURNS WAS FMC CORPORATION MANAGER IN TEHRAN FROM MID 1976 TO DECEMBER 1978. DURING COURSE OF HIS TOUR THERE, HE DEVELOPED SEVERAL HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN AGRICULTURAL, MILITARY, AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN IN LATE 1978, HE LEFT CANADIAN NATIONAL HENRI STE. M A R T I N IN CHARGE OF FMC OPERATIONS IN IRAN, AND STE. MARTIN HAS CONTINUED FMC OPERATIONS THERE AND MAINTAINED SOME OF THOSE CONTACTS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, STE. MARTIN HAS REPORTEDLY DEVELOPED, OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS, EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN KURDISH MOVEMENT. STE. MARTIN DEVELOPED THESE CONTACTS THROUGH HIS IRANIAN AZARI WIFE WHO IN TURN HAS MANY KURDISH RELATIVES. IT WAS APPEAL FROM THESE KURDISH CONTACTS THAT LED STE. MARTIN, THROUGH BURNS, TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT US.

3. STE. MARTIN, WHO IS 30 YEARS OLD, NATIVE OF QUEBEC AND GRADUATE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL, ARRIVED IN IRAN IN 1976 WITH HIS IRANIAN WIFE. HE WORKED AT VARIETY OF JOBS IN TEHRAN UNTIL SUMMER 1978 WHEN HE WAS HIRED BY FMC. DURING HIS THREE YEARS IN TEHRAN STE. MARTIN HAS DEVELOPED ACADEMIC INTEREST IN KURDISH NATION AND HAS BUILT UP THROUGH HIS WIFE LIST OF EXTENSIVE CONTACTS. IN JUNE 1979 HE AND HIS WIFE TRAVELED FOR SEVERAL WEEKS INTO KURDISTAN AND MET WITH SEVERAL PROMINENT KURDISH LEADERS, INCLUDING RAHIM SAIF G H A Z I, WHO, ALONG WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF GHAZI CLAN, TOLD STE. MARTIN THAT HE WOULD LIKE HIS ASSISTANCE IN CONVEYING MESSAGE TO WESTERN POWERS



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ERN ASSISTANCE AND THAT THEY
TO ATTEMPT SECURE THAT AS-
THIS GROUP, WHICH ALSO IN-
CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF
STATED THAT THEY DID NOT
REASONABLE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
WANT TO SOLICIT SOVIET SUP-
EIR DISTRUST OF SOVIET
REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD IN 1947.
F WITH BARZANI'S, WHO THEY

NONE OF THIS NEW INASMUCH AS CATOMIC/19
SINCE APRIL 1979, BUT IT DOES
IN INTO KURDISH MOVEMENT
WHO MAY HAVE SOME FAIRLY
MARTIN MAY BE ATTRACTIVE
ACCORDING TO BURNS, HE SPEAKS
ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH ENGLISH
STE. MARTIN WOULD BE WILLING
WORD, AND INTENDS REMAIN IN
COURSE, WOULD NEED GO THROUGH
AND CANADIAN APPROVALS USE OF STE.
AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS
ECESSARY PAPERWORK/APPROVALS.
PROCESSING NOW, WE
AT SOME POINT OUTSIDE
IF FEASIBLE, RECRUITMENT AND
, BUT OTHER OPTIONS MAY
ACT IN TEHRAN. WOULD

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





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D RECTOR 517454.

MMEDIATE BONN INFO GERMANY, STUTTGART, TEHRAN, ANKARA,

BONN.

AJAJA CATONIC

A. BONN 84660
B. DIRECTOR 515091
C. BONN 84421

WE THINK REF B SHOULD ANSWER REF C. IF YOU ARE NOT IN
T REF B, IT AUTHORIZES REF C PROPOSAL WITH AN INITIAL
F DM 7500 TO COVER CATONIC/79 EXPENSES FROM MAY 79
EPTEMBER 79 AT DM1500/MONTH, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
G THREE MONTH TRAIL PERIOD FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 79
ATE.

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



S E C R E T 22[illegible]Z SEP 79 STATE

WITH DIRECTOR 51877

FOR PRIORITY BONN INFO TEHRAN

UNITEL AJAJA CATORIC

REF BONN 8[illegible]21

A. AGREEMENT BETWEEN C/TOPIC/19 (P/19) AND NOWIKOWSKY TO
NEGOTIATED TO SEP 79. IS THAT WE WILL PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH TO
EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONTACTING HURDISZ TARGETS. INTEREST
EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON AND THAT, AS HE HAD BEEN DO
THIS FROM APRIL 1975 UNTIL WE RECONTACTED HIM IN AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER 1979, WE WOULD SUPPORT THOSE EXPENSES AT THE RATE
DM1500 PER MONTH) FROM MAY THROUGH SEPTEMBER. NOWIKOWSKY H
PAID C/P19 DM1800 IN APRIL 1979.
WE WOULD ALSO PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH FROM OCTOBER THROUG
DECEMBER AS PART OF A CONTINUING TEST PERIOD TO DETERMIN
USEFULNESS OF HIS INFORMATION. IN RETURN FOR THIS MONEY,
HAS AGREED TO MEET EVERY TWO WEEKS WITH AN RI STATION OFFICE
RESPOND TO OUR REQUIREMENTS. AT THE END OF DECEMBER, WE
AND C/19 AGREED THAT WE WOULD REVIEW THE QUALITY OF INFOR
PROVIDED AND ADJUST HIS "EXPENSE ALLOWANCE" ACCORDINGLY.
BILLS NEED BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT HIS COLLECTION OF THIS
NOR DOES HE HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR EXPENDITURES.

2. HOPE THIS CLARIFIES MATTER. APPRECIATE BASE
ON HIS SUBJECT.

3. FILE 201-[illegible]0814. EYW 21SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL

S E C R E T

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

S E C R E T 2515322 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STUTTGART 17957 SECTION 1 OF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BONN INFO G[illegible], TEHERAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WNINTEL REBAT AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: BONN 24660 (NOTAL)

1. KEITH L. TOHLENNY HAD INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1830 HOURS IN ROOM 1083 COLOGNE INTERCONTINENTAL, AS ARRANGED. MEETING LASTED FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS, AND T/19 WAS PAID DM 7500 FOR PERIOD MAY 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1979 AT RATE OF DM 1500/MONTHLY FOR EXPENSES. FOR WHICH HE SIGNED HAND RECEIPT IN USUAL ALIAS. IT WAS AGREED WHAT MEETINGS WOULD CONTINUE FOR THREE MONTH TRIAL PERIOD [illegible] OCTOBER THROUGH DECEMBER. WITH DM 1500 MONTHLY AS EXPENSES. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE ON 27 SEPTEMBER. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE ANTICIPATED.

2. ATMOSPHERICS: TOHLENNY BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING HIS [illegible] (SLIGHTLY INCREASED) AND HIS LONG BACKGROUND IN ARMS SMUGGLING BUT THAT HE HAD VISITED KURDISTAN, HAD KNOWLEDGE OF KURDISH HISTORY, ETC. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TALK TO T/19 LIKE A FATHER WHEN NECESSARY AND THAT IF WOULD BE FOR T/19'S OWN GOOD. HE THEN STARTED TO QUESTION T/19 ON HIS SERIOUSNESS ABOUT KURDISH PROBLEMS, GENTLY POINTING OUT THAT T/19 HAD HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH KURDISH NATIONALISM DURING HIS ADULT LIFE AND AT ONE TIME PRAISING T/19'S FATHER AND HIS CLAN. TOHLENNY CLOSED THE INTRODUCTION BY SETTING HIS PERSONAL REGARD FOR THE KURDS AND REMARKED TO T/19'S DESIRE TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE. ALL THIS WAS WELL RECEIVED BY T/19.

3. GOALS: TOHLENNY THEN RAISED QUESTION OF WHAT HE WANTS DONE. T/19. DESPITE T/19'S DESIRES, WE HAVE NO INTENTION AT PRESENT OF ASSISTING KURDISH NATIONALISM WITH ARMS OR MONEY AND T/19 MUST BE AWARE OF THE DRAWBACKS FOR THIS. FURTHERMORE, WE DID NOT WANT T/19 TO RETURN BLACK TO KURDISTAN, EVEN FOR VISIT AS THIS WOULD PROBABLY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR EVERYONE. WE COULD HELP T/19'S COUNTRY BY SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS

PAGE 2 STUTTGART 17957 S E C R E T

HAPPENING THERE AND HOW EVENTS WERE CONTROLLED. THIS WAS FIRST AND BASIC STEP. T/19 AGREED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY, EVEN THOUGH HE DIDN'T LIKE IT, AND HE AGREED THAT THREE-MONTH TRIAL PERIOD SHOULD BE GOOD TEST. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO LONG DISCOURSE ON FACT THAT HE WAS GRADUALLY BEING SEPARATED FROM HIS SOURCES AND WOULD SOON HAVE NOTHING TO REPORT. HE THEN STATED THAT HE IS ABLE TO ENTER KURDISTAN SUCCESSFULLY AND SET UP NEW SOURCES AND ROUTES. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE COULD ASSIST HIM IN TWO RESPECTS: (A) SUPPLYING HIM WITH SAFE COMMUNICATION, I.E. POUCH FACILITIES, BETWEEN GERMANY AND IRAN AND (B) WHETHER WE WOULD HELP HIM SEND KURDISTAN NEWSPAPER TO TEHRAN INTO KURDISTAN. BLACK IN ORDER TO PUBLICIZE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS THERE. TOHLENNY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE RESPLYING BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS. T/19 CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD CORRESPONDED PRIMARILY THROUGH (A) COURIERS AND THEREFORE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SISTER IN TEHRAN, WHO IS MARRIED TO CHIEF IN JAF TRIBE AND SHE IN TURN HAD CONTACT WITH KURDISTAN BY PHONE AND LETTER. NOW SISTER'S CONTACTS IN KURDISTAN HAD FLED TO HILLS AND SISTER HAD MOVED TO BONN. MOREOVER, PUBLIC COMMO IN KURDISTAN WAS INCREASINGLY CONTROLLED AS WAS THAT IN TEHERAN. T/19 INSISTED THAT HE STILL HAD PLENTY OF POTENTIAL SOURCES IN KURDISTAN BUT HE HAD NO WAY TO REACH THEM FROM GERMANY AND TO SET UP NEW ROUTES AND COURIERS.

4. INTELS: T/19 HAD NO INTEL OTHER THAN GENERAL STATEMENT THAT ON 15 SEPTEMBER MENBRE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN MANY KURDISH TOWNS, BUT HE HAD NO NAMES OR NUMBERS. TOHLENNY SYMPATHIZED WITH T/19'S PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TRY TO EXTRACT MORE INFORMATION FROM TRUSTED KURDS IN GERMANY WHO ALSO HAD THEIR OWN SOURCES. HE AGREED TO DO THIS.

5. TARGETS: TOHLENNY TOLD T/19 THAT FIRST THING WAS TO COLLECT LISTS OF NAMES, ADDRESSES AND BIO DATA ON KURDS IN [illegible] THAT T/19 TRUSTED AND THOUGHT CAPABLE OF OBTAINING [illegible] INFORMATION FROM KURDISTAN. HE ALSO ASKED FOR SIMILAR [illegible] OF KURDS IN TEHERAN AND KURDS IN KURDISTAN. DEPENDING ON [illegible] WE COULD THEN HELP T/19 DETERMINE (A) WHO WAS [illegible] AND (B) IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ASSIST HIM [illegible] HIS FAILINGS. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHOM WE MIGHT BE DEALING [illegible] AND WHAT THEIR BACKGROUNDS WERE. T/19 AGREED READILY TO THIS



PAGE 3 STUTTGART 17257 S E C R E T
AFTER THINKING IT OVER CAREFULLY AND AFTER BEING ASSURED HE
COULD HANDLE INFORMATION IN SECURE MANNER, HE PROMISED TO
HAVE SOME INFORMATION AT NEXT MEETING.

C. SOVIET INFLUENCE: T/IS HAS NO HARD INFORMATION ON SOVIET
CONNECTIONS WITH NATIONALIST FORCES IN KURDISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN
RECENT WEEKS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALMOST ALL KURDISH LEADERS
HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS, USUALLY FOR A PURPOSE.
BARZANI, FOR EXAMPLE, HE KNEW AS COMMUNIST AND TUDEH MEMBER,
BUT OMAR ALI THEN BROKE WITH SOVIETS AND PERHAPS NOW IS BACK WITH
THEM. IN ABSENCE OF HARD AND CURRENT INFORMATION, ALMOST ANY KURD
COULD BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME SOVIET CONNECTIONS.
SAYED HIS FATHER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN AND STRONG KURDISH
NATIONALIST, HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE HIS
PURPOSES. T/IS WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR
INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET INFLUENCE.

D. T/IS SOVIET CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT, TOHLERNY ASKED
T/IS ABOUT HIS SOVIET CONTACTS. HE HAD INVITED SOME MONTHS AGO
SOVIET FRIEND SECRETARY ALEXANDER S. KULIN TO HIS FARM AND
KULIN RETURNED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO UNEXPECTEDLY AND ASKED IF
THERE WERE ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO HELP T/IS, REFERRING TO T/IS'
LOSS OF DIPLOMATIC POST. ACCORDING TO T/IS, KULIN WALKED AND
TALKED LIKE SAYING HE WOULD BE BACK, BUT HAS NOT YET RETURNED.
T/IS DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A FEELER FOR FUTURE PITCH
OR NOT, BUT INTENDS KULIN TO RETURN AND TALK ABOUT T/IS AND
PAPER DIRECTION. T/IS PROMISED TO REPORT ANY CONTACT
IMMEDIATELY AND IN DETAIL. HE WAS ALSO WARNED OF POSSIBLE
ESPIONAGE AND PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE. T/IS THEN ASKED IF
INDIRECT THROUGH KULIN WAR CONNECTED WITH SUBJECT MENTIONED TO
GET HIS COUSIN, RAHIM SAIFI (M A ZI, PROFESSOR KURDISH
STUDY AND CULTURE IN BAKU. T/IS MET COUSIN FOR FIRST TIME IN YEARS
IN VIENNA AND IN BERLIN AND COUSIN MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT
COME TO [redacted] TO T/IS. T/IS DID NOT THINK ABOUT IT AT TIME. LATER
[redacted] COUSIN WAS ALLOWED TO COME TO BERLIN, AS HE
[redacted] FROM REFUGEES AS ARMED SERVICES PERSONNEL OUTSIDE SOVIET UNION.
[redacted] BUT NOT SO [redacted] COUSIN MEANT BY SOMEONE . A KURD WHO
[redacted] INTERVIEW HIM A [redacted] IN SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET CONNECTIONS
[redacted] CHIEFS OR WENT [redacted] MEANT SOMEONE REPRESENTING SOVIET
[redacted] INTEL. [redacted] DID NOT KNOW AND T/IS ASKED IF HE



PAGE 4 STUTTGART 07937 S E C R E T
SHOULD ASK COUSIN TO SEND SOMEONE. TOHLERNY ADVISED WAITING.

8. T/19 REQUESTS: T/19 MADE SOME REQUESTS. (A) HE WANTED TO KNOW IF BOOK COULD ASSIST SISTER NOW IN BOON IN EDUCATION AT AMERICAN SCHOOL, SINCE CHILDREN HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AMER SCHOOL IN TEHERAN. TOHLERNY SAID HE KNEW NOTHING ON DOWN SCHOOL BUT WOULD ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH SITUATION. (B) T/19 WOULD LIKE COPY OF BOOK BY (FNU) EGGLETON ABOUT KURDS AND (C) COPY OF ROOSEVELT ARTICLE IN MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ABOUT KURDISH REPUBLIC OF 1945-46. HE MAILED NO MONEY REQUESTS, AND ALMOST FORGOT TO COLLECT MONIES OWED HIM.

9. IN GENERAL MEETING WENT VERY WELL WITH GENUINE CORDIALITY AND HUGS AT END OF MEETING AND A SEEMING HAPPINESS TO GET ON WITH BUSINESS. T/19 SUGGESTED MOVING NEXT MEETING UP TO 27TH OR 28TH SEPTEMBER HE WAS JUST AS LEAVING. T/19 MENTIONED THAT ON WHO CLAIMED "THE COUNCIL FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY". HE ALREADY HAD THE PAPERS DRAWN UP AND IT WOULD BE A BEGINNING OF HIS ATTEMPT TO PULL TOGETHER AN ORGANIZATION HE COULD USE. TOHLERNY WILL OBTAIN COPY OF PAPERS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS AT NEXT MEETING.

10. COMMENTS: IN PRESENT SITUATION AND WITH PRESENT QUIDDITIES OF U.S. THEREFORE WE SHOULD GET OUR SOON BEFORE WE GET BACK IN MORE DEEPLY THAN WE WANT TO BE. THREE MONTHS TRIAL SHOULD BE ABLE MIDDLE ACTIVE ROLE, BASED ON REWARDING ONLY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT THEN T/19 MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. THERE SEEM TO BE NO OTHER KURDS WITH FAMILY BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WHO CAN MAKE STRONG BID FOR KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS T/19 ALSO CANNOT. BUT NEVER OF RECENT SORTS IN BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE HAD A BETTER FOOT ON HIM. PERHAPS ENOUGH TO ALLOW TO PUT IT ALL TOGETHER FOR ONCE. TOHLERNY TOLD HIM BLUNTLY THAT NO ONE WAS GOING TO AID HIM UNLESS HE LEARNED IT AND HIS TRACK RECORD AS KURDISH NATIONALIST WAS VERY THIN. HE HAD TO MAKE HIMSELF INTO SOMEONE OTHERS WOULD COME TO. BOTH KURDS AND OTHERS, URGENCY THAT THERE FOR LIFE. T/19 TOOK THIS VERY SERIOUSLY AND FINALLY AGREED THAT HE HAD TO WORK AND WORK HARD TO GET WHAT HE WANTED. HE NOTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD DONE MUCH WITHOUT

PAGE 5 STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
HELP AND WHILE EN EXILE, TOHLERNY BELIEVE RTACTION SHOULD
CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WHERRE AND HOW IT ULTIMATELY WANTS TO GO WITH
T/19 BEFORE THE TRAIL REPIOD IS UP IN DECEMBER. TOHLERNY ALSO
BELIEVES THAT IF THE SOVIETS OFFERED T/19 GUNS, MONEY, ASSISTANC
TOMORROW, HE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULT TIME REFUSING, BELIEVING
THAT HE COULD SOMEHOW USE THE SOVIETS FOR HIS OWN ENDS. T/19
SAYS HE BELIEVES IN AUTONOMY FOR KURDS, RATHER THAN INDEPENDENCE
AND SAYS HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO ALMOST ANYTHING TO HELP
ACHIEVE IT FOR THE KURDS. HE IS BEGINNING TO THINK MORE OF
IMITATING HIS FATHER, HOW THAT IRAN IS A MESS, WHAT HE CAN DO,
HOW FAR HE CAN CHANGE HIS PLAYBOY PAST, WHAT INFLUENCE HE CAN AC
BRING AROUND HIS NAME, IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. THE POINT IS
THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DECIDE IF WE WANT HIM, WHAT WE WANT
HIM FOR, AND HOW BADLY WE WANT HIM. IF NOT, HE WILL EITHER HAVE
PASSED THE POINT WHERE HE HAS THE DESIRE TO WORK FOR THE KURDISH
CAUSE OR SOMEONE ELSE MIGHT ALREADY OWN HIM.

11. FILE: 201-0306414. RYW 25SEPT99 DRV D9C.1
E C R E T
BT
937

S E C R E T 271828Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54321

TO: STUTTGART INFO DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WHITEL RMBAT AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: STUTTGART 17937

1. ACCORDING TO 12 SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF ENGLISH LANGU
WEEKLY CALLED "THE IRANIAN", RAHIM GHAZI RETURNED TO IRA
IN APRIL 79. MAGAZINE SAYS HE WAS MEMBER OF KURDISH
DELEGATION WHICH RECENTLY CAME TO TEHRAN TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE
WITH PODI ON KURDISH REBELLION. THERE IS NO MENTION OF
TRAVEL OUTSIDE IRAN SINCE GHAZI'S RETURN FROM USSR.

2. FILE: 201-306414. RVW 27 SEP 99 DRV DSC.1. ALL

SECRET.
S E C R E T







28SEP

S C R E T 281653Z SZJZPB FTAFR

BONN 34952

TO DIRECTOR, STUTTGART IAIO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WINTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF A. STUTTGART 17957
B. BONN 34944

1. REF B REPORTED INTL FROM 27SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC

2. SARDAR J A F, ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS, RIED TO T/19'S SISTER (PARA EIGHT REF A). AFTER FLEEING HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD WHERE HE BECAME ED IN WORKING WITH IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTING KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQ. JAF TRIBE WAS URING IRAQI-KURDISH FIGHTING IN 7 'S AND SADAR APPARENTLY AN SLATE. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO COME TO GERMANY ABOUT 21 H IRAQI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET T/19 AND HIS SISTER. MINUTE TRIP WAS POSTPONED SO SARDAR COULD MAKE TRIP STAN, AND HE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BONN 5 OCT. L ARRANGE FOR TOHLERNY TO MEET SARDAR. TO T/19, SARDAR'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN RICAN SCHOOL, BUT WITH COST RUNNING OVER $8,000 (THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE. SULTATION WITH BONN, TOHLERNY PROPOSES USING SCHOOL PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A PAY-AS-YOU-GO IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS OTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METHOD OF COMMO WOULD TIME ALLOWS TRAINING. OTHERWISE, WILL ARRANGE FOLLOW- WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE) TO GERMANY TO SEE FAMILY OTE TRAINING AND SGSWIRL.

REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS L BY 5 OCT.

TLE: 201-0306414. RVW 28SEP99 DRV DOC.1



S E C R E T 3312Z12 OCT 79 STAFF

CITE BONN 24962

TO DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKA

SUBJECT: ALEXA CATOMIC

REF: BONN 24962

1. FOLLOWING PIECES OF INFORMATION WERE PROVIDED F
CATOMIC/16 (C/16) DURING LAST MEETING WITH TOHLENNY AND AR
FORWARDED FOR HQS INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE COMMENT:

A. RADIO T A R R A B A I, 2ND VICE PRESIDENT
TARRAH KURDISTAN, HAS WIFE (RELATIVE OF KHOMEINI) NOW IN
IRAN BOOKED, WEST GERMANY. C/19 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND NAM
HQS. HAVE LE INTEREST?

B. C/19 HAS STORY OF SON OF TURKISH KURD, FNU
[illegible] WHOM C/19 EXTRACTED FROM SHAH'S PRISON AT SON
[illegible] IN 1977. SON RECENTLY CAME TO C/19 WITH UNKNOWN KURD
[illegible] WITH STRANGE STORY. SOCIALIST COUNTRY, IDENTITY
[illegible] WANTS TO SHIP ARMS TO KURDS UNDER GUISE ARMS ARE BEING
[illegible] CHRISTIAN SUPPORTERS IN EUROPE. KURD ASKED C/19 IF HE
[illegible] WOULD HAVE COMMENT, WHO COULD DELIVER TO KURDISTAN BY
[illegible] STORY REQUIRES MUCH MORE DETAIL AND SUBSTANTIATION,
[illegible] STORY REQUIRES MUCH MORE DETAIL AND SUBSTANTIATION,
[illegible] AGENT ASKED C/19 TO ACQUIRE IN NEXT MEETING WITH
[illegible] SCHEDULED IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS. C/19 SUGGESTED
[illegible] SPECIALIST, PREFERABLY NATIVE GERMAN, WHO COULD
[illegible] UNDER GUISE OF EXPLORING FEASIBILITY. TOHLENNY
[illegible] OF STORY AND HELPS NO COMMITMENT.

2. SOVIET ALEXANDER K U L I N (PARA SEVEN REF A)
NO FURTHER CONTACT.

[illegible]: 2ALT-E346414. REV 23 OCT 99 DEF DOC.1.



6 Oct 79 0 7 07 z

S E C R E T 051436Z OCT 79 STAFF

TE BONN 05112

D PRIORITY DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

NTE: AJAJA CAT OMIC

EF: DIRECTOR 92611/19

1. AS SPECULATED IN REF, SARDAR J A F IS INDEED BROTHER OF SALAR. CAT OMIC/19 (CI/19) INFORMED TOKLER ON 4 OCT THAT SARDAR JAF WILL BE DEPARTING BAGHDAD 5 OCT, ALTHOUGH LATTER DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL BE COMING FIRST TO LONDON OR TO BONN. JAF WILL BE IN BONN ONLY FEW DAYS AND T/19 WILL BROKER MEETING BETWEEN JAF AND C/O AT THAT TIME. WILL USE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO EXTRACT WHAT INTELLIGENCE JAF MAY HAVE. WE MAY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI INVOLVEMENT WITH ANTI-KHOMEINI KURDS, GUN-RUNNING TO KURDS AND MILITANT KURDISH LEADERSHIP.

2. GIVEN RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED REF, WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF JAF. IF PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD, BASE PROPOSES TO UNDERWRITE JAF'S RETURN TO BONN ASAP FROM BAGHDAD. AT THAT TIME WE CAN BETTER ASSESS JAF'S ACCESS AND CAPABILITY AND WHERE WE WANT TO GO WITH HIM.

3. HQS: STUTTGART AND BONN RECEIVE LITTLE KURDISH TRAFFIC EXCEPT MILITARY. IT WOULD AID CONSIDERABLY IN HANDLING KURDISH CASES IF WE COULD BE INFO ADDEES ON RELEVENT KURDISH REPORTS, SO AS TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF REPORTING AND TO BRING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE UP TO SPEED.

4. SDTRIBE/1 C/O WILL BE MEETING WITH ASSET IN APPROXIMATELY THREE WEEKS. THERE GOOD CHANCE SDTRIBE/1 WILL HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF SARDAR JAF AND BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSESSMENT DATA.

5. FILE: 201-386414. RVW- 5 OCT 99 DRV D9CM.

S E C R E T







49

1 Nov 79 04 24Z

C R E T 3102122 NOV 79 INTEL

DIRECTOR 543732.

TEHRAN INFO BONN, GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, STUTTGART, AVIV, MOSCOW.

INTEL AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

A BONN 95221 (NOT SENT TEL AVIV)

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/19065-79 BASED ON REF FOR ISSEM PER FIELD DISSEM LINE.

TDFIRDE-315/13065-79
DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
COUNTRY: IRAN/IRAQ/USSR
SUBJECT: 1. ARMS OBTAINED BY KURDISH FACTION;
2. COMMENTS OF KURDISH TRIBAL LEADER ON OTHER COUNTRY SUPPORT TO THE KURDS (DOI: OCTOBER 1979)
SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG STANDING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. SOME OF HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. THE INFORMANT HAD GOOD ACCESS.

1. ONE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAFS, ARE CURRENTLY EMPLACED IN AN AREA EAST AND WEST OF KERMANSHAH. IN THIS AREA, THE TRIBE HAS 1,500 MEN. A NUMBER DELIBERATELY KEPT THIS LOW IN ORDER TO GET QUALITY FIGHTERS. THEIR ORIGINAL SUPPLY OF ARMS WAS OBTAINED BY TAKING A MILITARY COMPOUND NEAR KERMANSHAH IN LATE APRIL 1979. THEY OBTAINED FROM THE FORTRESS MORE THAN 1,000 GERMAN G-3'S, AS WELL AS 100 "LARGE" G-3'S, PRESUMABLY THE G-3 IN THE MACHINE GUN MODE; TWELVE U.S. MADE 60-MM MORTARS; TWO "SMALL" ARTILLERY PIECES; AND THREE TRUCK LOADS OF AMMUNITION. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER, THE GROUP RECEIVED AN ADDITIONAL 400 KALASHNIKOVS WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THIS GROUP OPERATES IN THE KERMANSHAH-SANANDAJ AREA TO THE WEST OF THIS AREA AND TO THE IRAQI BORDER - THE MARDASHT-BANEH AREA. THE KURDISH ELEMENTS ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

2. A LEADING MEMBER OF THE JAFS CLAIMS THAT NO ONE IS HELPING THE KURDS EXCEPT IRAQ, AND THAT IRAQ IS PROVIDING CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT. (SOURCE COMMENT: KURDS APPARENTLY HAVE UNLIMITED AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ IF THEY HAVE GOOD CREDENTIALS.) SYRIA HAS BEEN HELPING THE NORTHERN KURDS, THE SORRANI, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF JALAL T A L A B A N I. BUT THEIR AID HAS NOW DWINDLED. TALABANI WAS RECENTLY IN BAGHDAD LOOKING FOR ASSISTANCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS CONSIDERED AN UNUSUAL STEP AS TALABANI FOUGHT THE IRAQIS IN 1974-1975.) THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) IS ALSO RECEIVING SOME HELP FROM IRAQ, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEIR ARMS HAVE

EEN LOOTED FROM THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. EVEN ABDOL RAHMAN
A S E M L U, THE PRESENT LEADER OF THE KDP, HAS VISITED
AGHDAD SEVERAL TIMES.

3. THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING NOTHING TO HELP THE KURDS,
HOUGH THOUGH THEY COUID DO IT VERY EASILY ACROSS COMMON BORDERS,
AND EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THE KDP ARE BELIEVED BY THE KURDS TO
BE COMMUNISTS, OR AT LEAST LEFTISTS. THE GROUP THAT VISITED
THE SOVIET UNION TO ASK FOR ASSISTANCE HAD NOT RETURNED AS OF
16 OCTOBER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SEE IDFIHDB-315/16275-79
DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1979 FROM THE SAME SOURCE WHICH REPORTED ON
THE VISIT.) (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, KURDS
FROM MANY TRIBES HAVE SENT REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE VIA RELATIVES
IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT SOURCE SAID AS FAR AS HE KNEW, NONE
CLAIM TO HAVE RECEIVED AID AND HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING
WHICH WOULD INDICATE SUCH AID HAD BEEN GIVEN.

4. IRAQ, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COOPERATING IN EVERY WAY,
OPENING AND CLOSING THE BORDER FOR CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY, AS
WELL AS SUPPLYING MATERIAL AID. IN LATE AUGUST SADDAM HUSAYN
VISITED SULAYMANIYAH, THE KURDISH CAPITAL IN IRAQ, AND THE
SCALE OF HIS AID TO IRANIAN KURDS WAS SO WELL KNOWN AND BELIEVED
THAT HE WAS GREETED AS IF HE WERE A HERO. (SOURCE COMMENT:
WHILE ARMING THE IRANIAN KURDS MAY LEAD AGAIN TO A RESURGENCE
IN IRAQI KURDISH ACTIVITY, THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY WANTED TO
USE THE KURDS AGAINST K H O M E I N I IN IRAN. IRAQ SEEMED
TO BE USING THIS PERIOD OF COMMON PURPOSE TO EXPLORE WHETHER
IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FAVOR THE KURDS RATHER THAN FIGHTING
THEM.)

5. ACQ.: (12 OCTOBER 1979)

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL .

BEFORE CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINAT
AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW
30OCT99 DRV DOC.1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
BT
#4863



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R E T 1917552 OCT 79 STAFF

DOWN 35222

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

ART.

AJAXA CATOMIC

DOWN 35221

1. PURSUANT REF OPS INTEL CABLE, KEITH L. TOHLEN MET
TOMIC/19 (T/19) AND SARDAR J A F 10 OCTOBER 19 79 FOR
ES, WHICH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SORT OUT ALL OPS MATTER
MARIGOM TIME JAF AVAILABLE. NEXT MEETING SCHED
19 ON 24 OCTOBER.

TOHLENY ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS JAF WHILE EXTRAC ING INT
PRIMARILY BY ASKING HARD QUESTIONS. JAF CAME ACROSS
KEITH WITH STRONG IDEAS ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW AND IDN'T
DATES (WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON), VERY CAREFU WITH
ALTHOUGH HE PREPARED A FEW, HE WAS NOT SELLING HE
STOCKY MAN WITH ALMOST A DISTINGUI HED APPE ANCE,
GRAY HAIR AND AN AIR OF QUIET AUTHO ITY.
THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEETING PRIMARIL AS
T/19 WAS PREPARED TO BRING
CONVINCED. HE
NOT ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE, EVE FOR HIS
WHICH HAD SOME BASIS IN FAC BY T/19
THIS ISSUE TO CLOSURE THEIR RAISE IT. AN
TOLD THAT JAF HAD AGREED TO T E HIS FA
WITH HIM. THAT HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO
GOVERNMENT BOTHERED ONE WHAT IT WOU BE
THAT IT WAS GOING BE DANGEROUS. JAF AGRE
CONCERN AND THAT TOHLENY DIDN'T AVE TO W
K YOU JUST THE SAME. HE MAY CLEVER
MIGHT WANT TO TRADE AND DIDN'T ANT TO
WENT CAREFUL BE SEEING THAT IF INGS DI
HIS FAMILY IN HASSEKAH, TO PAS THE WOR



PAGE 2 BONN 85222 S E C R E T
THROUGH T/19 AND JAF WAS PLEASED.

2. JAF WILL BE BACK IN BONN, PERHAPS IN A WEEK [illegible]
EX-PREMIER BAKHTIYAR IN PARIS AND A DENTIST IN [illegible]
AS INTEL FROM THE BAKHTIYAR VISIT, THIS CAN PRO[illegible]
AINED THRU T/19, BUT IF EKS WANTS TO RECONSIDER [illegible]
L TO ZUMD SCHOOL COSTS IN BONN (AND WE SUPPORT [illegible]
LE MAKE ONE LAST
HE RETURNS IN A WEEK.

3. JAF IS VERY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SECURITY
WITH THE IRAQIS AND SAID THEY WOULD KILL HIM IN A MINUTE [illegible]
BE PROTECTED IN IRAQ AMERICANS ARE NOT [illegible]
AND REQUEST ANY INTEL FOR[illegible]
WE ALSO REQUEST THAT JAF BE REGISTERED WITH [illegible]

TOHLERNY (AS PLOY) TOLD JAF THAT REACTION NOT [illegible]
IRAQI BUT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN KURDS. ANY ANTI-[illegible]
U.S. OR ACTIONS AIMED WILL BE TAKEN [illegible]
THE SITUATION. IF HE WANTED TO [illegible]
E. THE DEEP WAS NOT TO [illegible]
SITUATION. IF HE ACCOMP[illegible]
HE SHOULD MAKE A [illegible]
AND THAT WE [illegible]
WOULD ALWAYS [illegible]
WHETHER HE WILL BE BACK [illegible]
AGAIN. ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE SHOULD BE BACK [illegible]
THREE MONTHS. TOHLERNY URGED JAF TO [illegible]

TOHLERNY'S [illegible]
KURDISH LEADER. HE [illegible]
THAT HE IS GATHERING INTELLIGENCE TO [illegible]
LEADERS, EXILED IRANIANS, AND TO THE IRAQI [illegible]
BASING BUT INDEPENDENT FASHION [illegible]
CONTINUE TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE [illegible]
[illegible]
WAR MUCH TO LOSE [illegible]
OF HIS KIND, HE TENDS TO [illegible]
U.S. MOST ULTIMATELY COME THROUGH IN SOME WAY. A BAITH [illegible]





E T 182056Z OCT 79 STAFF

REGTOR 535045.

ONN, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISLAMABAD.
D.

EL AJAJA SDFICKLE SDDAZE CATOMIC

BONN 85221

1. DURING CURRENT OR UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH CATOMIC/1
9) AND SDFICKLE/1 (F/1) WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFOR-
ION AVAILABLE SUPPORTING SDDAZE/1'S (F/1) RCT REPORT ON GOVERN-
T OF IRAQ (GOI) SUPPORT TO KURDS FIGHTING IRANIAN FORCES.
EOVER, WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION ANY OF ABOVE
ORCES CAN PROVIDE ON N A G H S H B A N D I FAMILY, REPUTEDLY
OMINENT KURDISH FAMILY LEADERS OF WHICH HAVE FLED TO IRAQ.
MILY REPORTEDLY HAD LONG HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH SHAH.

2. FILE 201-963160; 201-960951; 201-326414. RVW 10OCT99
DOC.1 ALL SECRET.
E C R E T
BT
7755

--SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

IRAN

FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER BAKHTIAR'S NASCENT EFFORTS TO RETURN TO POWER (DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1979)

E: A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG-STANDING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HE ATTENDED A MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED.

1. FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER SHAPHUR B A K H T I A R HAS BEEN HOLDING DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WITH INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF VARIOUS KURDISH FACTIONS, AS WELL AS WITH EXILED IRANIAN GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. BAKHTIAR HAS STRESSED TO THESE GROUPS THAT SHOULD HE RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN, HE WOULD FAVOR KURDISH AUTONOMY BUT NOT SEPARATION FROM IRAN. BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAS ENOUGH POLITICAL SUPPORTERS AND WILL SOON HAVE ENOUGH FINANCIAL AID TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME. HE FURTHER IMPLIED THAT HE HAS BEEN IN INDIRECT CONTACT WITH THE FORMER SHAH, BUT THAT HIS PAST LOYALTIES TO THE SHAH PLAY NO ROLE IN HIS PRESENT OR FUTURE PLANS VIS-A-VIS RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN.

2. BAKHTIAR HAS GIVEN HIS MORAL SUPPORT TO THE KURDS. AT KURDISH REQUEST, BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO AGREED TO ENLIST THE AID OF FORMER SAVAK OR IRANIAN ARMY OFFICERS TO GO TO KURDISTAN TO TRAIN KURDISH FIGHTING FORCES. BAKHTIAR HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KURDS FROM BOTH THE KERMANSHAH AND MAHABAD AREAS WHO WOULD LEAD THESE FORCES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. HE IS PLANNING TO DISPATCH IN MID OR LATE NOVEMBER AN EMISSARY TO IRAN TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL AND MILITARY LIAISON WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

3. IN ADDITION TO COMING TO TERMS WITH THE KURDS, BAKHTIAR REALIZES THAT HE MUST ESTABLISH RAPPORT WITH THE IRANIAN COMMUNISTS IF HE IS TO REGAIN AND RETAIN INFLUENCE IN IRAN.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: BAKHTIAR SPEAKS WITH CONFIDENCE ABOUT HIS EVENTUAL RETURN TO POWER, AND GIVES EVIDENCE OF



...ABLE TO ATTRACT A RAPIDLY INCREASING ENTOURAGE OF ...SIDENT IRANIAN ELEMENTS TO HIM.)

5. ACQ: (26 OCTOBER 1979)

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 29OCT99 DRV D9C. (BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.



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29/1128Z OCT 79/ INTEL

85773 ZNY XXXXX

CTOR/ INFO STUTTGART, GERMANY, BERLIN, TEHRAN,
ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

L AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL ZRWAHOO

TAS/ ZRWAHOO FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT, SOURCE CATOMIC IS
MACAGONE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED CAITEX/ FOR SOURCE
PROTECTION. SEE BONN 85772 (NOTAL) FOR DETAILS OF
ACQUISITION THAT DO NOT AFFECT DISSEM. OBJ: S-I.
NO LIAISON. NO INDEX. FILE: 201-0306414. EG-7851
RVW 29OCT99/ DOC.1 BY 055362.

FILED: 291128Z

3 Nov 79 07 12z

S E C R E T 021345Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE BONN 85912

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO STUTTGART, GERMANY, TEHRAN, PARIS, GENEVA

WHITEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: A. BONN 85797 3309324
B. DIRECTOR 543343

1. MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) HELD ON 31 OCTOBER; NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 8 NOVEMBER TO COINCIDE WITH T/19 RETURN FROM PARIS.

2. T/19 HAS TALKED BY TELEPHONE WITH BAKHTIAR AIDES IN PARIS. BAKHTIAR SLIPPED OUT OF PARIS DURING WEEK OF 29 OCTOBER AND TRAVELED TO IRAQ WHERE HE MET WITH HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI GOVERNMENT LEADERS. BAKHTIAR WAS EXPECTED BACK IN PARIS AT THE END OF THE WEEK, AND T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO COME TO PARIS FOR A 4 NOVEMBER MEETING WITH HIM.

3. T/19 ALSO MET IN BONN WITH GLOBAL AIRWAYS REPRESENTATIVE JAMES SALINAS DESCRIBED REFS A AND B. DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON GLOBAL GUN-RUNNING CAPABILITIES. SALINAS WAS VERY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE KURDS FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES. THIS IS IN LINE WITH T/19 UNDERSTANDING THAT AN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY, PROBABLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY WEAPONRY TO THE KURDS, BUT THAT THE KURDS MUST ENLIST THEIR OWN MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR THE ARMS.

4. T/19 DISCUSSED RUMORS CONCERNING PRO-SHAH DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE IN IRAN BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE DETAIL OR RELIABLE SOURCING.

5. FILE: 201-306414. RVW 02 NOV 99 DRV D9C1.

CDS COMMENT: RELAYED TO INFO TEHRAN, PARIS, GENEVA PER DIR 545680
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3 Nov 79 7 202

E C R E T WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 232058Z NOV 79 INTEL

TE DIRECTOR 545700.

TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON, GENEVA, BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY.

NTEL AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

BONN 85912 (BEING RELAYED PARIS, GENEVA
~~(NOT SENT/NEEDED LONDON)~~

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/19334-79 BASED ON REF FOR DISSEM
FIELD DISSEM LINE. FOR LONDON: OKAY FOR GEOGRAPH SOURCED
N UNTESTED SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION.



3 Nov 79 07 23z

S E C R E T 030035Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 545686.

TO: PRIORITY BONN, GENEVA INFO PARIS, STUTTGART, GERMANY, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSTAT CATOMIC

REFS: A. BONN 85912 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA, PARIS, TEHRAN)
B. DIRECTOR 536378 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY, TEHRAN)

1. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ANY SUPPORTING DETAIL CATOMIC/19 (C/19) (IDEN FOR GENEVA, PARIS) CAN PROVIDE ON REF REPORT OF BAKHTIAR'S TRAVEL TO IRAQ. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHO HE MET, SUBJECT THEIR DISCUSSIONS, NATURE/RESULTS ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED AND IN ACTIONS TAKEN RESULTING FROM SUCH MEETINGS. PLS PREPARE ANY SUCH INFORMATION IN INTEL FORMAT TO FACILITATE MORE RAPID DISSEMINATION.

2. FOR GENEVA: REF A MAKES REF B PROPOSED CONTACT WITH SDSTAT/1 (S/1) (IDEN FOR BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY) OF MORE PRESSING IMPORTANCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUNION ATTEMPTING CONTACT S/1 AT HIS EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEMPT DETERMINE RESULTS BAKHTIAR'S IRAQI TRIP AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION ON CURRENT BAKHTIAR ACTIVITIES. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. FOR BONN: WE ALSO INTERESTED IN DETAILS C/19 CONTACT WITH GUN-SHIPPERS AND C/19'S ROLE IN ALL OF THIS. WHERE DOES C/19 GET UNDERSTANDING THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY HAS AGREED SUPPLY WEAPONS TO KURDS, WHO IS ARRANGING FOR SUCH SUPPLY, HOW WILL THEY BE SHIPPED PRIOR TO TURNOVER TO ANY CHARTER OUTFIT C/19 PROVIDES?

4. FILE: 201-0306414; 201-0212149. RVW 2NOV99 DRV D9C.1
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#8469

1

CATOMIC/19. Name unknown. Resides in Berlin. May be a teacher. Regards himself as a principal leader of the Kurdish community in Europe. Comes from prominent Kurdish family (family may have branches in both Iran and Iraq). Was in Europe well before the Revolution, and it is possible that his family had been in opposition to the Shah, and that he was in effect in exile.

Purpose of contact: To acquire information on the situation in Kurdistan. C/19 was to debrief or introduce to us people with firsthand knowledge of developments in Kurdistan. Believe it was he who introduced a Kurdish leader who was traveling in Europe in September or October. Name not recalled, but believe he is brother of Kurdish leader who was executed after the Revolution, probably in March. There were one or two meetings, during which he claimed to have Iraqi support for his Kurdish force near Kermanshah.

JUN 79 02 5z

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ITE DIRECTOR 449193.

O: TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS AN ELES.

NINTEL AJAJA FORRES SD RA SIT

EF: DIRECTOR 449149

1. IDEN A IS H A OUN ROWSHA
IDEN B IS A IR ROWSHAI
IDEN C IS HA SA ROWSAHI

2. FILE: 201-9 10 5. RVW 31 MAY 9 DRV 09C-1 ALL SECRET

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
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THE SURVEY DEPART
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E C R E T 191800Z JUN 70 STAFF

TE FR/LOS ANGELES 23553 (HAGERUP, CTING)

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

NTEL AJAJA FORBES SDTRANS T

F: DIRECTOR 488103

1. IN CONTACT WITH SDTRANSSIF/1 (T/1) 18 JUNE HE ADVISED BAS
BUYING GIFTS TO TAKE TO FAMILY IN TEHRAN AND IN PROCESS OF
LING CAR. HE IS DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE ONLY BECAUSE HE
ING FOR AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON AS TO WHETHER
NOT HE WILL BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE. IF
ISED THAT THERE IS INTEREST, HE AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING AND/O
DANCE AND DEBRIEFINGS FOR PERIOD REQUIRED.

2. AS REQUESTED BY BASE IN TELCON WITH T/1 ON 15 JUNE, HE
EPHONED HIS BROTHER IN ABADAN ON 17 JUNE. HE HAD ALSO TALKED
HIS FAMILY IN TEHRAN OVER WEEKEND. BROTHER SAID THAT T/1
ER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOULD NOT ANTICIPATE BEING HIRED
OFFERED POSITION IN NIOC PRIOR TO ARRIVING IN COUNTRY AND
TIONED THIS OUT OF QUESTION FOR ANY EMPLOYEE AT ANY LEVEL
THOSE PREVIOUSLY SENT BY NIOC FOR TRAINING ABROAD COULD
HE SURE THEY HAD JOB ON RETURN. BROTHER EXPLAINED THAT THE
IN AUTHORITY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY BUT ADDED HOWEV
T/1'S CHANCES FOR EMPLOYMENT WERE VERY GOOD NOW FOLLOWING
ONS: T/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR ABADAN REFINERY AND IN
F HE RETURNING TO REQUEST REEMPLOYMENT IN SAME CAPACITY
NIZATION. T/1 BROTHER HIMSELF HAD BEEN MEMBER AND ACTIVE
RGANIZING THE PRO-REVOLUTIONARY, PRO-KHOMEINI COMMITTEE OF
RIGINAL ELEVEN PERSONS AT THE ABADAN REFINERY WERE [illegible]
STILL IN PARIS. T/1 BROTHER, AN OFFICIAL IN THE DEPARTMENT
ROCESSING, PLANNING AND ENGINEERING AT THE ABADAN REFINERY,
HE WOULD ASSIST T/1 IN GETTING NIOC EMPLOYMENT THROUGH HIS
NDS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. ALSO, AS AN OFFICIAL O
BROTHER RECOMMENDED THAT T/1 APPROACH HASSAN NAZIH
IOC AND SAID HE WOULD PREPARE A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION IF
WERE NEEDED.



2 FR/LOS ANGELES 20533 [illegible]

3. IN CONVERSATION WITH [illegible] FAMILY [illegible] T/1 [illegible]
ISED HIS FATHER, A RETIRED GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OF THE
ISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION, HAS ABLE TO JUST THE INTELLIGENCE OF
AT SHAHEDESTANI THE LATTER, A FRIEND OF [illegible]
VIOUSLY SERVED AS GOVERNOR OF KORASAN, GOVERNOR OF [illegible]
ISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN. PER T/1 SHA
SHESTANI HAD RESIGNED AS GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN ABOUT A YEAR AGO
WAS APPROACHED BY KHOMEINI TO REASSUME THIS POSITION. HIS
S SUGGESTION MET WITH CRITICISM AMONGST CERTAIN OF THE
OLUTIONARY COMMITTEE MEMBERS, THE ASSIGNMENT WAS DROPPED; SU
HESTANI REMAINS A FRIEND AND OCCASIONAL CONFIDANT OF
MEINI. THE FAMILY ALSO HAS A RELATIONSHIP WITH ENT (POSSIBL
GARAN) Z A G A R A N, THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN QOM, WHO IS ALSO
ONG-TIME CONFIDANT AND FRIEND OF KHOMEINI. T/1 AND HIS
ILY TALKED OF ARRANGING A PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH KHOMEINI
M/1 ON HIS RETURN REGARDING HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK EMPLOYM
T. T/1 WAS ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS INTERVIEW IS
SIBLE DUE TO HIS FAMILY CONNECTIONS. HIS EXPERIENCE IN ABADAN,
OBVIOUS INTELLECT AND HIS EDUCATION IN PETROLEUM ENGINEERING
PARENTS CLAIMED KHOMEINI AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAVE OFTEN
D THEY WERE ACTIVELY SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF THE YOUNG,
UCATED IRANIANS WHO COULD BE TRUSTED AND ARE ANXIOUS TO
URN TO WORK IN IRAN.

4. BASE CONSIDERS IT VERY MUCH ESSENTIAL THAT T/1 RECEIVE
ME TRAINING PRIOR HIS RETURN TO IRAN. HE SHOULD NOT SIMPLY
GIVEN SOME FORM OF COMMO WITH WHICH TO ADVISE REACTION
EN HE HAS SECURED A JOB AS STATED REF. BASE ENCOURAGES HQS
REVIEW THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES ON A PRIORITY BASIS, FOR T/1
ST CERTAINLY CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONTINUE TO DELAY HIS
PARTURE WITHOUT SOME SORT OF ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THERE IS FIRM
TEREST IN HIM. HE IS AVAILABLE TO STAY FOR TRAINING AS LONG
QUIRED, BUT CONTINUES ANXIOUS TO BE ON HIS WAY.

5. FILE: 201-0961045. WW 19JUN99 DRV DSC.1. ALL SECRET.
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

-521

E 2 DIRECTOR 461826 S E C R E T
[illegible]AL AS AGENT. SHORTAGE OF INSTRUCTORS IS PROBLEM WHICH
[illegible]ING TRAINING OF MANY NEWLY RECRUITED ASSETS.)
[illegible]

5. SUGGEST BASIS ON TRADECRAFT TRAINING SHOULD BE OPSEC
[illegible]ONAL SECURITY IN MAKING PERSONAL MEETINGS, ESPECIALLY CAR
[illegible]PS SINCE THESE MOST COMMON FORM OF AGENT MEETING CONDUCTED
[illegible]HERAN GIVEN PRESENT CLIMATE. HE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF
[illegible]ULAR AND ALTERNATE COMMO PROCEDURES, BUT ALSO IN OPEN COIN
[illegible]PHONE MESSAGES TO TRIGGER UNSCHEDULED MEETINGS. IN VIEW OF
[illegible]LIHOOD HIS BEING LOCATED IN ABADAN, THIS ASPECT MAY BE PAR-
[illegible]ULARLY PERTINENT. ADDITIONALLY SUGGEST THAT THEORETICAL AND
[illegible]CTICAL TRAINING IN SURVEILLANCE AND SURVEILLANCE DETECTION
[illegible]OBILE AND FOOT) BE PROVIDED, AS WELL AS SIGNALS AND DROPS.

6. PROPOSE THAT A FIRST MEETING WITH TEHRAN STATION OF-
[illegible]CER BE SET UP SO T/1 CAN MAKE CONTACT AS SOON AFTER HE GETS
[illegible]TABLISHED IN NEW JOB AS POSSIBLE. SUGGEST T/1 TRIGGER THIS
[illegible]ING WITH APPROPRIATE OPEN CODE SIGNAL. SOLICIT ADDITIONAL
[illegible]S VIEWS ON HOW TO BEST TAILOR A COMMO PLAN FOR T/1.

7. FOR TEHRAN: PLS PROVIDE FR/LOS ANGELES WITH TEHRAN
[illegible]AR PICK UP SITE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE, AND ANY OTHER PERTINENT
[illegible]GGESTIONS.

8. FILE: 201-9610[illegible]45. RVW 20JUN99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

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S E C R E T 211240Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 163506 (BIELINSKI ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/LOS ANGELES INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WWINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 461326
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 205 3

1. CAR PICK UP SITE FOR SDTRANS T/I:

2. GENERAL AREA: WITHIN THE GENERALLY TRIANGULAR AREA FORMED BY ABBASABAD STREET ON THE SOUTH, BOKHAREST STREET ON THE WEST AND AN UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTINE SQUARE AND SHAHANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE SQUARE AT NORTH APEX OF TRIANGLE.

3. SPECIFIC AREA: PROCEEDING NORTH ON BOKHAREST STREET FROM ABBASABAD STREET TOWARD ARGENTINE SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (AFTER CROSSING THROUGH THE ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION) ON THE RIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET. OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS SEVENTH STREET. EIGHTH STREET RUNS BETWEEN BOKHAREST AND THE UNNAMED STREET CITED IN PARA ONE, BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF THE UNNAMED STREET AND SHAHANSHANI FREEWAY. SDTRANSIT/I SHOULD STAND NEAR THE EAST END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS STREETS IN PROCESS OF BEING RENAMED T/I SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET BEING THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF THE INTERSECTION OF BOKHAREST AND ABBASABAD.

4. BELIEVE T/I SHOULD BE ISSUED STATION OPS PHONE NUMBER (838-899 RPT 838-899) FOR OPEN CODE CALL-IN TO TRIGGER MEETINGS. AS HIS VISITS TO TEHRAN LIKELY TO BE INTERMITTANT, SUGGEST THAT HE OFFER CASE OFFICER MEANS TO RETURN CALL AND THROUGH OPEN CODE ESTABLISH TIME/DATE FOR MEETING. POSSIBLE HE CAN BE NEAR TELEPHONE AT RELATIVE IN TEHRAN AT CERTAIN TIME FOR CASE OFFICER'S CALL.

5. FILE: 201-961045. RYBAT 21 JUN 79 DRV DSC.I. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

7 Jul 79 02 58Z

S C R E T 062015Z JUL 79 STAFF

TE FR/LOS ANGELES 20581 (HAGERUP ACTING)

PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, ATHTECH,

INTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORREL AQUAT C SDTRANSIT

REFS: A. DIRTECH 53270
B. DIRECTOR 469805
C. FR/LOS ANGELES 20577
D. TEHRAN 53306

1. ON 6 JULY SDTRANSIT/1 (E/) MET WITH HAGERUP FOR NEXT
LAST TIME IN LOS ANGELES (FINAL MEETING 1500, 9 JULY). HE
AS COMPLETED ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO DEPART, WITH EXCEPTION OF
ACKING SOME BOOKS WHICH HE LEAVING WITH FRIEND TO SEND TO H
ATER. HE HAS NOT YET SOLD CAR, BUT HE AND PURCHASER WERE C
ANT LATER IN AFTERNOON SAME DAY. HE WAS ADVISED OF REF B
ND DEMONSTRATED SURPRISE THAT ENTEZAM NO LONGER IN DEPUTY
MINIM POSITION. HE SAID OTHER ASSIST TO REPLACE ENTEZAM WO
FAMILY FRIEND (HASSAN) S A R A G H I A N, ELDERLY SPOKESM
R THE PRINCE. RE BROTHER WHO MADE THE APPOINTMENTS, HE WA
TING ON BEHALF OF FAMILY AND NOT ON HIS OWN. T/1 SAID HE
T HAVE SPECIAL ACCESS BUT TIES OF BROTHER WHO WAS KILLED I
NT AND ACTIVE IN TAKING CARE OF FAMILY REQUESTS. INTERES
T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS, CONTACT AND FRIENDS WAS PUT OFF UNT
T/1 ACTUALLY IN CONTACT WITH STATION.

2. RE SW: HAGERUP HAD RECEIVED FINAL TEST LETTER FROM
DIRTECH OFFICER FLOAR BY EXPRESS MAIL ON 4 JULY. T/1 DEPART
IN CAR WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. HE MUCH ASSURED BASE WHITE M
MESSAGE CAME CLEAR. BASE APPRECIATES THIS ADDED ASSISTANCE
INDICATORS CITED PARA 4 REF A WERE REVIEWED. A SINGLE
ADDITION WAS ADDED ONLY FOR USE IN COVERT TEXT. THIS WOULD
BE IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT T/1 WOULD BE FORCED UNDER DURESS
WRITE A/A ADDRESS. LETTER WOULD INCLUDE: DON'T SEND TRANS
AS I NO LONGER PLAN TO RETURN TO SCHOOL. IDEN US A/A AND
FOR USE BY T/1 IN EVENT HE WRITES TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.
3. ON TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION: TELEPHONE NUMBER CITED

PAGE 2 FR/LOS ANGELES 20581 S E C R E T
4. REF D WAS GIVEN T/1 FOR ALTERNATE CONTACT WITH STATION.
THIS POSSIBLE CONTACT SYSTEM IF T/1 CALLS HE WILL WILL SAY
THIS IS MIKE, CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES? WHEN "CHARLES" COM
PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE AMENITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHO
GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL
CAR PICKUP SITE AS STIPULATED IN REF D. ANY OTHER PLACE M
TIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREG
OR IF INCLUDED IT IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE
DATE/TIME OF MEETING CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND
OUT ON PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE/TIME WILL BE
DAYS AND 2 HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON; I.E., IF IT AGR
MONDAY NIGHT AT TEN P.M. (2200 HOURS), THE CAR PICKUP WOULD
SATURDAY NIGHT AT EIGHT P.M. (2000 HOURS). T/1 HAS MEMORIZ
THIS SIMPLE 2/2 SYSTEM. IN THE EVENT STATION WANTS TO TELE
T/1, IT WILL HAVE TO BE ARRANGED PRIOR TO CALL. THE TIME O
THE CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME 2/2 SYSTEM. IF T/1 IS ADVIS
THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WI
ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED.
NUMBER TO CALL IS IDEN I AND CALLER SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN C.
IT WOULD BE BEST IF CALL WAS MADE IN FLUENT FARSI.

4. RE CAR PICKUP: T/1 REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY OF HIS C
PICKUP BE 20 JULY REPEAT 20 JULY AT 2200 HOURS WITH
ALTERNATE OF 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOT MADE, HE WILL
REVERT TO 1ST AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH, USING WESTE
CALENDAR. THIS WILL BE TO SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING
2100 AND 2200 HOURS. HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TE
MINUTES. T/1 WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE IN LEFT HAND SMALL SHOPPI
BAG, IN RIGHT HAND HE WILL HAVE NEWSPAPER. HE WILL BE DRESS
IN BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATER AND BLUE JEANS. (THERE WAS RE-
CENTLY DEATH IN FAMILY JUSTIFYING THIS DRESS.) HE WILL WEAR
HEAVY HORN-RIMMED GLASSES WITH CLEAR GLASS. HE WILL APPROACH
CAR PICKUP SITE FROM ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION.
HE KNEW OF LOCATION AND SAID HE WOULD DRIVE HIS BROTHER'S CAR
THE NEIGHBORHOOD PRIOR TO MEETING TO MAKE SURE HE HAD LOCATION
WELL IN MIND.

5. T/1 IS PRECISE AND INTELLIGENT; HE ASSUMES INSTRUCTION
WITHOUT QUESTION AND REPEATS BACK WELL GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY GI
VEN. HE WANTS EARLY CONTACT SO AS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIB



R 3 FR/LOS ANGELES 2058 S E C R E T
DOES NOT QUESTION HIS OWN ABILITY OR OTHER ASPECTS OF OPER
NS. BASE WILL HAVE FINAL MEETING AND ADVISE ADDEES IF EVE
OMMEND FURTHER REPORTING BY BASE. HE HAS TICKETS FOR 1000
RS, 10 JULY. GOOD LUCK.

6. FILE: 201-0961045 WW 06JUL99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
C R E T
ET
074

7 Jun [illegible]

E C R E T 062100Z JUL 79 STAFF

TE FR/LOS ANGELES 29582 (HAGERUP ACTING)

: PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, ATHTECH,

INTEL RIBAT AJAJA PARRE: AQUAT C SDTRANSIT

FS: FR/LOS ANGELES 2054 1

1. IDEN A: PROFESSOR ROBERT M. CARTER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TYLER BUILDING, 3601 FI STREET, LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90007.

IDEN B: 557-705 REPEAT 557-705.

IDEN C: HOMA TOUN

2. FILE: 201-09 104 . RVW 06JUL99 DRV DOC 1, ALL SECR
E C R E T
BT
9075



S E C R E T [illegible] JUL 79 [illegible]

CITE PRFLOS ANGELES 2858[illegible] ACTING)

[illegible] FROM: TEHRAN INFO D[illegible]

[illegible] FROM: MANJA FORREST, S[illegible]

[illegible] A. PRFLOS ANGELES 2[illegible]
B. PRFLOS ANGELES 2[illegible]

[illegible] BRIEF MEET WITH SO[illegible]SIT/I (T/I) ON 9 JULY
[illegible] ADVISING THAT HE [illegible]OT DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
[illegible] ALL MEETING ARR[illegible]MENTS REMAIN THE SAME.
[illegible] BERAY WAS CALL FR[illegible] OF T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
[illegible] FATHER HAS JUST [illegible]IVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
[illegible] FOU S H A H E[illegible] I A N I WAS RECENTLY
[illegible] THE PRESENT SOVER[illegible]HEN HE BECAME 55. THIS
[illegible] OF THREE COUSINS, [illegible]ER WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
[illegible] MINISTER OF TRA[illegible]ATION AND OTHER POSITIONS
[illegible] PARA 3 REF B[illegible] T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY TH
[illegible] SUNWAY PATROL. [illegible]INFORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIE
[illegible] CHIEF OF POLIC[illegible]ON ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3
[illegible] OF T/I FAMILY [illegible] T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
[illegible] NA[illegible]ED TO POSTPONE DE[illegible]TURE UNTIL NEXT IRAN AIR
[illegible] WILL HAVE OPPORTUNI[illegible]TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
[illegible] RECOMMENDATION FROM [illegible]REST ANI TO THE POLICE CHIEF

[illegible] ON [illegible]TCHLER [illegible] HIS FIRST CAR PICKUP
[illegible] WILL BE AT SITE.

[illegible] 001-80418[illegible]. RVW [illegible]99 DRV D9[illegible]. ALL SECRET.

13 JUL 79 04 30Z

FM ET 222427Z JUL 79 STATE

DIRECTOR 474398. SECTION 1 OF 2.

COMMODORE FR/LOS ANGELES AFPO SECONITH TEHRAN.

SECRETARY'S EYES ONLY FOR HOLBROOKE FROM VANCE

REF: A) 20589

1. THERE IS HIGH DEGREE OF INTEREST IN WEATEVER INFORMATION SHAHRESTANI MAY HAVE ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, WE WOULD LIKE HIM TO DEBRIEF SHAHRESTANI ALONG LINES OF REQUIREMENTS WHICH PROVIDED BELOW. T/1 HIMSELF SHOULD KEEP REQUIREMENTS IN MIND, PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNING QOM SINCE HE WILL BE IN A POSITION TO ANSWER THEM AFTER HIS PLANNED VISIT TO [illegible] (MENTIONED IN REF).

2. FOR TEHRAN: IF FR/LOS ANGELES UNABLE ACCOMMODATE BRZEZINSKI IN VIEW OF FACT T/1 ON VERGE OF DEPARTURE FROM U.S., REQUEST YOU DEBRIEF T/A ON HIS MEETING WITH GEN. SHAHRESTANI AFTER REESTABLISHING CONTACT IN TEHRAN.

3. REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MILITARY

A. ACCORDING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS, THE POOI TRIED TO FIRE GENERAL AZIZOLLAH RAHIMI, THE OUTSPOKEN COMMANDER OF THE GENDARMERIE (MILITARY POLICE), BUT WAS OVERRIDDEN BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, CAUSING CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. BOTH DEFENSE MINISTER RIAHI AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF FARROOD HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL OBEY KHOMEINI'S ORDER. WOULD APPRECIATE SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON RAHIMI AFFAIR. IS RAHIMI TRYING TO PUT HIMSELF INTO POSITION TO TAKE RIAHI'S OR FARROOD'S PLACE? HOW MUCH SUPPORT DOES RAHIMI HAVE WITHIN THE MILITARY?

B. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE HOMAFAR GROUPS? ARE THEY ALLIED WITH THE MUJAHEDDIN-E KHALQ? ARE THEY MOVING AWAY FROM SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI?



DIRECTOR 47998 S E C R E T

C. COMMITTEES WITHIN THE MILITARY: IS THERE A COMMAND
URE OR HIERARCHY? DO THEY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER?
E THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES? ARE THEY NOMINATED OR
TED BY SOMEONE OR SOME GROUP? ANY SIGNIFICANT LEADERS
NG? COMMENTS ON MADANI RELATIVE TO THE COMMITTEES?
ONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMITTEES?

D. WHO CONTROLS ACCESS TO ARMS? ARE MILITARY UNITS IN
N ARMED? PLANS TO REBUILD THE MILITARY? STATUS OF U.S.-
IED EQUIPMENT?

E. ARE MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINING REVOLUTIONARY
OS?

ESTAN

F. COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT PIPELINE SITUATION: DOES
RCE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT LABOR TROUBLE IN THE OIL FIELDS?
THING ABOUT THE ARAB PROTESTS IN KHUZESTAN?

C. ARE THE IRAQIS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE TROUBLES
KHUZESTAN?

B. DOES HE HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
E QASHQAI?

OMMITTEES

I. DO COMMITTEE LEADERS HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO KHOMEINI
OR DO THEY HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE TEHRAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE?
OR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL?

J. IS THERE A GATHERING MOMENTUM AWAY FROM THE
COMMITTEES TOWARD TRUE POLICE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS? CAN SOURCES
DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF SOME OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES
AND OTHERS WHICH NOW SEEM TO BE FREQUENTLY REPORTED FROM
PROVINCIAL CITIES?

QOM

K. DESCRIBE THE ORGANIZATION OF KHOMEINI'S HEADQUARTERS.
IS HIS HEADQUARTERS ACTUALLY LOCATED AT THE FAIZIEH SCHOOL? OR
DOES HE USE OTHER BUILDINGS? HOW ARE THE GUARDS ORGANIZED? ARE
THEY TRAINED? BY WHOM? WHO ARE THEY? IS THERE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF SOME KIND? WHO RUNS IT?



DIRECTOR 47828 S E C R E T
1. GIVE ALL DETAILS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY
KHOMEINI. WHO IS WITH HIM MOST OFTEN? ARE ANY OF THE
HIS RECENTLY WITH HIM, AND IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE ANY
S ABOUT THEM AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI: HIS SON
HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW ESHRAQI, BEHESHTI, BANISADR, KHALKHALI,
MATAHARI, MONTAZERI. WHAT IS KHALKHALI ITS LEADER? WHAT ARE
THE FEDAIYEN-E ISLAM? IS KHALKHALI IN? HOW MANY MEMBERS DOES IT HAVE?
OALS OF THE FEDAIYEN-E ISLAM? HOW MANY MEMBERS DOES IT HAVE?
M. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI,
AT-MADARI, GOLPAYGANI, AND MARASHI-NAJAFI. DO EACH OF THESE
ALATOLLAHS HAVE HEADQUARTERS? DO THEY HAVE GUARDS OF THEIR
IS THERE HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS?
HARGE ARE THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS?
K. IS THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL LOCATED IN
KAN OR IN QOM? WHO IS ON IT? HOW OFTEN DOES IT MEET? DOES
THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AGREE TO SEE IN SMALL MEETINGS?
Q. WHO DOES KHOMEINI AGREE TO SEE IN SMALL MEETINGS?
DO PEOPLE ARRANGE TO GET ACCESS TO KHOMEINI? WHAT SORT OF
INION DOES ONE HAVE TO BE IN TO SEE HIM?
P. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH?
Q. WHO WOULD BE A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI IF HE
F. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH?
Q. WHO WOULD BE A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI IF HE
ANY SPECULATION ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN QOM? HOW
PRINCIPAL ACTORS MIGHT BE?
R. IS THERE A REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS POST IN QOM? HOW
MANY OF THEM ARE THERE? ARE THEY TRAINED? BY WHOM?
S. THE IRAQI-UNIFORMED GUARDS WITH RAHIMI ARE SUPPOSED
TO HAVE SOME KIND OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMEINI. WHO ARE
THEIR WHO TRAINED THEM? HOW MANY ARE THERE? WHO ARE THEY
LOYAL TO?
T. WHAT IS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN QOM? HOW
ACCESSIBLE IS IT TO FOREIGNERS? ARE THE POLICE RESPONSIBLE FOR
SECURITY IN QOM, THE MUJAHEDIN, OR THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS?
WHAT IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OTHER?
U. WHAT SORT OF INCIDENTS INVOLVE TERRORISTS? WHO ARE
THEY? WHAT SORT OF SENTENCES DO THEY RECEIVE WHEN THEY ARE
ARRESTED? IS THERE FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WITH OR SUPPORT TO THE
TERRORISTS?
4. ANY ABOVE PROVES HELPFUL. REALIZE SOURCE WILL NOT BE
AWLA SERVICE ALL ABOVE. HOWEVER, HE SHOULD KEEP THEM IN MIND FOR
FUTURE.
BT
#0653



S E C R E T 2516502 JUL 79 STAFF 28 Jun 79 UR [illegible] Z

CITE DIRECTOR 482379.

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

E
INTEL AJAJA FORREX SDTRANSIT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 053765
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 28981
C. TEHRAN 053868

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED ES SDTRANSIT/1. FOLLOWING WAS CONTACT PLANS:

A. TELEPHONE COMMO: S/A WILL CALL STATION OPS [illegible] 830300 EST 830306 AND WILL SAY HI, THIS IS MIKE, CAR I [illegible] CHARLIES. WHEN CHARLIES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL IDENTIFY [illegible] AND THEN MENTION THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER FOR [illegible] PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PICKUP SITE LISTED BELOW. PLACE MENTIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS EXAMINED AS [illegible] RECAMPED DECAUSE IF INCORRECTED IS ONLY FOR CONFIRMATION [illegible] THE DATE/TIME CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND [illegible] THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE EARLIEST TIME WILL BE [illegible] AND TWO HOURS FROM NO TIME AGREED UPON IE: IF IT [illegible] MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200, THE CAR PICKUP WOULD BE EARLIEST [illegible] 2000 HOURS. IN EVENT STATION SHOULD WANT TO CALL S/A [illegible] HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY EW OR BE PERSONAL [illegible] OF CALL WILL BE MADE ON SAME TWO/TWO LISTED [illegible] THAT HE WILL BE CALLED. DATE AND TIME MUST BE [illegible] ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS RESIDENCE HOUSE AT TIME CALL [illegible] NUMBER TO CALL IS 1000 AND CALLER SHOULD ASK FOR [illegible] WHAT IF CALL MADE AT PARTI.

B. CAR PICKUP: C/S HAD REQUESTED [illegible] CAR PICKUP ON 20 JUNE AT 2200 HOURS. IF MEET [illegible] AND LEFT OR MADE NO MAKE IN WILL [illegible] WELL BE SAME CAR PICKUP WITH ALWAYS USING [illegible] IN WILL WANT AN HIS FOR MAKE/FROM OF THE [illegible]

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 482379 S E C R E T
ATTEMPT TO HAVE IN LEFT HAND SMALL SHOPPING BAG AND IN RIGHT HAN
A NEWSPAPER. HE WILL BE DRESSED IN BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATE
AND BLUE JEANS. HE WILL WEAR HEAVY HORN RIMMED GLASSES WITH
CLEAR GLASS. HE WILL APPROACH CAR PICKUP SITE FROM ABBASABAD/
BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION. HE HAD SAID HE KNEW OF LOCATIO
AND SAID HE WOULD DRIVE BROTHER'S CAR IN NEIGHBORHOOD PRIOR TO
MEETING TO MAKE SURE HE HAD LOCATION WELL IN MIND. THE ENTIRE
AREA OF THE SITE IS WITHIN THE TRIANGULAR AREA FORMED BY ABBAS-
ABAD STREET ON THE SOUTH, BOKHAREST STREET ON THE WEST, AND AN
UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTINE
SQUARE AND THE SHAHANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE
SQUARE AT THE NORTH APEX OF TRIANGLE. SPECIFIC AREA: PROCEEDING
NORTH ON BOKHAREST STREET FROM ABBASABAD STREET TOWARD ARGENTINE
SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (WALTER
CROSSING THROUGH ABBASABAD/BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION) ON THE
RIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET. OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS SEVENTH
STREET. EIGHTH STREET RUNS BETWEEN BOKHAREST STREET AND UNNAMED
STREET ABOVE, BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF UNNAMED
STREET AND SHAHANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY. T/1 SHOULD STAND NEAR THE
EAST END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS
STREETS ARE BEING RENAMED SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET BEING
FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF INTERSECTION
OF BOKHAREST AND ABBASABAD.

2. IF NEWS AND OTHER MATERIAL RELATING SDTRANSIT/ HAVE
BEEN DESTROYED, ADVISE AND WE WILL FORWARD.

3. FILE: 201-961045. RFW 25JUL89 DRV DSC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#0716


MIRABAD

26 Jul 79 13 35Z

S E C R E T 252205Z JUL 79 INTEL

CITE DIRECTOR 482711.

TO: TEHRAN INFO NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KARACHI, KABUL, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KUWAIT, FR/LOS ANGELES, RIYADH.

WNINTEL INTEL
FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 FOR DISSEM PER PARA FOUR.

TDFIRDB-315/13141-79
DIST: 25 JULY 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS SECRET WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON
COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: STATUS OF IRANIAN POLICE FORCES AS OF LATE SPRING 1979 (DOI: MAY-JULY 1979)
SOURCE : A WELL-EDUCATED IRANIAN SOURCE WITH AN INTEREST IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS.

1. THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (INP) CONTINUES TO BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AND TO FUNCTION AS AN EFFECTIVE POLICE FORCE. LARGELY SUPPLANTED BY THE PASDARANS (REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS), THE MORALE OF THE POLICE FORCES HAS SUNK TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE EBB: THEY ARE UNARMED; MOST OF THE LOWER RANKS PAY NO ATTENTION TO THEIR OFFICERS; THEY DO NOT WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS; AND THEIR APPEARANCE IS GENERALLY SLOVENLY. PUBLIC ORDER IN THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO BE MAINTAINED BY THE PASDARANS, WHO COULD FORM A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE THE MINUTE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I GAVE THE WORD. EVEN IF THE INP WERE AGAIN GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER, IN THEIR PRESENT CONDITION THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO DO SO.

2. THE CURRENT COMMANDER OF THE INP IS A LIEUTENANT COLONEL NASER M O J A L A L I, WHO IS FORMALLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE INTERIOR MINISTER. HE RECEIVES AT LEAST SOME GUIDANCE FROM QOM ON ACTIVITIES OF THE INP. THE COURT SYSTEM STILL DOES NOT FUNCTION PROPERLY AND IF THE POLICE DO BECOME INVOLVED IN APPREHENDING A SERIOUS CRIMINAL, THE CRIMINAL IS STILL TURNED OVER TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, RATHER THAN THE GOVERNMENT COURT SYSTEM.

3. ACQ: (20 JULY 1979)

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KARACHI, KABUL, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KUWAIT.
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 25JUL99 DRV D9C.1 BY RECORDED REPORTINGOFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
BT
#1326





2 TEHRAN 53827 S E C R E T
Y, 30 JULY. T/I'S FAMILY HAD KNOWN FOR 2- ARS THAT
UD WAS A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN (CHARIKS), DID NOT KNOW
HING SPECIFIC ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES. THEY D OT KNOW EXACT
E DIED, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT BELIEVE A VER T OF SUICIDE
HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE PASDARAN (REVOLU WARM GUARDS).
IMSELF IS A SUPPORTER OF THE MUJAHEDIN, BU NOWS SOME OF
EDAYAN WHO WERE HIS BROTHER'S CONTACTS. H AS A TENTATIV
FROM THESE FRIENDS TO ACCOMPANY THEM TO K ISTAN TO
OW THE FEDAYAN ARE SUPPORTING THE KURDISH DCRATIC PARTY
. C/O TOLD T/I THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO L OTHER ISSUES
ACT HIM FROM GOAL OF OBTAINING JOB IN NIOC REFERABLY IN
STAN. HOWEVER, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KU AND THE FEDA
BE AN IMPORTANT REPORT. IF HE COULD ARRAN THIS WOULD SO
IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT OCESSING.
LIEVES THAT WE CAN DO SO AND WILL REPORT E DETAILS ON
AYAN INVOLVED AND THEIR PLANS AT THE NEX EETINGS. THIS
WOULD LAST ABOUT ONE WEEK AND COULD NOT TA PLACE BEFORE
AUGUST. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, C/O LEA THAT PLAN
KURD HIMSELF.

3. FROM HIS BROTHER AT THE KOMITEH IN A N, T/I HAS
ABOUT LABOR PROBLEMS AT NIOC. THE WORKER RE VERY
ED ABOUT RATION PRIVILEGES FOR FOOD WHIC HEY HAD HAD
T YEARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. COOR ATION BETWEEN
AD GUARD FORCE AND THE PASDARAN GUARDS IS IG PROBLEM.
LL BE RETURNING TO ABADAN ON 3 AUGUST TO IT FAMILY AND
IDENTITY) BEFORE RETURNING TO TEHRAN VI OM. C/O
ED THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ALL F ROBLEMS FACE
BROTHER IN ABADAN AND THAT T/I SHOULD PA NTENTION TO
HIS BROTHER'S REMARKS ON LABOR PROBLEMS. REPORT THEM
S/C ALSO KNOWS AN ARAB SHEIKH, WHO WAS INOR POLITICA
IN KHUZISTAN IN THE SHAH'S ERA. C/O TOLD THAT WE ARE
D IN LEARNING ABOUT ARAB ATTITUDES AND LITICAL
CONCENTRATING ON ARAB-FARSI POLITICAL DI RENCES IN THE

4. FOR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 1 ST, T/I IS
TO REPORT ON HIS SPACE JOB PROSPECTS A IOC, ON INFOR
MATION AT THE ABADAN KOMITEH, AND ON INTERVIEW



GE 3 TEHRAN 3827 S E C R E T
TH KHOMEININ IN QOM. HE WILL ALSO PROBAB VE SOME INFORMA-
OM ON FEDAYAN-KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY CO TION.

7. FR OS ANGELES: SD TRANSIT/I APP AFTER THIS FIRST
EETING, TO BE A WELL-MOTIVATED AGENT WHO H CCEPTED HIS
CANDESTINE RO E FULLY. HIS FUTURE VALUE W EPEND ON LANDING
OB WITH THE R GHT ACCESS, BUT HE IS THE KI F AGENT MATERIAL
E NEED.

8. FI : 201-961045. RVW 2 AUG 89 09c.1. ALL SECRE
S E C R E T

BT
#3827



7 Aug

S E C R E T 07[illegible]342 AUG [illegible] STAFF

DITE DIRECTOR 48[illegible]756

TO: TEHRAN INFO [illegible]/LOS ANG[illegible]

INTEL AJAJA FORREL SDTRANSIT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53826
B. TEHRAN 53827

1. HQS PLEASED WITH SMOOTH INITIATION OF CONTACT BETWEEN STA[illegible] AND SDTRANSIT/1 (T/1) REF [illegible]. REF CONTAINS VARIOUS PROPOSING OPS ANGLES AND WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE COVERT OF MUJAHIDIN, FEDAIEEN [illegible] INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND IN OTHER REGIONAL (KURDISH) SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS. CONCUR STRICTLY FOLLOWING TO EXPLORE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY [illegible] BETWEEN DIRECTIONS AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS OF INTEREST TO T/1 [illegible] KEEPING EYE LOCKED ON ABADAN [illegible] LOOK FORWARD TO RESULTS OF AUGUST MEETING.

2. [illegible]HQ? TRACES T/1'S FIANCEE [illegible]

3. [illegible]: 201-961945. RYW 05AUG[illegible] DPC.1 ALL-SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 141325Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53916

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL/INTEL - SOURCES

1. PLEASE ADVISE SOURCES OF FOLLOWING DISSEMS:
TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 (DIRECTOR 482081)
TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 (DIRECTOR 482711)
TDFIRDB-315/12861-79 (DIRECTOR 476697)
TDFIRDB-315/13216-79 (DIRECTOR 484384).

2. NO FILE. RVW 13 AUG 79 DRV DOC.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

18 AUG

S E C R E T 171404Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 498859.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R

SUBJECT: WNINTEL/INTEL - SOURCES

REF: TEHRAN 53916

1. SOURCES OF REF DISSEMS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 SDVALID/1;
B. TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 SDTRANSIT/1;
C. TDFIRDB-315/12061-79 SDACE/1;
D. TDFIRDB-315/13216-79 SDVALID/1.

2. NO FILE. RVW 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#9925

S E C R E T 210820Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53983

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL INTEL - PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS

1. IN ANTICIPATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION FROM SDTRANSIT/1 AND SDPROBE/1, FOLLOWING ARE PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS:

A. SDPROBE/1.

(1) FOR REPORTING IN WHICH SDPROBE/1'S NAME APPEARS AS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE, E.G., "VIEWS OF (SDPROBE/1) ON . . .": "A MEMBER OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY WHO IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF (SDPROBE/1). HE IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE IS TOLD."

(2) FOR ALL OTHER REPORTING: "A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED."

B. SDTRANSIT/1.

(1) FOR REPORTING ON PETROLEUM AND KHUZESTAN: "AN IRANIAN ACADEMIC WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE IRANIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED."

(2) FOR REPORTING ON KURDISTAN AND TEHRAN POLITICS: "AN IRANIAN INTELLECTUAL OF KURDISH DESCENT WITH PERSONAL CONNECTIONS TO THE FEDAYAN AND MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATIONS HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED."

2. WELCOME HQS INPUT. PLS ADVISE APPROVED BYLINES.

3. NO FILE. RVW 21 AUG 99 DRV DOC.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 181536Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54525

TO: DIRECTOR INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTEL SDTRANSIT

1. CASE OFFICER MET SDTRANSIT/1 (T/1) ON 15 AND 17 OCTOBER FOR DEBRIEFINGS ON HIS ACTIVITIES FOR PAST TWO MONTHS. T/1 SPENT MOST OF AUGUST IN KURDESTAN, ACCOMPANYING FEDAYAN FIGHTERS WHO WERE ASSISTING THE KURDS. HE BROUGHT SEVERAL HUNDRED PHOTOS TO 15 OCTOBER MEETING, SOME OF WHICH DOCUMENT FEDAYAN PARTICIPATION IN KURDISH DEMONSTRATIONS. C/O SELECTED SOME FOR COPYING AND FORWARDING TO HQS.

2. ON 9 SEPTEMBER, NEAR PAVEH, T/1 WAS WOUNDED BY A GUARDSMAN (PASDAR). BULLET HIT T/1 IN SIDE, GLANCING OFF RIB. A KURDISH DOCTOR TREATED HIM AND HE RETURNED TO TEHRAN TO RECUPERATE. DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, HE CONTINUED EFFORTS TO SECURE GOOD POSITION AT NIOC, EITHER IN TEHRAN OR ABADAN. HE HAS BEEN OFFERED POSITIONS TEACHING AT UNIVERSITY OF SHIRAZ AND AT ABADAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AIT), NEITHER OF WHICH IS OPERATIONALLY INTERESTING. T/1 DOESN'T WANT TO TAKE THESE POSITIONS BECAUSE HE FEELS HIS CREDENTIALS ENTITLE HIM TO SOMETHING BETTER.

3. T/1 MISSED MEETING DATES EITHER BECAUSE HE WAS IN KURDESTAN OR WAS CONVALESCING. HE SAID THAT AT LAST MEETING DATE ON 1 OCTOBER, A GUARDSMAN APPEARED AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING AT MEETING SITE. T/1 SAID WAITING FOR A FRIEND. C/O AND T/1 CHANGED MEETING POINT TO NAHID STREET OFF MOSSADEGH AND MADE MEETING TIME 1900 HOURS, WITH ALTERNATE AT 2000 HOURS.

4. C/O AND T/1 MEETING AGAIN ON 19 OCTOBER. PROCESSING INFORMATION ON FEDAYAN COOPERATION WITH KURDS FOR DISSEMINATION.

5. FILE: 201-961845. RVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T








ننگ بر
عوامل استعمار

REPORT CLASS--SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: KDP AND FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ ACTIVITIES IN KURDESTAN (DOI: AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN IRANIAN OF KURDISH DESCENT WITH PERSONAL CONNECTIONS TO THE FEDAYAN AND MUJAHIDIN ORGANIZATIONS. HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED.

1. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, THE KURDISH AREAS OF WESTERN IRAN AROUND KHANEH AND MAHABAD WERE UNDER CONTROL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE LEADER OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP); AYATOLLAH EZZEDIN HOSSEINI HAS THE HIGHEST PRESTIGE OF ALL THE KDP LEADERS, WHILE ABDUL RAHMAN QASSEMLOU ENJOYS SOMEWHAT LESSER RESPECT. THE BARZANI BROTHERS, IDRIS AND MASSOUD, THE SONS OF MULLA MUSTAFS BARZANI, ARE CONSIDERED MERCENARIES (JOSH) WHO HAD BEEN PAID BY THE SHAH AND BY FOREIGNERS, AND WHO NOW HAVE NO STANDING AMONG THE KDP SOPPORTERS.

2. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACTIVE WORKERS WITHIN THE KDP IS CALLED THE KOMITEH ZAHMAT KESHAN KURDESTAN AND INCLUDES ALL KURDS WHO TAKEN ACTIVE PART IN SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING GUERRILLAS, THE PESHMERGA. THE ORGANIZATION IS INFORMAL AND IS PREPARED TO ASSIST ANY KURDS WHO WISH TO FIGHT WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO CREDENTIALS OTHER THAN KURDISH PARENT ABE. (SOURCE COMMENT: DURING SEPTEMBER 1979, THE MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION IN THE BORDER TOWN OF KHANEH PASSED OUT WEAPONS FREELY TO ANY ONE WHO VOLUNTEERED TO FIGHT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.)

3. ABOUT 95 PERCENT OF THE ARMED KURDS BELONG TO THE KDP'S PESHMERGA, WHILE THE FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ GUERILLAS WERE NOT MORE THAN FIVE PERCENT OF ALL FIGHTERS. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, ABOUT 25 KNOWN FEDAYAN WERE IN MAHABAD-KHANEH AREA. (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE WERE PROBABLY NO MORE THAN 200 FEDAYAN FIGHTING IN ALL OF KURDESTAN DURING THIS PERIOD.)

4. GUERILLAS AND SYMPATHIZERS OF THE FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ HAVE FOUGHT AND DEMONSTRATED TOGETHER WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY SINCE FEBRUARY 1979, BUT THERE IS NO ORGANIZATION COORDINATING THE

ACTIVITIES EXPLICITLY SPONSORED BY THE FEDAYAN ARE WELCOMED IN THE LARGER CITIES SUCH AS MAHABAD AND SANANDAJ, WHERE FEDAYAN AND PESHMERGA GUERILLAS OF THE KDP HAVE FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE, WHILE MARXIST FEDAYAN CONCEAL THEIR AFFILIATION IN SMALLER VILLAGES AND THE COUNTRY SIDE, WHOSE PEOPLE ARE DEVOT MOSLEMS AND DEEPLY-ANTI-COMMUNIST.

5. ALTHOUGH THE FEDAYAN ARE ORGANIZED INTO GROUPS CLASSIFIED AS "SYMPATHIZERS" AND "FIGHTERS" BOTH TYPES OF MEMBERS TRAVELED TO KURDESTAN TO TAKE PART IN THE FIGHTING IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE FEDAYAN NORMALLY TRAVEL IN SMALL GROUPS, USING ORDINARY MEANS OF TRANSPORT, AND PICK UP WEAPONS AFTER THEY ARRIVE IN KURDESTAN.)

6. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (19 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT- 10,787.

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KOWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TELAVIV.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCE AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 25OCT99 DRV D9C.1 CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station on 4th November 1979.

S E C R E T OCT 79 INTEL

CITE TEHRAN ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD
JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TELAVIV.

WINTEL SDTRANSIT INTEL

SUPDATA: SDTRANSIT/1. NOLIAISON. NO FILE. NO INDEX. OBTAINED
BY JAMOTTE. FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-10,787. CLBY 015356.

FILED: PAQUIN

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station in 4th November 1979.

SDTRANSIT/1. Name unknown. Marital status: Believed to be single. Age: Probably mid-twenties. Educated in the U.S. (school unknown). Academic specialty: Petroleum engineering, or possibly a related field. Returned from the U.S. in July or August. No regular employment since his return.

Contacts: Met approximately once a week, when in Tehran (see below). Picked up by car. Meetings either pre-arranged or scheduled by means of phone call from the Source.

Purpose of contact: 1) Information on organization and activities of the Fedayan; 2) Information on the petroleum industry (production, physical security, labor situation, etc.); 3) Arab politics and organization in Khuzestan, to include Iraqi involvement, if any. Re 1): Source had personal friends in the Fedayan, and although not himself a member, was able to spend approximately two weeks with them in Kurdistan, where he received a bullet wound. (He reported a maximum of about 50 Fedayan fighting with the Kurdish dissidents.) Re 2): Source was offered at least one job with NIOC in Tehran, but it was judged that this would not provide the desired access to the situation in the oil fields themselves, and as of 4 November he was exploring job prospects in Abadan. Re 3): Access to the Arab situation would have been contingent on his finding a job in Khuzestan.

Payment: Source received regular compensation, exact terms not known.



S E C R E T 211625Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE BONN 02218 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WNINTEL AJAJA TEYWAY CHLEO SDFICKLE

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 44543 (444543)
B. BONN 01345
C. WASHINGTON 459970, 19 JUNE 79

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF BASE, WALDO R. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED SDFICKLE/1 (S/1) AND ARRANGED A MEETING WITH HIM FOR THE EVENING OF 21 JUNE. THE MEETING, WHICH, LASTED MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF HOURS, TOOK PLACE IN THE HOTEL IN COLOGNE. IT WENT SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT INCIDENT.

[redacted] VASILIY [redacted]

[redacted] VLADIMIR [redacted]IKHIN (201-896426) KN[redacted]

[redacted] IN OUR FIRST MEETING WITH HIM, [redacted] NOT SHOW PICTURE[redacted] OF LOCAL SOVIETS TO S/1.) VALENTIN SUGGESTED THAT S/1 MEET [redacted] AT 1200 HOURS ON 30 JUNE [redacted] VALENTIN WOULD MEET S/1 ON THE STREET OPPOSITE THE SMALL CHURCH AT RHEINUFERHAFEN IN COLOGNE. S/1 STATED THAT EXCEPT FOR THE 26 MAY MEETING HE HAD REPORTED ALL OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN DETAIL TO HIS FORMER SDJANUS CASE OFFICER.

C. ACCORDING TO S/1, HIS SDJANUS CASE OFFICER HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON THE KINDS OF SUBJECT TO DISCUSS WITH HIS SOVIET CONTACTS AND THE KINDS OF INFORMATION TO PASS TO THEM. S/1 IS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE INFORMATION WHICH HE PASSED TO THEM WAS GENUINE, AND THAT THEY TRUST HIM.

PAGE 3 BONN 82218 S E C R E T

THIS IS WHY S/1 THINKS THE SOVIETS INVITED HIM TO EAST BERLIN.
ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS SDJANUS C/O, S/1 ACCEPTED THE
INVITATION. HE WENT TO WEST BERLIN
LAST WEEK OF JULY 78 AND WAS MET BY NOVIKOV AT
A PRE-ARRANGED SITE IN THE S-BAHN CHARLOTTENBURG STATION.
THEY IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDED TO EAST BERLIN BY S-BAHN, AND
CROSSED THE BORDER CHECKPOINT ON FRIEDRICHSTRASSE, WHERE TWO
OTHER SOVIETS WERE WAITING FOR THEM. THEY TOOK S/1 BY CAR TO
AN APARTMENT ON KOPERNIKSTRASSE 23, WHICH IS LOCATED NOT FAR
FROM THE IRANIAN EMBASSY. S/1 SPENT 3 DAYS IN EAST BERLIN.
THE SOVIETS TOOK HIM SIGHTSEEING, BUT THEY ALSO CONDUCTED
DISCUSSIONS WITH S/1 ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF AKSA, THE DEMOCRATIC
PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK), AND THE "UNION OF REVOLUTIONARY
KURDS OF TURKEY" (DEVRA). S/1 SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN
VERY NEGATIVE TOWARDS THE DPK, BUT THEY PROUDLY STATED THAT
THEY SUPPORTED DEVRA. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT S/1 RESIGN
FROM THE DPK AND DEVOTE HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO THE ACTIVITIES
OF DEVRA. THEY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT S/1 [illegible]

PAGE 4 BONN 82218 S E C R E T

FOR AKSA. CONSEQUENTLY, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS SDJANUS
CASE OFFICER, S/1 ACCEPTED IN ONE INSTANCE DM 1,000, ON EACH
OF TWO OCCASIONS DM 2,000 AND ONCE DM 500. S/1 SAID THAT HE
HAD REPORTED ALL THIS AND HAD TURNED OVER THE MONEY TO SDJANUS.

E. CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS, S/1 SAID THAT ALL OF
HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PREARRANGED EXCEPT
FOR THE FIRST MEETING WITH VLADIMIR. NO MEETING WAS EVER
MISSED. ONLY ON ONE OCCASION DID NOVIKOV GIVE S/1 AN
OPERATIONAL TELEPHONE NUMBER. THIS WAS JUST BEFORE BREZHNEV'S
LAST VISIT TO THE FRG, NOVIKOV INSTRUCTED S/1 THAT SHOULD HE
HEAR THAT SOME VIOLENT ACTION WAS PLANNED AGAINST BREZHNEV,
OR THAT SOME ANTI-BREZHNEV DEMONSTRATION WAS ABOUT TO TAKE
PLACE, HE MUST IMMEDIATELY CALL THAT NUMBER AND PASS THE
INFORMATION. THE TELEPHONE NUMBER GIVEN BY NOVIKOV WAS
[illegible] 0279-140530. (C/O COMMENT [illegible]
OBERWERZKENNZAHLEN) [illegible]
NOT



PAGE 6 BONN 22219 S E C R E T

JAIL UNDER THE SHAH REGIME. AT THE BEGINNING S/1 DID NOT ACCEPT MONEY, BUT LATER ON HE RECEIVED A MONTHLY SALARY OF DM 800, PLUS OPERATIONAL EXPENSES. HE ALSO RECEIVED BONUSES FROM SDJANUS FROM TIME TO TIME. FELTHOUSE PROPOSED TO PAY S/1 A MONTHLY SALARY OF DM 800 BEGINNING 1 JUNE 1979, FOR A TRIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. SUBJECT ACCEPTED. IT WAS ALSO AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON 7 JULY IN DUESSELDORF.

7. C/O COMMENT: S/1 MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION, AND WE BELIEVE THAT HE SPOKE THE TRUTH ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. IN ORDER TO BE SURE WE WOULD LIKE TO ARRANGE AN [illegible] FOR S/1. WE DO NOT WISH TO RUSH THIS PROCEDURE, SINCE S/1 IS FINANCIALLY INDEPENDENT AND A PROUD [illegible] DO NOT WANT TO HURT HIS FEELINGS.

[illegible] AND T[illegible]

18 AUG [illegible] 2

[illegible] AUG 79 STATE

[illegible]RECTOR, GERMANY, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

[illegible]FOR SDJANUS SKDICKLE INTEL

[illegible]83673
[illegible]NGTON 496090

[illegible] SITUATION IN EAST IS CERTAINLY NOT CALM, WE FEEL
[illegible]ROUGH HIS FAMILY CONNECTIONS, MIGHT BE ABLE TO
[illegible] FREELY THAN OTHER FOREIGNERS. HE COULD GET INTO
[illegible]RE TO ASK QUESTIONS INDISCRIMINATELY OF EVERYBODY,
[illegible]PECT HIM TO DO SO.

[illegible] IS WHETHER SDFICKLE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE
[illegible]FORMATION TO JUSTIFY COST OF TRIP WHICH, WE ASSUME,
[illegible]FUND. WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING MORE DETAILS
[illegible]LY WHOM SDFICKLE WOULD SEE AND WHAT SPECIFIC
[illegible]RMATION HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COLLECT. WILL HE BE ABLE
[illegible]CIFIC DETAILS ON SOVIET SUPPORT, ON SUPPORT POSSIBLY
[illegible] COUNTRIES, AND ON WEAPONS SMUGGLING. WILL HE BE
[illegible] DETAILED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON THE
[illegible] KURDS, THEIR FUTURE INTENTIONS, AND THE INTERPLAY
[illegible]BES. WOULD BOT BE INTERESTED IN PROPAGANDE-TYPE

[illegible]01-960951, 201-306414. RVW 17 AUG 99 DRV D90.1

↓
SDFICKLE

?



S E E T 211837Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 498994.

TO: PRIORITY BONN, ANKARA INFO GERMANY, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN

WNI L AJAJA SDJANUS CKLEG SPICKLE

REF: A. ANKARA 44355
B. WASHINGTON 496890
C. BONN 53673

1. WE ARE, IN FACT, INTERESTED IN SUITABLE F/L'S (F/I)
EL TURKEY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IF HE WILLING, HIS TRAVEL
IRANIAN KURDISTAN. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, EVENTS KURDISH
NG FAIRLY RAPIDLY AND BOTH AREAS OF PRIORITY F INTEREST.
EF B INDICATES, WE DO HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS CONCERNING F
VEL IN TURKEY DUE FLAP POTENTIAL AND DANGER, AND WE SIMILA
CERNED OVER F/I TRAVEL IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE BOT
BE ACCOMPLISHED IF F/I PROPERLY BRIEFED ON REQUIREMENTS
IONED CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES. ACCORDINGLY, WOULD APPR
N RECONNOITRING F/I AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE H
L BUSINESS TRAVEL THROUGH TURKEY TO IRAN FOR PURPOSE OF CON
WOULD LIKE, IF POSSIBLE, FOR F/I BEGIN TRAVEL THIS WEEK O
RLY NEXT AND ANTICIPATE TRIP LASTING ONE TO TWO WEEKS. IF
LLING/ABLE TRAVEL BOTH IRAN AND TURKEY, DO NOT BELIEVE H
OULD SPEND MORE THAN TWO-THREE DAYS IN EASTERN TURKEY AS
RIORITY REQUIREMENT IS IN IRAN.

2. ARE PREPARED FUND COST OF F/A'S TRAVEL AND, IF HE
ROVIDE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS L
ELOW, PROVIDE HIM WITH BONUS DEPENDING ON QUANTITY AND QU
F INFORMATION AND ITS FULFILLMENT OUR REQUIREMENTS.

3. WE WISH EMPHASIZE NEED FOR THOROUGH BRIEFING F/I
REALITIES OF SITUATION IN EASTERN TURKEY AND SOUTHWESTERN
WHICH, BEING KURDISH, WE SURE HE AMPLY AWARE. HE SHOULD
CAUTIONED DANGER HE MAY ATTRACT ATTENTION TO HIMSELF BY H
TRAVELS IN TURKEY AND HE SHOULD BE DISCREET IN WHO HE CON
AND HOW HE ACQUIRES INFORMATION. AS TURKISH SECURITY AUTH

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 498994 S E C R E T
OUT FOR JUST HIS SORT OF ACTIVITIES. IN IRAN, AS F/1 [illegible]
OGNIZANT, IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEGU CRACKDOWN ON KURDIS
MOVEMENT AND HIS ABILITY TRAVEL OR CONTACT MEMBERS HIS FAMILY
MAY BE RESTRICTED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, OF COURSE,
SHOULD HE EVER ADMIT REACTION CONTACT AND BE NOT IN POSITION TO
OFFER HIM ASSISTANCE SHOULD WE RUN INTO DIFICULTIES EITHER
COUNTRY. FELTHOUSE SHOULD INSURE F/1 UNDERSTANDS ALL OF ABOVE
BEFORE HE ACCEPTS OUR INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING HIS TRAVEL.

4. WHILE WE ANTICIPATE NO CONTACT F/1 IN TURKEY, AS HE
SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED BY HIS C/O IN BONN ON HIS RETURN FROM THIS
TRAVEL, WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMERGENCY CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IN
CASE HAS HIGHLY PERISHABLE INFORMATION WHICH COULD NOT WAIT FOR
HIS RETURN TO GERMANY. F/1 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH, SOME TURKISH,
EXCELLENT GERMAN, EXCELLENT FARSI, AND HAS NATIVE KURDISH.
BEST ISTANBUL BEST CHOICE FOR CONTACT SINCE COB IS FLUENT
GERMAN LANGUAGE. FLS ADVISE.

5. IN RESPONSE REF QUESTIONS CONCERNING ACCESS F/1, WE
BELIEVE HE WOULD BE ABLE SERVICE THOSE REQUIREMENTS IN SUFFI-
CIENT DETAIL JUSTIFY EXPENDITURES INVOLVED. REFER BONN AS TO EXAC
TOPICS HE WOULD BE ABLE SEE IN TURKEY AS F/1 HAS BEEN PRIMARILY
TARGETTED AGAINST IRANIAN KURDISH PROBLEM. IN ADDITION REQUI
REMENTS POSED REF A, FOLLOWING QUESTIONS/ISSUES OF HIGH INTERE
CONCERNING IRANIAN KURDS:

A. IDENTIFICATION OF VARIOUS FACTIONS AND LEADERS
KURDISH MOVEMENT OF CONTINUING INTEREST.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR KURDISH
MENT, IF ANY. WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT? ARMS? MONEY? CAN L
CUBAN, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED?

C. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF TUDEH OR CHARIKHA-YE FED
KHALQ SUPPORT FOR KURDS?

D. KURDISH STRATEGIES CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF
OF MINORITIES ISSUE IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE?

E. WITH GROWING EVIDENCE THAT RIVAL KURDISH FAC
ESTABLISHING ENCLAVES IN KURDISTAN, I.E., F/1'S KDP RELA



14 SEP 19 [illegible] 152

[illegible] R E T 1[illegible]Z SEP TO STATE

E. BONN 84383

PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

NTIAL AMAJA SOFICKLE

PARIS 11836

1. DURING A SEPTEMBER MEETING SOFICKLE SAID THAT MRS. AL-RAHMAN BASHLU APPEARS TO BE 44-46 YEARS OLD, MEDIUM HT, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, SOMETIMES DYES HER HAIR. SHE DRESSES LY AND CONSERVATIVELY. THE OLDER DAUGHTER IS ABOUT 20-21 S OLD, THE YOUNGER ONE IS ABOUT 17-18 YEARS OLD. BOTH GIRLS TTE TALL. SOFICKLE IS NOT SURE BUT THINKS THAT THE OLDER S GOING TO COLLEGE, WHILE THE YOUNGEST IS ATTENDING FRENCH SECONDARY SCHOOL.

2. ACCORDING SOFICKLE FAMILY, BASHLU HAS POLITICAL EXILE TUS FOR RESIDING AND WORKING IN PARIS. SUCH PERMITS ARE OBTAINED WITHIN KURDISH CIRCLES IN PARIS.

[illegible] FILE: 881-[illegible]. 501-[illegible]. RVW [illegible] SEP 99 DRV D9C. I[illegible]

[illegible] E T

C O N F I D E N T I A L 110927Z SEP 79 STAFF 11 SEP 79 2 45Z

FM BONN 84384

TO PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/11/85 (SFICKLE, A.J.)

TAGS: PINS

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR 508752

REF: A. BONN 84385

1. SFICKLE/1 (F/1) MET EVENING 8 SEPT 79 BY FELTHOUSE AND KOWSKY. WAS GIVEN REF A AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR MEETING TRIP TO KURDISTAN. DURING MEETING F/1 WAS REPEATEDLY FED ON ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY AND FACT WE NOT POSITION OFFER HIM ANY HELP IF HE ENCOUNTERS ANY DIFFICULTIES TURKEY OR IRAN. F/1 ACCEPTED AND RECEIPTED FOR DM 2500 TRAVEL EXPENSES; DM 800 AUG SALARY AND DM 200 OPS EXPENSES.

2. F/1'S SCHEDULE HAD HIM TRAVELING PARIS 9 SEPT 79 TO HELENA QASEMLU AND GET LETTER FOR DELIVERY TO HER HUSBAND. WILL RETURN BONN AND DEPART BONN 12 SEPT 79 VIA TURKISH AIRLINES FOR ISTANBUL AND VAN. HE WILL THEN TRAVEL INTO BOTH IRAQI AND IRANIAN KURDISTAN, EXPECTING RETURN EUROPE AT END OCTOBER. WILL MEET AND DEBRIEF AT THAT TIME.

3. FILE: 201-096095 1. RVW 10 SEPT 99 DRV DSC. 1.

END OF MESSAGE



90ct 79 12 58z

C R E T 09120Z OCT 79 STAFF

BONN 85

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, C

NTEL [redacted] SDFICKLE

: BONN 84384

SDFICKLE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKI
IRANIAN KURDISTAN. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVE
OCT AND SET UP A DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE

ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICKLE'S RETURN WAS DEL
HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY)
IES IN SALMAZ
AND DETAINED FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED
ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAI
DOCUMENTS. SDFICKLE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT
PURPOSE IN TURKEY, FORTUNATELY
THE LOCAL JUDGE AND THE AUTHORITIES
IN IRAN WERE NUNS AND FRIENDS OF SDFICKLE'S FA
FOREIGN MINISTRY. A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "SON OF SHA
ARRESTED" APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN DAILY "KEYHAN," NO.
DAILY NEWSPAPER. WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLIP
SDFICKLE'S ARREST TO HQS VIA TM NUMBER 4

RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WIL BE
E.

[redacted] RVW 09 OCT 99 DRV DSCI:

105

SECRET 171517Z OCT 79 INTEL
CITE BONN 85481 SECTION 1 OF 2 ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN .

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUBJECT: ZRWAHOO FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT. SOURCE SDFICKLE/1. SUB-SOURCES SDFICKLE'S FATHER AND OTHERS DESCRIBED IN BONN 85330. FELTHOUSE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED OMITTED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. OBJ: S-1. NO LIAISON NO INDEX. FILE: 201-0960951. EGN-7833. RVW 17 OCT 99 DRV D9C . 1 BY 055363.

FILED: 171517Z

REPORT CLASS- SECRET-WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: STATUS OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT IN IRAN (DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: A KURD, NOW RESIDING ABROAD, WHO IS BELIEVED TO HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO THE KURDISH COMMUNITY IN IRAN AND WHO RECENTLY VISITED IRANIAN KURDISTAN. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THE MORALE OF PARTISAN FIGHTERS IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN IS HIGH , AND THE KURDS CONTINUE IN THERE DETERMINATION TO GAIN AUTONOMY. THE PRINCIPAL PARTISAN GROUPS CURRENTLY OPERATING IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN ARE THE RESISTANCE GROUP OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN, THE SAZEMAN-E, ZAHMAT-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN, THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND THE FOLLOWERS OF HOSSEINI. THE KURDS ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS STOLEN FROM RAIDS ON IRANIAN GARRISONS AND WITH ARMS SUPPLIED BY IRAQ. KURDISH FORCES HAVE SOME CONTACT WITH THE TUDEH PARTY, BUT ACTUALLY COLLABORATE ONLY WITH THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND CHRIKH-HAYI-[redacted] IRAN. A NEW ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN FORMED TO LIQUIDATE KURDS WORKING. WITH THE KHOMEINI REGIME. END SUMMARY.

1. DESPITE THE RETREAT OF KURDISH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS AND THE EXTENSIVE MATERIAL AND HUMAN LOSSES SUFFERED IN AUGUST 1979, THE SPIRIT AND MORALE OF THE GENERAL KURDISH POPULATION AND THE PARTISAN FIGHTERS IN IRAN IS HIGH. THE KURDS ARE HOPEFUL ABOUT THE FUTURE AND ARE DETERMINED TO WIN THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY. THE PEOPLE DO NOT BLAME ABD-AL-RAHMAN Q A S E M L U , SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK), OR KURDISH RELIGIOUS LEADER, EZ-ED-DIN H O S S E I N I , FOR THE LOSSES AND RETREAT. KURDS RESPECT AND ADMIRE THESE TWO LEADERS.

2. THE MAJORITY OF KURDISH RESISTANCE UNITS ARE LOCATED NEAR THE IRAQI AND TURKISH BORDER, AND IN THE MOUNTAINS AND FOREST REGIONS OF KURDISTAN. THERE ARE FOUR MAIN ARMED KURDISH PARTISAN GROUPS. THEY ARE:

A. THE ARMED RESISTANCE GROUP OF THE DPK-THIS GROUP'S LEADER IS A FORMER MAJOR IN THE IRANIAN ARMY AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE DPK, ABDUL RAHIM A B B A S S I. THE GROUP'S HEADQUARTERS IS IN THE FOREST OF SARDASHT. THESE FORCES ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE TRAINING FOR SUDDEN ATTACKS AND QUICK RETREATS. MILITARY UNITS OF THE DPK ARE OPERATING FROM WESTERN AZERBAIJAN DOWN TO THE SOUTH OF THE KURDISH MOUNTAIN TRAILS TO IRAQ.

B. MILITARY UNITS OF SAZEMAN-E ZAHMET-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN-THIS IS A MARXIST-LENINIST, LEFTIST MILITARY UNIT LED BY FORMER LAW STUDENT SALAH M U H T A D I. THE SAZEMAN -E ZAHMET-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN IS RUMORED TO BE OPERATING EITHER IN THE SOUTH NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER OR IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF SANANDASH.

THE KURDISTAN SECTION(SHAHA-YE KURDISTAN) OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN-THIS KURDISH GROUP ALSO HAS MARXIST-LENINIST CONVICTIONS AND IS PART OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN. IT STRONGLY OPPOSES THE PRESENT KHOMEINI REGIME. THE SO-CALLED RADICAL KURDISH COMMUNIST GROUPS, THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND THE SAZEMAN-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN DIFFER IN THAT THE FIRST IS PART OF AN IRANIAN ORGANIZATION; THE SECOND IS A PURELY KURDISH ENTITY. BOTH ARE ANTI-SOVIET. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NO ENMITY BETWEEN THEM. THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN OPERATES IN THE MARIVAN AREA.

D. ARMED FOLLOWERS OF RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL LEADER HOSSEINI-THEY CONSIST OF VARIOUS SMALL GROUPS WHO ARE HIDING AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION IN TOWNS AND LARGER VILLAGES.

E. BESIDES THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FOUR GROUPS, THERE ARE VARIOUS SMALL KURDISH ARMED RESISTANCE GROUPS, AMONG THEM TWO SIGNIFICANT ONES--THE GROUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ROSSOUL M O L M A N FROM THE PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OF KURDS IN IRAQ, AND THE GROUP OF DR. MAHMOUD O S M A N ALSO FROM IRAQ.

3. THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF KURDISH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS IN IRAN STANDS AT MORE THAN 20,000 . THE MAJORITY OF THESE

FIGHTERS BELONG TO THE ARMED GROUP OF THE DPK. THEY ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM THE IRANIAN GARRISONS IN MAHABAD, SANANDAJ AND NUSUT IN FEBRUARY 1979. THE KURDS HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO LAST THROUGH THE WINTER ACTIONS.

4. MORE ARMS ARE COMING TO THE IRANIAN KURDS FROM IRAQ. THE MAIN SUPPLIER OF THOSE ARMS IS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE CELAL T A L A B A N I ORGANIZATION. THE IRANIAN KURDS ALSO RECEIVE AID FROM EAST GERMANY, ROMANIA AND CUBA. THIS AID, HOWEVER, IS [redacted] OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, FOOD AND CLOTHING, AND USUALLY REACHES THE KURDS VIA IRAQ. IN AUGUST 1979 , THE DPK SENT A SPECIAL DELEGATION TO CUBA. AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER, THE DELEGATION HAD NOT YET RETURNED TO IRAN.

5. Q A S E M L U SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME IN IRAQ AND VERY SELDOM COMES TO IRAN. HOSSEINI IS ALSO HIDING IN IRAQ, BUT FREQUENTLY VISITS IRANIAN KURDISTAN. THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DPK CENTRAL COMMITTEE SUCH AS MEHMED EMIN S I R A C I, AMIR K H A Z I AND HANI B U L U R I Y A N ARE REMAINING IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN WITH THE ARMED GROUPS.

6. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH ARMED GROUPS HAVE SOME CONTACT WITH THE TUDEH PARTY, BUT THEY ARE NOT COLLABORATING WITH IT. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS ARE, HOWEVER, CLOSELY COLLABORATING WITH THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN. CHRIKH-HAYI-KHLKI IRAN, AND OTHER IRANIAN DISSIDENT GROUPS WHO ARE OPPOSING THE KHOMEINI REGIME. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY TO ADOPT A JOINT ACTION PLAN WITHIN THE COMING SIX MONTHS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME.

7. IRANIAN ARMY UNITS PRESENTLY STATIONED IN KURDISTAN ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. THEY OFTEN PROTECT THE LOCALS FROM KHOMEINI'S MILITIA FORCES. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS VALUE THIS EFFORT AND SEE IT AS A GOOD SIGN FOR THE FUTURE. THE DPK IS WORKING TO WIN THE SYMPATHY OF ALL TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN ARMY UNITS.

8. A NEW KURDISH ORGANIZATION IS BEING CREATED IN

BT
5481

IRANIAN KURDISTAN. IT IS CALLED SHAHIT (WITNESS). THE GOAL OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO LIQUIDATE THE KURDS WHO ARE COLLABORATING WITH THE KHOMEINI REGIME. NOT LONG AGO SHAHIT KILLED A KURDISH LANDLORD, T E L I B E K (LNU), WHO HAD COLLABORATED WITH KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVES. NOW THE ORGANIZATION IS PLANNING TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST OTHER KURDS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR KHOMEINI'S REGIME.

9. NEITHER THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION(PLO) NOR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION HAS AN OFFICE OR REPRESENTATIVES IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN. KERIM H I S S A M I. A MEMBER OF THE DPK'S POLITBURO, IS IN CONTACT WITH A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD. HISSAMI ALSO HEADED A DPK DELEGATION WHICH VISITED PLO HEADQUARTERS IN LEBANON. SINCE THAT TIME HE HAS HAD CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PLO. HISSAMI IS ABOUT 54 YEARS OLD AND RESIDED IN PRAGUE FOR MANY YEARS. HIS FAMILY IS STILL LIVING IN PRAGUE BUT HISSAMI HIMSELF IS IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN.

10) THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY IS IN SESSION IN TEHRAN. THE KURDS ARE NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO IT AND FEEL IT IS WORTHLESS. ONLY ONE KURD FROM SANANDAJ IS A MEMBER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND HE HAS NO INFLUENCE IN IT.

11. ACQ: (9 OCTOBER 1979)

12. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO COTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 17OCT99 DRV D9C. 1 BY RECORD REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT

#5481

S E C R E T 242201Z OCT 79 STAFF

25 Oct 79 04 17z

CITE DIRECTOR 538929.

TO: BONN INFO TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA ZRWAHOO

REF: BONN 85541 EGN-7939

1. DO NOT PLAN TO DISSEM REF AS REPORT AS WRITTEN DOES NOT APPEAR TO ADD SUFFICIENT NEW INFO TO WHAT ALREADY KNOWN TO WARRANT DISSEM.

2. IT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN THAT PAST EFFORTS BY BARZANI AND TALA-P

BANI TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES HAD FAILED. THIS SUPPORTED ALSO BY TDFIRDB-315/13524-79 FROM GNGRAPH (FROM AN ESTABLISHED SOURCE DRAWING ON A NUMBER OF SUBSOURCES WHOSE RELIABILITY AND ACCESS CANNOT BE ASSESSED) WHICH REPORTED THAT MASUD BARZANI HAD CROSSED FROM IRAN INTO NORTHERN IRAQ TAKING WITH HIM SIZEABLE GROUP OF PESH MERGA. JALAL TALABANI, DISSIDENT KURDISH LEADER UNTIL RECENTLY SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION WITH MASUD WHO REJECTED HIS ADVANCES. REPORT ALSO SAID MASUD BARZANI HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YAZDI AND THE KDP HAD GAINED SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD GIVEN IT WEAPONS AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. CATGMIC/19 IN TDFIRDB-315/15112-79 (BONN 84015) REPORTED ALSO THAT BARZANI BROTHERS HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER TALABANI. AGAINST THIS ARE TWO REPORTS OUT OF BAGHDAD IN AUGUST 1979 WHICH INDICATE THAT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979 THERE WAS TO BE FRESH EFFORTS BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS TO REACH SOME KIND OF ACCOMMODATION.

3. IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFO BELIEVE REF REPORT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL IF SDFICKEL/1 COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC AS TO DATE OF HIS INFO. DID HE PICK UP IN ANY SPECIFIC INFO OF PROPOSED MEETINGS IN EITHER SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER; IF SO, WERE THESE EFFORTS ALSO REJECTED ETC. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF SDFICKEL/1 COULD PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFO THAN BONN 85330 ON WHO SUBSOURCES WERE WHO CAN DEFINITELY SAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT COORDINATION EFFORT

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 538929 S E C R E T
BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PAST COORDINATION BETWEEN KURDISH FACTIONS AND COMMUNISTS PLUS AMPLIFICATION ON EXACT MEANING OF STATEMENT "SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS IMPOSSIBLE BECUASE THE BAGHDAD REGIME CONSIDERS THE IRAQI COMMUNISTS TRAITORS AND IS ACTIVELY PERSECUTING THEM" WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

4. PLS ADVISE. NO FILE. RVW 23 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#5514

1 Nov 79 04 17z

S E C R E T 311839Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543375.

TO: ,BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

REF: BONN 85706

1. CONCUR PARA TWO REF.

2. WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILED COMMENTS RESULTS SDFICKLE/1'S TRIP IN NEAR FUTURE. WE VERY PLEASED.

3. FILE: 201-0969951. RVW 30OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#4196

S E C R E T 140623Z STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419577

TO: TEHRAN INFO PARI

WNINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL FUSIL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 408750 (NOT SENT/
B. PARIS 96132 (BEING RELAYED
C. PARIS 95702
D. PARIS 96010 (FEB 1979)

1. REF A REQUESTED PARIS ST
RECRUITED STATION ASSETS UNCAMEL/1
TO REPORT ON KURDISH AUTONOMY MOVE
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN, AND TO SPOT L
ASSETS WITH ACCESS TO TRIBAL AFFA

2. FURTHER TO REF B RESP
FRENCH CITIZEN, IS FREE-LANCE JO
OF FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF)
PARIS STATION SINCE 1972 AS REF
ON PCF AFFAIRS AND ON COMMUNIS
HAS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN
CONTACTS IN VARIOUS AFRICAN A
CIRCLES, INCLUDING KHOMEINI
FRANCE. UNCAMEL/1 HELD INTE
AND LATER SUCCEEDED IN HAVI
ALSO, RE REF C AND SUBSEQUE
FULLY TO ACCOMPANY KHOMEIN

3. WOULD APPRECI
RESPONS TO REF B AS
VENTU

2 DIRECTO[redacted] T
ACTS.

4. PARI[redacted] TO ABOVE, DOE[redacted]MEL/1 HAVE ANY
TENTIALLY EXPL[redacted]IS WITHIN IRAN[redacted]MMUNIST
EMENTS?

5. PARIS [redacted] THAT UNFUSIL/1[redacted] PREPARED TO
AKE TRIP, BEGINN[redacted]20 APRIL. (DO N[redacted]ESEE OVERLAP
IN AGENTS' ACTIVI[redacted]EY WILL BE DIREC[redacted] PARATELY
AGAINST RESPECTIVE[redacted]C TARGETS.) UN[redacted] IS U.S.
CITIZEN RESIDING P[redacted]RE HE IS SELF-E[redacted] AS PHOTO-
GRAPHER AND FILM PR[redacted] HE WAS BRIEFL[redacted]YED BY IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT IN 1977 [redacted]DUKE SERIES OF F[redacted]OR TELEVISION
AND PRESUMABLY SPENT[redacted] TIME IN IRAN D[redacted]HAT PERIOD.
A WITTING, PAID AGENT[redacted]E WAS RECRUITED[redacted] 1978 AS ACCESS
AGENT TO LEFTIST AND[redacted]THEAST ASIAN TA[redacted]N FRANCE AND ELSE-
WHERE. UNFUSIL/1 WAS[redacted]CCOMPANYING PHO[redacted]R AT SERIES OF
INTERVIEWS WITH KHOMEI[redacted] HELD NOVEMBER[redacted] HE MANAGED TO
INGRATIATE HIMSELF WITH MEMBERS OF KH[redacted]MMEDIATE ENTOURAGE
AND HAS SINCE ESTABLISHED GOOD PERSON[redacted]TIONSHIP WITH
PRINCIPAL ADVISER YAZDI, WHO, PER RE[redacted]UED STANDING INVITA-
TION FOR UNFUSIL/1 TO VISIT HIM IN [redacted]NFUSIL/1 ALSO
RECEIVED PERSONAL INVITATION TO ACC[redacted]HOMEINI GROUP FROM
FRANCE TO IRAN, BUT WAS UNABLE TO [redacted]CAUSE OF CONFLICTING
PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENTS.

6. ANTICIPATE UNCAMEL/UNFU[redacted]S TO EXTEND NO MORE
THAN COUPLE OF WEEKS, AND THEREF[redacted]O NEED AT THIS TIME
FOR DIRECT STATION CONTACT. HOW[redacted] EVENT EITHER ASSET
SHOULD COME ACROSS PERISHABLE I[redacted]NEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR
EMERGENCY CONTACT WITH TEHRAN S[redacted]ALSO WELCOME TEHRAN
COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS ON ABOVE [redacted]ING AS WELL AS ON BEST
TARGETING OF EACH.

7. FILE: 29-6-248/3[redacted]RET RVW 13
APR 1999 DRV D9C.1.
S E C R E T

E C R E T 151221Z APR 79 STAFF

ITE TEHRAN 52705 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL E USIL

REFS: A. PARIS 98132
B. DIRECTOR 419577

1. BELIEVE THAT IF WHEN UNCAMEL/1 (PLIES FOR VISA
HE STRESSES FACT HE IS EXPERIENCED FRE' JOURNALIST OF SOME
FINANCIAL MEANS AND IN GENERAL AVOIDS NG HIS POLITICAL
AFFILIATION, HE SHOULD ENCOUNTER NO B (IS TRAVEL TO TEHRAN
OR INTO KURDISH AREAS. ONCE IN IRAN, LD PLAY ON HIS CP
CREDENTIALS TO GAIN MORE FRIENDLY RE KDP. WESTERN JOUR-
NALISTS, EVEN AMERICANS, HAVE RECEN' ELLED INTO HINTERLANDS
AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW DID NOT RUN I BLE. (EMBASSY PRESS
ATTACHE CONFIRMS THIS.) PGOI PERM' S NOT REQUIRED, BUT
WE BELIEVE THAT C/1 CHANCES OF SUC LD BE ENHANCED IF HE
HAS LOCAL ASSISTANCE IN TEHRAN. AN ARANGE THROUGH
FRIENDS FOR DRIVER/GUIDE WHO UNDF KURDISH DIALECT HE WOULD
HAVE A LEG-UP ON THE PROBLEM. I' JGGEST HE INQUIRE IN
PARIS WHO REPRESENTS FRENCH PRES RAN. FOR STATION INFO
ONLY, TEHRAN ASSET SDTRAMP/1 (T D JOURNAL DE TEHRAN
UNTIL ITS RECENT CLOSURE AND IS AFR BUREAU CHIEF. T/1 WOULD
LIKELY PROVIDE C/1 WITH ADVICE STANDARD C/1 MANAGES TO
CONTACT T/1 AT HIS OWN INITIA' DO NOT REPEAT NOT SUGGEST
THAT WE SHOULD OURSELVES PLAC T/1 IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER.

2. SUGGEST THAT C/1 INIT INVESTIGATION BY INTER-
VIEWING KURDESTAN DEMOCRATI' EADER ABDOL RAHMAN GHASMLOU
WHO HAS OPENED PARTY OFFICE AD AND WHO IS PRESENTLY
ACTING AS UNIFYING FORCE A OUS KURDISH FACTIONS. OB-
VIOUSLY GHASMLOU WILL PRO' ITH CURRENT PARTY LINE IN HOPE
THAT C/1 WILL PUBLISH SYM TREATMENT. DETAILED READ-
QUARTERS REQUIREMENTS AP LE AND GIVEN TIME AND LUCK,
C/1 SHOULD MANAGE TO IC QUESTIONS ON HIGH [redacted]
HOPE ...GE "LINE". AT COURSE [redacted]

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 02705 S E C R E T

VISIT, IF C/I HAS DEVELOPS LOCAL LEFTIST CC , WE WOULD AP-
PRECIATE RUN-DOWN ON WHO THEY ARE. IF C/I :NTURE INTO TALKS
WITH LOCAL FEDAYEEN (CHARIKS) OR MARXIST-C D MUJAHIDIN,
THIS WOULD REPRESENT A VALUABLE OPERATION . HE SHOULD
VISIT TEHRAN UNIVERSIT A CENTER FOR LEF CTIVITY, IN ORDER
TO MOVE AGAINST THIS TA ET.

3. WHILE UNFUSIL/1 (F/1), PER PARA F B, HAS EXCEL-
LENT ENTREE TO KHOMEINI GROUP, THESE CF LS MAY WORK TO
HIS DISADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO TALK TO LEADERS. IT HAS
BEEN REPORTED THAT AYATOLLAH SAQDARI, R OF THE KURDISH
SHIITES WHO WAS CLOSE TO KHOMEINI, HA KURDISTAN AND THAT
ALAMEH MOFTI-ZADEH WHO WAS KHOMEINI'S O THE KDP HAS LOST
HIS POPULARITY AND IS ISOLATED. THE E ARE SOMEWHAT AT
A LOSS AS TO HOW BEST F/1 MIGHT APP OBLEM. IF HE PLACES
HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL OF KHOMEINI GRO EXPECT THAT HE WILL
GET CANNED EXPLANATION OF HOW PGOI O HANDLE MINORITY
DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY. ON OTHER HA /1 TRAVELS ON OWN
STEAM, AS SUGGESTED FOR C/I, HE P OULD HAVE REASONABLE
CHANCE OF SUCCESS. IF F/1 VISITS WE WOULD WANT HIM TO
VISIT KHOMEINI GROUP (INCLUDING END OF TRIP AND WE
WOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE REQUIR RIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE
FROM PARIS.

4. BOTH C/I AND F/1 SHOULD STAY AT INTERCONTINENTAL
HOTEL (JOURNALIST HANG-OUT). LANNING DEPART PARIS 20
APRIL, SU C/I PLAN LEA TER SO HE WILL BE
TALKING TO ANNOUNCED. EVENTS IN
IRAN ARE MUCH IN FLUX AN USEFUL TO READ TIME-
FRAME OF COVERAGE. WE WOU TO PROVIDE F/1 AND C/I
WITH STATION CONTACT PHONE D INITIAL MEETING COULD BE
HELD AT HOTEL ROOM. PLEAS LANGUAGE CAPABILITY EACH
ASSET AND TRUE NAME AS WE TO THE WIRE. STATION WILL
PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTI

5. FILE: 29-6-948/ 4284. RVW 15APR99 DRV DOC.1
IT



2 8 18 24z

E C R E T 281515Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 9853

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 419577
B. TEHRAN 52785

1. C/O BRIEFED UNCAMEL/1 GENERA ELEVANT SECTIONS OF REFS. RE PARA 4 REF A, UNCAMEL/1 KNOWS NO ONE WITHIN IRANIAN COMMUNIST ELEMENTS BUT SAID SOMEONE WHO DOES - JACQUES V A R I N, WHO WORKS AT FR MUNIST PARTY (PCF) PUBLICATION "FRANCE-NOUVELLE". AC O UNCAMEL/1, VARIN HAD CLOSE CONTACTS WITHIN TUDEH WH DUAL IRANIAN COMMUN- ISTS WERE LIVING HERE IN EXILE AN CLANDESTINITY. VARIN ALSO HANDLED PRINTING TRACTS FOR CAMEL/1 KNOWS VARIN PERSONALLY AND WILL SOLICIT HIS D AID ON POSSIBLE TRIP TO IRAN. UNCAMEL/1 BELIEVES TH LL AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (AFP) OFFICE IN TEHRAN N CONFIR LBL AND WILL MAKE INQUIRIES HERE RE WHO IS WILL ADVISE.

2. INDEX/VARIN. FILE: 48/3. RVW 20APR99 DRV D90.1.
S E C R E T

11 May 79 23 50

C R E T 122322 MAY 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 437053.

PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL UNFUSED, INTEL

REFS: A. NIT-10,581 TEHRAN 53026 TDFIRDB-315/08453-79
B. NIT-10,582 TEHRAN 53013 TDFIRDB-315/08529-79

1. REFS WERE GOOD REPORTS WHICH WERE WELL RECEIVED. IT RAISES THE QUESTION ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, WHETHER GHASEMLOU'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK) AND BARZANI'S KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) ARE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PARTIES, OR WHETHER THEY ARE FACTIONS OF THE SAME PARTY. THERE IS CONFLICTING REPORTING ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE RECENT PAST. TO ADD TO THE CONFUSION, SDGASLEY REPORTED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR LEADERS AT THE 25 FEBRUARY 1979 FOURTH GENERAL CONGRESS OF THE DPK IS A CLOSE ADVISER TO JALAL TALABANI (WHO HE SHOW HEADS THE PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN ((PUK)) AND SUPPOSEDLY SPOKE FOR TALABANI AT THE CONGRESS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION APPROPRIATE SOURCES COULD PROVIDE ON THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE DPK, AS WELL AS CLARIFICATION OF ABOVE, AND, IF A FACTION OF A CROSS-BORDER PARTY, ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY.

3. NO FILE. RVW 11 MAY 99 DRV DSC.1 ALLSECRET.

SECRET


DPK CADW
DPK OFFICE
TEL 976-127
BRITISH SOCIETY HEAD W/ITES TO DPK
105



E T 051533Z JUN

RIS 10276

EHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

EL AJAJA UNCAMEL

S: A. TEHRAN 53294
B. DIRECTOR 451889
C. TEHRAN 51410

1. REGRET DELAY BUT
REPORT VIS-A-VIS TRIP TO I
TRAVEL BY END NEXT WEEK.
LEFTIST MAGAZINE, "DEMAIN
IN PAST, TOLD THEM HE HAD
FINANCIAL SUPPORT) FROM
IF MAGAZINE WOULD BE INI
PHOTOS. EDITORS RESPON
ENTHUSIASM AND UNCAMEL/
OF ACCREDITATION. HE
FRENCH COMMUNIST PART
HE HAD BEEN TOLD HAD
DUCED HIM TO NOURI A
PRESIDENT OF ONE-YEA
(ASSOCIATION FRANCAI
D'IRAN). ALBALA PR
VARIN IS ATTEMPTING
DESCRIBED AS MAN "
ADVISE FURTHER DEV
1 HAD LITTLE TO
BE ABLE TO
ITORS OF PARIS
E HAS WRITTEN
ITH IMPLIED
D) AND ASKED
OR HIS ARTICLES/
WITHOUT MARKED
LEAST GET LETTER
VARIN, CONTACT AT
CE-NOUVELLE" WHO
Y; VARIN INTRO-
EN, PCF MEMBER,
TION, AFASPI
TY AVEC LE PEUPLE
IONS IN IRAN.
ET FNU N A Z A R I,
N PARIS. WILL

3. IS REF
UNCAMEL/ WOULD
TION.
GREE THAT
LE INFORMA-

4. INDE
25 JUN 9
S E C R E T
4284. RVW

/AM 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR.

/A 76

/OLLOWING IS NEW CONTACT PLAN FOR UNCAMEL/1. PHONE
[redacted] EXT 1138 RPT 1138 DAYTIME OR 835-5138 RPT
[redacted], AND ASK FOR "JOAN" WITH C/1 IDENTIFYING
[redacted]. MEETING WILL OCCUR AT LOCATION AND DATE GIVEN
[redacted] CONVERSATION, [redacted] RPT ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN
[redacted]. C/1 SHOULD [redacted] MAGAZINE IN HIS HAND,
[redacted] OFFICER.

2. REQUEST PHYSICAL SURV [redacted] UNCAMEL/1 NO LONGER IN
[redacted] FILE WORLDWIDE. PLEASE [redacted].

3. FILES: 819-[redacted]

/ 8 JUL 99 DRV D9 C.1. ALL SECRET.

17 SEP

S E C R E T 151530Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE WESTPORT 44610 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, BONN, MUNICH, TEHRAN, ANKARA.

should have gone Baghdad

MNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA TRACE

REF: WESTPORT 44648

1. FOLLOWING IS A BIOGRAPHIC/BACKGROUND AND PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT REPORT ON AHMED RUEF AL-NAKIB, AN IRAQI KURD WHO WALKED IN AT THE USCONSGEN IN MUNICH ON 27 -7675 1979 AND WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INTERVIEWED BY ELMER J. ZAKRISON IN MUNICH:

A. AHMED RUEF AL-NAKIB (FROM HERE ON A) WAS BORN ON 10 NOVEMBER 1931 IN SULEYMANIYA, KURDISTAN, IRAQ. A KURDISH NATIONAL AND IRAQI CITIZEN. IN 1950, FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL (GIMNASIUM) IN SULEYMANIYAH, HE ENROLLED IN AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL IN ABU-GREB, NEAR BAGHDAD. A DID NOT GRADUATE FROM THE ABOVE SCHOOL; HOWEVER, YEARS LATER, HE CONTINUED HIS STUDIES AT THE NICOLAE BALCESCU FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE IN BUCHAREST, ROMANIA. IN ROMANIA, A MET ILSE MEE GEGESCH, AN ETHNIC GERMAN WHOM HE MARRIED IN 1964. THEY HAVE A 7-YEAR-OLD SON, NURI. FROM 1956 TO 1958, A SERVED WITH THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT IN THE IRAQI ARMY IN KURDISTAN. SINCE 1961, A INTERMITTENTLY RESIDED IN IRAQ, IRAN AND WEST GERMANY. FROM 1961 TO 1962 HE RESIDED IN FRANKFURT-MAIN, AFTERWARDS IN STUTTGART (1961-64), MUNICH (1964-65), GIESSEN (1965-68) TEHRAN (3 MONTHS IN 1968), SULEYMANIYAH (1968-75), WHERE HE SERVED AS DIRECTOR OF THE LOCAL AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION CENTER. FROM 1975 TO 1974, FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, A WAS AN AGRICULTURAL ADVISER TO MUSTAFA B A R Z A N I, THE LATE KURDISH REBEL LEADER. IN 1974, WHEN THE KURDISH REVOLT AGAINST THE IRAQI ARMY WAS CRUSHED, A CROSSED THE IRAQI-IRANIAN BORDER INTO IRAN WITH THE RETREATING KURDS. THERE, HE INITIALLY RESIDED IN A KURDISH REFUGEE CAMP, NEAR PAVE (FOR CIRCA 5 MONTHS). THEN, FOR ANOTHER NINE MONTHS, HE RESIDED AT SARPOLZAHAB, ALSO IN IRAN. AFTER 15 DAYS IN TEHRAN, A LEFT FOR DUESSELDORF,

WEST GERMANY, WHERE HE RESIDED WITH HIS BROTHER DR. [illegible]ARI NURI UNTIL 1975. FROM 1975 TO JUNE 1979, A RESIDED IN [illegible]EYMANIYAH, WHERE HE WAS MOSTLY UNEMPLOYED AND LIVED OFF SUBSI[illegible]NCE GIVEN TO HIM BY HIS WEALTHY FATHER. IN BETWEEN, IN FALL [illegible] 1978, A VISITED HIS BROTHER AND IN-LAWS IN WEST GERMANY. [illegible]AIMS THAT HE COULD NOT FIND SUITABLE WORK BECAUSE OF DISCRIMI[illegible]ION TOWARDS THE KURDS ON THE PART OF THE IRAQI GOVERNME[illegible]

3. A CLAIMS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BARDINGI TR[illegible] (SOMETIMES [illegible]) AND THE SON OF SHEIK RSUF AL-NAKI[illegible] 67-YEAR-OLD WELL-KNOWN BUSINESSMAN AND LANDOWNER IN [illegible]EYMANIYAH. (TEL: 25846). FATHER OWNS A PLANTATION, EXPENSIVE [illegible]LA AND A NUMBER OF SHOPS IN SULEYMANIYAH. A HAS TWO BROTHERS [illegible]OTH FORMER ARMY COLONELS IN IRAQ: TAHER AL-NAGIB, AN A[illegible]NTANT AT A GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN BAGHDAD; AND SALHALDIN AL-[illegible]B, AN OFFICIAL AT THE ARMY INDUCTION CENTER IN KIRKUK. ANO[illegible]R BROTHER, TARIK NURI, A PHYSICIAN WHO OWNS HIS OWN PRACTICE, RE[illegible]S IN GIESSENKIRCHEN, NEAR MOENCHENGLADBACH, FRG.

4. POLITICAL AFFILIATION: A CLAIMS TO BE A MEM[illegible] OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN - DPK (IRAQ). FROM 1956 [illegible] 1968, HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE DPK'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. EARLY [illegible] HE WAS SECRETARY OF THE KURDISH STUDENT ORGANIZATION IN E[illegible]E. A CLAIMS TO KNOW WELL ALL LEADING PEOPLE OF THE DPK IN [illegible]Q, AS WELL AS A LARGE NUMBER OF KURDISH LEADERS IN IRAN. [illegible]NOWS PERSONALLY BOTH TWO SONS, MASRUTH AND IDRIS, OF MUSTAFA [illegible]ZANI. A CLAIMS THAT MASRUTH BARZANI WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE MU[illegible]FA BARZANI AS THE OFFICIAL LEADER OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE. M[illegible]TH WAS REPORTED TO BE CURRENTLY IN EASTERN TURKEY. A ALSO [illegible]IMS THAT HIS POLITICAL OPPONENT FROM EARLIER DAYS IN EUROPE [illegible] ABDEL RAZAK BARZANI. CURRENTLY THE HEAD OF THE KURDISH [illegible]MO-CRATIC PARTY, [illegible]. [illegible]QAIYWU STUDIED IN THE USSR AND I[illegible] COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER. HE IS THE AUTHOR OF A BOOK ON KURDI[illegible]. A STATES THAT THERE ARE CURRENTLY TWO REBEL FACTIONS IN I[illegible] ONE LED BY IDRIS BARZANI; THE OTHER ONE HEADED [illegible] JELAL T A [illegible]; A PRO-COMMUNIST WHO WENT TO MAHABA[illegible]

IRAN, TO HELP THE KURDS THERE GAIN THEIR AUTONOMY [illegible] THE IRANIANS.

D. CONNECTIONS WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: A CLAIMS THAT HE SOUGHT HELP FOR THIS PEOPLE BY INFLUENCING VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS, THRU THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, OF THE PLIGHT OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE IN THEIR RIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND/OR AUTONOMY. IN 1954, 1957, AND AGAIN IN FALL 1958, A CONTACTED THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BAD GODESBERG, WHERE HE HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS THERE. HE ALSO [illegible] REPORTS ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ. A CLAIMS [illegible] OF FUNDS KEEP HIM NOW FROM GOING TO SEE THE ISRAELIS [illegible] BAD GODESBERG. IN 1968, A ALSO ESTABLISHED CONTACT [illegible] IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SAVAK, IN BAD GODESBERG. ASSOCIATION WITH SAVAK CONTINUED UNTIL 1975, WHEN HE VISITED IRAN. IN 1968, A WAS THE GUEST OF SAVAK IN [illegible] CIRCA THREE MONTHS. DURING THIS PERIOD, HE HELPED [illegible] RELATIONS BETWEEN SAVAK AND IRAQI KURDS, LED BY MUSTAFA BARZANI. A CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED SAVAK WITH LENGTHY DETAILED REPORTS ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ. [illegible] TO 1973, WHILE WITH THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN, [illegible] TAINED CONTACT WITH SAVAK. A EMPHASIZED THAT HE VOLUNTARILY PROVIDED INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS AND IRANIANS AND [illegible] AT NO TIME DID HE ACCEPT ANY FINANCIAL COMPENSATION [illegible] EXCEPT FOR EXPENSES.

E. CONNECTIONS WITH US OFFICIALS ABROAD: A ALSO [illegible] HELP BY CONTACTING US OFFICIALS AT DIFFERENT US INSTALLATIONS ABROAD. IN EITHER 1963 OR 1964, HE CONTACTED THE US EMBASSY IN BONN. IN 1968 AND IN 1974, HE CONTACTED THE US CONSULATE IN TEHRAN. THERE, IN 1974, HE DISCUSSED THE KURDISH PROBLEM WITH MR. LARRY THOMAS (P). SEPTEMBER 1978, A VISITED THE EMBASSY IN ANKARA, WHERE HE VERBALLY REPORTED ON THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. IN OCTOBER 1978, HE VISITED THE US CONSULATE IN MUNICH, WHERE HE DISCUSSED THE KURDISH PROBLEM WITH A

[illegible]

T

48610



PAGE 5 WESTPORT 48610 S E C R E T
COMUNISTS FROM TAKING O R FULL CONTROL OF KURDISTA WHEN
ASKED BY ZAKHILSON WHETHE OR NOT HE WOULD BE INTERE D IN
COOPERATING WITH AIS HE BOVE, A NSWERED THAT HE W L BE
HAPPY TO DO SO, BUT ONLY IN RETURN FOR U.S. BACKING THE
KURDISH CAUSE AND NOT FO FINANCIAL COMPENSATION.

3. A PLANS TO RETURN ITH WIFE (WHO HAS WEST GER N PASS-
PORT) AND SON TO IRAQ ON SEPT 1979. HE IS IN POSS SION
OF IRAQI PASSPORT (DID NO HAVE PASSPORT WITH HIM DU
INTERVIEW) WITH WEST GERM 3-MONTH VISA VALID UNTIL SEPT.
IF HQS IS INTERESTED IN FU THER ASSESSING AND/OR RECR ITING A
PLEASE ADVISE. A COULD BE RECONTACTED THRU HIS IN-LA , FAM.
GEGESCH, KIRCHSEEONERSTR 6 II, EGELFARTING, NEAR MUN
(WHERE HE CURRENTLY RESIDE , TEL: 08091-2582, OR THR IS
BROTHER IN GIESSENKIRCHEN, HERE HE PLANS TO VISIT PRI TO
HIS DEPARTURE FROM GERMANY.

4. A S REPORT AND THREE PHOTOS (A WITH SOME INFLUEN L
KURDS) WILL BE POUCHED TO HQ ASAP.

5. NAFILE DEFER. RVW 10 SEP 99 DRV DD C1.

E C R E T
BT
48610

12 SEP 19

E C R E T 1206332 SEP 7[illegible]

TE DIRECTOR 511480.

O: IMMEDIATE WESTPORT [illegible] IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH, GERMANY.
OSTINE TEHRAN, ANKARA [illegible]

NINTEL KYBAT AJAJA TRAC

EFS: A. WESTPORT [illegible] (NOTAL RELATES ISTANBUL)
B. WESTPORT [illegible] NOTAL)

1. A. REQ HAS FOLLOWI[illegible] ON REMAN KAUT AL-M A'Q I B (PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED 201-0772961).

2. FOR BAC[illegible] OF 6 APRIL 1965. THE OFFICIAL SOURCE SERVICE LISTED MAHIN AS [illegible] LIAISONOFFICER OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS SOCIETY IN EUROPE (KSSE) [illegible] GRADUATED FROM THE IRAQI AGRICULTURAL SECONDARY SCHOOL AND W[illegible] STUDENT IN RUMANIA IN 1959/60. SPECIALI-ZING IN GENERAL AGRIC[illegible]

3. IN DOBR[illegible] OF 31 MARCH 1965, MAQIB'S WIFE CLAIMED SHE WAS FORCED TO AGR[illegible] WORK WITH THE RUMANIAN SECRET SERVICE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A [illegible] TO JOIN HER HUSBAND IN GERMANY IN 1961. IN SHIER OR CL[illegible] HER COMPANY, MAQIB BELIEVED SHE WAS STILL COLLABORATING A[illegible] AND THAT SHE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE RUMANIANS.

4. [illegible] OF 20 NOVEMBER 1965 STATED THAT MAQIB CAME TO THE EMBASSY IN [illegible] ASKED TO SPEAK WITH A POLITICAL OFFICER. THIS SOURCE [illegible] THIS DOCUMENT (WHICH IN THE LAST ONE IN WILE) IS ALMOST V[illegible] WITH THIS) CONTAINED IN REF A. MAQIB WAS TOLD THAT WHILE [illegible] WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE CAUSE OF MINORITIES, OFFICIAL[illegible] THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN [illegible] FORCES. MAQIB STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS [illegible] OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION AND THAT HE WOULD NOT MISINTERPRET WI[illegible] OF POLITICAL OFFICERS TO READ HIS STORY AS ANY INDICATION O[illegible] ASSET SUPPORT FOR BARZANI'S KURDS.

5. SUBJ APP[illegible] BE OF DEFINITE OPERATIONAL INTEREST AND, PER REF A, PARA 2, [illegible] CAUTION OFFICER WITH MIDDLE EAST



S E C R E T

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 51144 S E C R E T

FOLLOW-UP DEBRIEFING. EGS OFFICE

EXPERIENCE SHOULD FAIL IF NO SUCH IS SENT ON ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT

R. FRANK ANDERSON WILL BE IN FEW DAYS. MR. ANDERSON WILL MEET

ND. IF SUBJ CAN DELAY DEPARTURE CONTACT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT HE

IM. REQUEST WHETHER CONTACT SHOULD PERHAPS 22 SEPT. AND ADVISE EQS

AN REMAIN MUNICH. HOPEFUL WILL

MEDIATELY.

3. DEBRIEFING REPORT [illegible] WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.

4. BONN: FYI MARI [illegible] IN TELEPHONE IDEA PERSON OFFICER M

JACK CAMERON SEES [illegible] AMB. HOR FIRST. MR. CAMERON

RETURN HOME UPON COMPLETION [illegible] BONN CABLE. YOU MY SEE. CHARLS

REMAIN IN MUNICH BRIEFING [illegible] NOT MAY BE NECESSARY ASK MR.

CAMERON TO HANDLE THIS REQUEST. REQUEST BE STAND FAST DOWN

UNTIL DECISION MADE.

5. FILE: [illegible] VW 12 SEP 60 DEC DOC. 2. ALL SECRE

S E C R E T

#9B2



12 Sep

E T 12 0357Z SEP 79 STAFF

TPORT 8628

ED AT DIRECTOR INFO BONN, GERMANY MUNICH, IRAN, ISLAMABAD

RY AT AJJA

RECTO 5 1480

AHMAD ALI AL-M A D I B HAS AGREED TO POSTPONE HIS E FROM GERMANY UNTIL 22 SEPTEMBER. HE IS LOOKING TO MEETING MIDDLE EAST SPECIALIST AND EXPECTS PHONE ON ZARISON AT 1000 HOURS ON 18 SEPTEMBER M AL-NAQUI O RETURN TO IRAQ BY AUTOMOBILE VIA YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE KE .

IF WE PORT CAN SUPPORT NEAR EAST OFFICER IN ANY WAY

FILE 201-8722 61. RVW 12 SEP 99 V D9C1.

ET







13 Sep 79 15 3 Z

S E C R E T 122307Z SEP 79 STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 51223.

: IMMEDIATE WESTPORT. CONN INFO GERMANY. [illegible] TEHRAN.

INTEL REBAT AJAJA CORE

REFS: A. WESTPORT [illegible]
B. DIRECTOR [illegible]

1. APPRECIATE KISON'S EFFORTS PER[illegible] MR. FRANK NDERSON ARRIVING [illegible] VIA LUFTANSA 69 FR[illegible]ON 18 SEPT AT 435 HOURS (ITINERARY [illegible]RADE FORWARDED HUM[illegible]. AS SOON AS NDERSON HAS CONTACT[illegible]WICH BASE AND DET[illegible]NE HIS SCHEDULE. NDERSON WILL CONTAC[illegible]STPORT RE AL-HAQIB[illegible].

2. FOR BONN: APPRECIATE MR. JACK G[illegible]SON STANDING BY; HOWEVER, IN VIEW [illegible] AND ANDERSON AVA[illegible]ILITY, REQUEST THAT GRIERSON RETURN HQS.

3. FILE: [illegible]561. RFW 12SEP79 [illegible] DOCCI ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#1284

15 SEP 79

E T 140900Z SEP 79

KARA 44631

FORT INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, BONN, MUNICH, TEHRAN.

EYBAT AJAJA TRACE

STPOT 48610

ER REF PARA 1E PLS SEE EMBASSY ANKARA A[illegible] A-70 DT
S FOI REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AHMED [illegible] AL-NAKIB

E: DEFER. RVW 14 SEP 99 DRV DSC.1.
T



R E T 111320Z SE PD STAFF

[illegible] 48619

[illegible], BERLIN, PARIS, TEHRAN INFO GERMANY BONN, ROME.

[illegible] GARCOPS KIRIA INTEL

[illegible] ON KURDISH REFUGEES IS FROM UNTESTED SOURCE [illegible] OF INTEREST

[illegible]

1. IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS KURDISH REFUGEES HAVE BEEN HEADING [illegible] INCREASING NUMBERS FOR WEST BERLIN SINCE THERE IS AN EXILE [illegible] REFUGEES ARE USING TWO [illegible]

2. [illegible]

[illegible] VIDING KURDISH [illegible] THE REFUGEES HAVE VALID IRANIAN TRAVEL DOCUMENTS.

[illegible] KURDS FROM IRAQ, IRAN, SYRIA AND TURKEY ARE TO MEET [illegible] IN ORDER TO AGREE ON A [illegible] DURING THE [illegible] COURSE OF ACTION.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] INCREASING SIGNS THAT [illegible] INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION [illegible] THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNS THAT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES [illegible] ROUTES USED THERE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES [illegible] PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE WILL BE LAUNCHED IN EUROPE TO BOLSTER THE KURDS [illegible] OTHER EUROPEAN IRANIAN GROUPS, WHICH ARE PRIMARILY MARXIST [illegible] CAMPAIGN. [illegible] OTHER GROUPS, WHICH ARE PRIMARILY [illegible] [illegible] HAVE TAKEN OR THEIR SUPPORT [illegible] [illegible] TO GAIN MORE [illegible] FOR MINORITIES IN [illegible] KURDISH DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER TO GAIN MORE [illegible] ADVANTAGE OF THE ANTI-REGIME KURDISH DEMONSTRATION OF ALL [illegible] [illegible] OF THE INCREASED SUPPRESSION OF [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] IN IRAN. THE WEST BERLIN-BASED [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] TORTURE IN IRAN [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

136



19 SEP 79 ... 22Z

... 82 SEP 79-STAFF

... ANKARA, STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN

... ANY AVAILABLE HQS AND ADDEE INFO

... STOCKHOLM OF A KURDISH ASSOCIATION

... KURDISH SEPARIST MOVEMENTS IN TURK

... ACTIVELY PREPARING INTEL DISSEM ON T

... AND WORLD APPRECIATE INFO ASAP.

... 19 SEP 99 DRV DSCS ALL SECRET



S E C R E T 1 9 3442Z SEP 75 ATF

CITE ST CKHOL 26184

TO: F CURITY ISTANBUL INFO KARA, TEHRAN DIREC

WNINT EL INTEL

REF: IS ANBUL 3265

1. SECRET AVE NO INFO ESTABLISHMENT KURD
ASSOC ATION IN STOCKHOLM. L QUERY LIAISON AT
BUT R PLY WIL NOT BE RECE IN TIME FO YOUR

2. N FILE RUV 19 SEP RV D90.5.
S E C R E T



S E C R E T 230[illegible] STAT

CITE DIRECTOR 517248.

TO: PRIORITY ISTANBUL, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM, [illegible]

INFO: [illegible] INTEL

REF: ISTANBUL 33065

1. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT DOUBT ITS EXISTENCE, [illegible] INFORMATION ON ANY KURDISH ASSOCIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM.

2. NO FILE. RYW 19 SEP 89 DRV 89C1.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

28 Sep 79 0? 4.2

S E C R E T 2906192 SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 522759.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - PLANS AND INTENTIONS OF FEDAYEEN AND CHARIK STUDENTS TO CREATE A FEDAYEEN PARTY

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED FROM SDPARTNER/1 25 SEPTEMBER. INVITE STATION COMMENTS.

AT A MEETING OF KURDISH NATIONALISTS, CHARIK AND FEDAYEEN STUDENTS OPPOSED TO THE REGIME OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THE STUDENTS DETERMINED THAT THEY HAVE LOST POWER AND REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN IRAN, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD A LARGE ROLE IN OVERTHROWING THE SHAH, BECAUSE THEY HAD NO REAL POLITICAL POWER BASE MECHANISM TO ENSURE THAT THEY HAD A SAY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ONCE THE PHYSICAL ACT OF REMOVING THE SHAH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE FEDAYEEN THEREFORE HAVE DETERMINED THEIR IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IS TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL PARTY UNDER THE OFFICIAL REGULATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

RECOGNIZING THAT THIS PARTY WILL BE CONTROVERSIAL IN CURRENT DAY IRAN, WHILE THEY INTEND TO HAVE VARIOUS FRONT PEOPLE PRESENT IN IRAN, THE ACTUAL LEADERSHIP WILL BE OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY AND, AS PRESENTLY INTENDED, BASED IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

2. FILE: 201-962539. RVW 27SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2427

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—225 323

FEDAYEEN PARTY

COMPETITION FOR REPRESENTATION IN
RLIAMENT WILL BE ORGANIZED ON PARTY BASIS, AND IT ENTIRELY
IBLE THAT STUDENTS WOULD WANT TO GET INTO THE ACT.

2. REF ALLUSION TO "CHARIK AND FEDAYEEN" STUDENTS
EARS TO BE A MISNOMER, AS THE TWO TERMS ARE PART OF THE NAME
A SINGLE ORGANIZATION, THE CHARIKA-YE-FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ. WAS
PARTNER/I REFERRING ONLY TO THE ONE ORGANIZATION, OR DID HE
END TO INCLUDE ALSO THE ISLAMIC-ORIENTED MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ?
AVE NOT BEFORE HEARD OF SIGNIFICANT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
SH NATIONALISTS AND THE FEDAYAN.

OF EMIGRE ACTIVITY,



[redacted]

[redacted]ITIES COULD BE USED TO GOOD EFFECT AS WE SEEK
[redacted]NCE VARIOUS U.S. INTERESTS HERE, ESPECIALLY IN INTEL
[redacted]ION FIELD. THE OTHER EDGE OF THE SWORD AS WE SEE IT HERE
[redacted]T MANY--MAYBE MOST--IRANIANS TEND T@ SEE THE SUPERPOWERS
[redacted] FROM SAME CLOTH, AND
[redacted]S AUDIENCE WILL ASSUME THAT, WHATEVER THE RUSSIANS
[redacted] DOING, WE MUST BE INVOLVED IN SOMETHING EQUALLY
[redacted]US. FOR THIS REASON, WE SUSPECT THAT MOST EFFECTIVE USE
[redacted] ON SOVIET SUPPORT TO ETHNIC SEPARATISTS WOULD INVOLVE
[redacted] BRIEFINGS OF RELEVANT OFFICIALS.

[redacted]



2 Oct 79

DIRECTOR, TEHRAN

INTEL

STATION FEELS THAT ANY COVERT ACTION EFFORT TO LI
SOVIETS WITH KURDISH MINORITIES IN IRAN OR, BY EXTENS
PARTY IN ORDER TO BE CREDIBLE WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED O
UNPOSTABLE EVIDENCE. OTHERWISE OUR EFFORT MIGHT BE

ACTION [illegible]. MOST RECENT INFO ON ARMS SUPPLY
SH KURDS COMES FROM EXPROMISE/1 WHO HAS JUST RETURNED
TO EASTERN TURKEY WHERE HE TALKED WITH SENIOR TURKISH
FFICERS. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, SOVIET RIFLES
UGGLED VIA THE BLACK SEA INTO THE TRABZON AREA.
INE [illegible] THAT COULD HAVE AN IMPACT
IN [illegible] DETAILS.

1 OCT [illegible] DDY B96.5 ARMS SMUGGLING



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/WNINTEL--NO[illegible]--OCONTRACT--OR
COUNTRY: IRAQ
SUBJECT: THE IRAQ[illegible] REGIME'S POLICY [illegible] KURDISH ISSU
(DOI: MID-AUGUST - EARLY OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL ISRAELI SERVICE FROM SEVERAL USUAL
RELIABLE SOURCES.

1. IN MID-AUGUST 1979, THE IRAQI [illegible] BEGAN TO CONDUCT
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN. IRAQI UNITS RECEIVED AIR SUPPORT. IN [illegible] OCTOBER THE OPERATIONS INCREASED, BUT ROUTINE SECURITY ACTIVITY IN THE AREA CONTINUED.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, THE IRAQI REGIME HAS MADE SEVERAL GESTURES. KURDS EXILED TO CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN IRAQ AFTER THE MARCH 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR AREAS. AUGUST 1979 UNDER AN AMNESTY DECLARED BY THE IRAQI REGIME, KURDISH EXILES, MAINLY IN IRAN, WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO IRAQ.

3. (ISRAELI SERVICE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ON THE SURFACE THE MOVES MENTIONED ABOVE SEEM CONTRADICTORY, THEY ARE ACTUALLY PARTS OF THE SAME COHERENT POLICY. BOTH ARE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THE KURDISH PROBLEM AND TO RESTORE QUIET IN THEIR AREAS. SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS APPEAR TO INFLUENCE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THIS ISSUE. FIRST OF ALL THE POLICY ON KURDISTAN IS DETERMINED BY IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN'S DESIRE TO BASE THE REVOLUTION THROUGHOUT IRAQ. SECONDLY FOLLOWING THE EXECUTIONS AND APPARENT CONSOLIDATION OF HIS OPPONENTS WITHIN THE IRAQI REGIME, THERE IS A DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE RECENT KURDISH MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE KURDS HAVE BENEFITED FROM IRAN TO WAGE THE BATTLES THERE WITH GOVERNMENT TROOPS SINCE THE [illegible] OF 1979. THAT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS [illegible]. THIRDLY, [illegible] CULTURAL RESETTLING THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION ABANDONED BY THE [illegible] FOLLOWING THE END OF THE REBELLION IN MARCH 1975 HAS [illegible] ENTERED THE AUTHORITIES TO CONCLUDE THAT ONLY THE KURDS [illegible] CAN RESETTLE THE REMOTE VILLAGES OF KURDISTAN.)

ACQ: ISRAEL, TEL AVIV (29 OCTOBER 197[illegible] FIELD NO: NFW-2

FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT TEL AVIV - SENT TO AMMAN, BEIR
TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEA



E C R E T 030147Z NOV 79 AFF

TE DIRECTOR 545787.

TEL AVIV INFO TEHRAN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
ARACHI, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI,
NTEL INTEL FGI ZEVAHOO

TEL AVIV 30031 (NFW-23

1. NOT ISSEMINAD REP AS
RMATION TO BE OF INTEREST
THAT PRESENT IRAQI REGIME
OT METHOD OF RULING. HOWEVER IN
CE THAT AN INCREASE IN MILITARY
S TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST.
OWS SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTING
AKOR OF SUCH STEPPED UP IRAQI
HAVE BEEN OF MORE INTERESTED
MATION TO SUPPORT CLAIM THAT
SARA WAS INTO ON RESETTLEMENT
OWERED IN BAGHDAD INTERESTED
OCEDURE AS ONE DESIGNED TO

NO FILE RVW INCOMING DR

E T



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON
COUNTRY: IRAQ/IRAN
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN KURDISH AFFAIRS (OCT) (OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A NEW SOURCE GOING A NUMBER OF KURDISH VISITORS T BRITAIN."

1. A KURD WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG KURDISH VISITORS TO BRITAI SAID IN LATE OCTOBER 1979 THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SPLIT BETWEEN MASTUD B A R Z A N I AND H S BROTHER IDRIS B A R Z A N I. THE FORMER HAS STATED THAT IRAQI AND IRANIAN KURDS SHOULD COORDINATE IRAQI AFFAIRS WITH THE IRANIAN KURDS AND VICE VERSA. HE [illegible] BY GOVERNMENTS IN ONE OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THE OTHER, AND HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI KURDS COMBINED COULD CREATE AN INDEPENDENT UNIT WHICH WOULD NOT BE DOMINATED BY EITHER GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE KURD, IDRIS BARZANI FELT THAT KURDISH AGITATIONS COULD BE BETTER SERVED BY CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE AYATOLLAH. KUBOLLA K H O E I N I IN IRAN. T [illegible] AND IDRIS ESTABLISHED A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH [illegible] WHO WAS GOING TO USE THE KURDS AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE [illegible] BRITISH COMMENT: THE SPLIT BETWEEN MASTUD AND IDRIS IS BOGUS AND WAS CREATED FOR TACTICAL REASONS TO ALLOW THE IRAQI KURDS A REFUGE IN IRAN IF IT WAS NEEDED. MASTUD, RATHER THAN IDRIS, HAS THE SUPPORT OF KURDISH FIGHTERS.)

3. THE KURD SAID MR. MAHMUD O T H M A N, WHO HAD FORMED A SPLINTER GROUP OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) AFTER THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT, HAD MADE HIS PEACE WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY OF HIS FOLLOWERS WERE IN BAGHDAD IN OCTOBER; THEY HAD ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE IRAN WITH THEIR WEAPONS BUT HAD BEEN DISARMED BEFORE DEPARTURE BY JALAL T A L A B A N I 'S MEN.

4. THE KURD ALSO SAID THAT THE KDP NO LONGER EXPECTED HELP FROM [illegible] COUNTRIES. IT PINNED ITS HOPES ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE [illegible] HAD MADE CONTACT WITH KURDISH REPRESENTATIVES IN WEST [illegible]

[illegible]: ENGLAND, LONDON (29 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD NO.



CE-74,357.

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AMMAN, [illegible] ONLY; DAMASCUS, JIDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T/WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS/NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS/DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR/PRI. [illegible] BY RECORD REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATIONS AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

S E C R E T



S E C R E T 301 59Z OCT 79 INTEL

IT LONDON 11402 ZNY XXXXX

DIRECTOR WFO ANKARA, BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, [illegible]
RIYADH, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

WMI FBI INTEL ZRWAHDQ

UPDATE: ZRWAHDQ FOR DESK REVIEW. GNDAPN FROM [illegible]
CK 79-[illegible] WITH DELICATE SOURCE CONTACT [illegible]
FIELD WO. CTL-79,357. NO LIAISON. NO [illegible]
RVW 30OCT99 BY DRV D98I BY 056156



REPORT CLASS S E [illegible] N--[illegible] O

COUNT [illegible]

SUBJECT: IRAQI KURDISH ACTIVITY [illegible]

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL ISRAELI SERVICE FROM A [illegible] OF DOCUMENTS

SOURCE'S IRAQI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES: [illegible]

DATE TESTED: [illegible]

1. EVERY WEEK THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT DISPATCHES MILITARY AND OTHER AID TO THE KURDS IN IRAN VIA THE SURJIL KURDISH [illegible] SERVE AS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S CAVALRY. (ISRAELI COMMENT: THESE ARE ARMED UNITS OF KURDS CULTIVATED BY BAGHDAD. KURDS FOUNDED IN IRAN AS TRANSFERRED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO MILITARY AND CIVILIAN HOSPITALS IN NORTHERN IRAQ. AGRICULTURAL [illegible] IN THE SULAIMANIYA AREA. THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN HOSPITALS [illegible] AREAS ARE PROVIDED WITH PERSONS SUFFERING FROM [illegible] ERNMENT ALSO ALLOWS THE KURDS OF IRAQ TO OBTAIN WEAPONS, [illegible] IRAN TO FIGHT AGAINST THE REGIME OF IRANIAN LEADER AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. EVERY KURD IN IRAQ MAY JOIN THE WAR IN IRAN ON HIS OWN. TO BE ARMED BY IRAQI AUTHORITIES OF IT. OFFICIALS CAN ALSO GO TO IRAN AND OBTAIN WEAPONS. ISRAELI SERVICE COMMENT: THIS INFORMS THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AFTER HAVING OBTAINED WEAPONS. THIS ACCOUNT SEEMS EXAGGERATED.

2. [illegible] KURDISH FAMILIES FROM IRAN HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO [illegible] IRAQ. ACCOMMODATION FOR THEM IS ARRANGED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THE AREAS OF KALAMJA AND PENJWIN, WHERE SPECIAL CAMPS, CONTAINING SMALL HOSPITALS, HAVE BEEN SET UP. EVERY DAY THEY ARE GIVEN FOOD AND MONEY. ALL THE LEADERSHIP MEMBERS OF BARZANI'S GROUP WHO RETURNED TO IRAQ RECENTLY, WERE HOUSED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE GIVEN HOUSES IN THE AL MANSOUR QUARTER IN BAGHDAD. A PRIVATE CAR AND A SUM OF MONEY. THEY WERE ALSO ALLOWED TO CHOOSE THE CITY OF THEIR RESIDENCE.

3. THE ACTIVITY OF JALAL TALABANI'S MEN IN NORTHERN [illegible] HAS NOW STOPPED COMPLETELY AS ALL THE ARMED MEN ARE WITH THE KURDS IN IRAN, OPERATING AGAINST KHOMEINI'S REGIME. THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE IRANIAN KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) ABDOL RAHMAN [illegible]


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



REPORT CLASS S E C R E T
COUNTRY: IRAQ
SUBJECT: RETURN OF RESETTLED KURDS
ORIGINAL REQUIREMENT
(DOI: LATE OCTOBER

SOURCE: A WELL ESTABLISHED
CONTACTS AMONG
PERSONALITIES.
ESTABLISHER.

1. DURING THE LATE SUMMER
KURDS WHO HAD BEEN FORCIBLY
YEARS AT LOCATIONS IN SOUTHERN
BASRA, AMARA AND KARBALA) IN
INTENDED TO DIFFUSE THE KURDISH
RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL SITES
HERE. THE BA'TH GOVERNMENT
(IN SOME CASES THEIR OWN HOMES
AFTER THEIR EARLIER RESETTLEMENT
FINANCIAL RELIEF TO TIDE THEM OVER
ESTABLISHED.

2. BY THIS CONCILIATORY MEASURE
MINORITY, THE BA'TH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
THE MILITANT KURDS INTO SUPPORTING
PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN IN ANY
FIELD COMMENT: SEE TDFIRDS-3
REPORTED THE RESETTLEMENT OF
REFUGEES IN IRAQ, ALSO TO BE USED
IN ANY EVENTUAL HOSTILITIES WITH

3. ACQ: 29 OCTOBER 1979.

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN,
DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KUWAIT,

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE
AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE
OT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR


DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR. ADM 3&CCT'S DIRECTIVE RECORDED REPORTING
OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS
OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.



31 Oct 79 09 57Z

S E C R E T 3013402 OCT 79 MATEL

CITE AMMAN 4813 (SCHUELKE ACTING) ZEXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KUWAIT, TEL AVIV, RIYADH, TEHRAN, [illegible], PARIS.

WAINDEL INTEL

SUBDATA: ZRWAHOC FOR HEADQUARTERS [illegible] OPACT: NONE.
SOURCE: CUMIRTHWI FROM [illegible] HQS)
(UNILATERAL). FIELD [illegible] 943. DACHSEL
OBTAINED: NO LIAISON [illegible] CL BY 037650.
CO: S-1HA. FILE DEFE[illegible] FOR KILTIGER;
PARIS FOR PRESTERAU AN[illegible]
FILED: 3013402

S E C R E T OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN

TO: DIRECTOR

WNINTEL INTEL SDBLADE

1. IN SW MESSAGE DROPED 10 OCTOBER, SDBLADE/1 REPORTED IRANIAN ARMY IS PLANNING "SEVER" AND "SERDOUS" ACTION AGIANST THE KURDISH REBELS IN WESTERN IRAN. PRESS IS CARRYING INTIMATIONS TO SAME EFFECT. THE PLANS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED NEXT WEEK. REMINDER OF MESSAGE REPORTED 9 OCTOBER ATTACK AGAINST PASSDARAN FORCES BY KURDS, AND VISIT OF DAFENSE MINISTER CHAMRAN TO KURDISTAN FOLLOWING THE ATTACK, ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN COPIOUSLY REPORTED IN LOCAL MEDIA.

2. FILE: 201-873159. RVW 11OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET S E C R E T

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station on 4th November 1979.



OFIRDB-311/1909-79

LIST: 1 NOVEMBER 1979

INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S E C R E T--WINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: INTENTIONS OF GENERAL MOBASSER IN EXILE OPPOSITION
INCLUDING KURDISH LEADER WITH SMALL ARMY
(DOI: OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A FORMER IRANIAN OFFICIAL OF PRESENTLY UNDETERMINED
RELIABILITY. HE HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION
REPORTED BELOW.

1. GENERAL MANOUCHEHR H A S H E M A, THE FORMER HEAD OF THE NOW DEFUNCT IRANIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANIZATION'S (SAVAK) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL ISS[illegible] ZADEH'S (SAVAK) THE FORMER HEAD OF THE WEST AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE [illegible] SAVAK, AND OTHER FORMER SAVAK OFFICERS MET WITH GENERAL KOHSEN M[illegible] B A S S E R, THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE, ON FRIDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1979, IN LONDON. GENERAL MOBASSER SPOKE OF THE NECESSITY FOR ORGANIZING A MOVEMENT TO RESIST THE NEW ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN BY GATHERING TOGETHER IRANIANS LIVING OUTSIDE IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT THE SUPPORTERS OF FORMER IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAPOUR B A K H T I A R HAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED TO FORM A VIABLE MOVEMENT AND THAT THE NEW MOVEMENT SHOULD GATHER TOGETHER ALL OFFICERS AND KNOWN IRANIANS WHO RESIDE IN LONDON. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: INFORMATION FROM OTHER REPORTING INDICATES THAT MOBASSER HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF BAKHTIAR.)

2. GENERAL MOBASSER TOLD THE SMALL GROUP THAT A LEADER OF A LARGE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAFS, RECENTLY VISITED LONDON AND MET WITH GENERAL MOBASSER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KURDISH LEADER IS ALSO IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR.) THE KURDISH LEADER HAS A SMALL ARMY OF 1500 MEN EQUIPPED WITH MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES WHICH BASED ON THE BORDER OF IRAN AND IRAQ. HE DOES NOT NEED FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUT HE DOES NEED MILITARY EXPERTS--AT LEAST TWO OR THREE WELL-TRAINED OFFICERS WHO CAN TRAIN HIS SMALL ARMY. THE K[illegible]



IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,

THE MERCIFUL AND THE COMPASSIONATE.

ILL-REPRODUCED AND MISSING DOCUMENTS FROM BOOK NO.32 (THE KURDISH PROBLEM) PART II ARE INCLUDED AT THE END OF THIS COLLECTION.

5 AUG [illegible] 2 HQ 2

S E C R E T 040112Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE FR SAN FRANCISCO 25018

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN

WNI PEL AJAJA ROM 24 SDTHROB

REF DIRECTOR 24911

1. THANKS FOR FINE WORK HERE BY TDY ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFFER ROB
STA /POOL AND FBI INS COUNTERPART LEE BEAUCHAMP, SDTHROP/1 (T/1) H
NOW ARMED WITH U.S. RE-ENTRY PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEA
AND RE-ENTER THE COUNTRY FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RTACTION. THF
ACCESS STAFF WHICH HAS ENDEARED ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBER
SHOULD ALSO HELP TO RESOLVE SOME OF HIS ANXIETIES OVER THEIR SITUA
AND ALLOW HIM TO CONCENTRATE NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

2. C/O MACHINSKY DISCUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION
AND TRAVEL ITINERARY WITH T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT
T/1 MAY EXPECT OF RTACTION AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BE

3. BASED UPON DSPS AND T/1 IS IN GERNAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS
APPROACH. THAT T/1 MAKE AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO
THREE WEEKS DURATION. AS SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED. FOR THE
PURPOSE OF RECONTACTING SUCH FORMER KURDISH ACQUAINTANCES AS HE CA
LOCATE AND GET TO SEE THEM. A LINE ON THEIR WHEREABOUTS OF OTH
HE SHOULD ALSO COLLECT ANY INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLAN
THE VARIOUS KURDISH PARTIES AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD
BE PROVIDED WITH A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL
STATION(S) DURING HIS VISIT. T/1 SHOULD STOPS IN LONDON, PARIS AND GERMANY.
OTHER THAN THOSE MENTIONED IN FR/SF 24837 AND FR/SF
2120. T/1 WOULD LIKE TO CONTACT IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF KDP LEADE
ISMAIL AHMED. T/1 IS ALSO ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN THE LOCATION OF ALI QAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY,
DAUGHTER THE PRESENT LOCATION OF ALI QAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY,
IS STILL HELD. HE MIGHT BE A KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHERS
PERSONAL ASSETS. INFORMATION, T/1'S OLD ADDRESS BOOKS AND FILES
REMAIN IN HIS POSSESSION IN TEHRAN APARTMENT AND STILL HAND PU
DECISION ON THIS. T/1 SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE
SUMMONED TO TEHRAN EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION FOR INTERVIEW.

2 FR/SAN FRANCIS[illegible] SECRET

COULD PASS THESE P[illegible] TO A STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING HERE.
TO HQS RE THIS P[illegible] LITY. OTHERWISE, T/1 WILL HAVE TO USE
PHONE DIRECTORIE[illegible] FREQUENT THE USUAL KURDISH HAUNTS.
USED THIS APPROACH[illegible] SOME SUCCESS DURING HIS 1975 TRIP TO
ROPE ON BEHALF OF TH[illegible]'S INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. T/1 HAS BEEN
RUCTED TO START NOW [illegible] THE PHONE AND TRY IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL
ESTABLISH WHEREABOU[illegible] OF HIS TARGETS.

4. T/1 BELIEVES [illegible] IS COVER STORY FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE SHOU
SEVERAL LAWYERS, T[illegible] FLED OFF ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.
MOST SUPERFICIAL I[illegible] WOULD BE A STORY OF TRAVEL TO SEE HIS
TER OR WIFE IN EU[illegible]. THE SECOND LAYER WOULD INVOVE THE STORY
HE HAS BEEN IN C[illegible] WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAZARGAN
RNMENT IN WASHINGT[illegible] AND THEY HAVE ENLISTED HIM IN AN EFFORT TO
BLISH A DIALOGUE W[illegible] KURDISH LEADERS ABROAD. THE MISSION IS
SOUND OUT LADJEVARDI[illegible] CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE CENTRAL
VERNMENT. THE MISSI[illegible] IS DELICATE BECAUSE BAZARGAN IS READY FOR
NCESSIONS BUT CANNOT[illegible] ISSUE WITH KHOMEINI AND HARD LINERS FOR
E MOMENT. THIRD LEV[illegible] STORY IS THAT AFTER GIVING SECOND, T/1
ES UP HIS CONTACT A[illegible] POSES SOME PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
TO SEIZE PERSONAL A[illegible] TAGE FROM T/1'S ROLE AS EMISSARY, I.E.
D THEMSELVES UP AN[illegible] ARS EXTRACT MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM
RGAN AND COMPANY. T/1 [illegible] UGGESTED TO GO ALTERNATE STORY THAT HE
S IN MEXICO RECENTLY[illegible] OT SOME PROMISES OF HELP FROM PEOPLE ARO
IN KURDISH FORCE[illegible] HOW TOGETHER TO SUPPORT COMBAQ[illegible] AT
FOR CROWN PRINC[illegible] DOES NOT THINK HIGHLY OF LATTER VERSION
USE:

(1) PAHLAVI CO[illegible] APPEARS UNLIKELY UNDER ANY CIR-
CANCES, AND;

(2) KURDS INCL[illegible] DING DP CHIEFS CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE
BETRAYED BY SHAH[illegible] AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT TO REHAT
EXPERIENCE.

PHALIZES THIS BUT [illegible] OUT SHAH HAS MONEY AND CONCEIVABLY COUL
REPARED TO SPEND S[illegible] IT TO HARASS THOSE WHO KICKED HIM OUT
OR OF IRQ+SHAH [illegible] FORCES BUILDING IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL
ZEAN HAS SOME PER[illegible] CURRENCY).
5. RE DOCUMENTA[illegible] FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE, T/1 BELIEVES BEST

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 493084 S E C R E T
THAT THEIR MOVEMENT IN NEED OF WEST[illegible]ERN ASSISTANCE AND THAT THEY
WOULD LIKE TO OPEN CHANNEL TO WEST [illegible]O ATTEMPT SECURE THAT AS-
SISTANCE. ACCORDING TO STE. MARTI[illegible] THIS GROUP, WHICH ALSO IN-
CLUDED MAHMOUD AND SADR G H A Z I [illegible] CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF
SHEIK EZZADIN H O S S E I N I AN[illegible] STATED THAT THEY DID NOT
DESIRE KURDISH INDEPENDENCE, SIMPL[illegible] REASONABLE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
WITHIN IRANIAN STATE. THEY DID NO[illegible] WANT TO SOLICIT SOVIET SUP-
PORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS BECAUSE OF [illegible]HEIR DISTRUST OF SOVIET
ACTIONS LEADING TO FALL OF KURDISH[illegible] REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD IN 1947.
NOR DOES THIS GROUP WISH ALLY ITSE[illegible]F WITH BARZANI'S, WHO THEY
DISTRUST ALMOST AS MUCH AS SOVIETS.

4. AS STATION AWARE, NONE O[illegible] THIS NEW INASMUCH AS CATOMIC/19
HAS BEEN CONVEYING SAME MESSAGE SI[illegible]NCE APRIL 1979, BUT IT DOES
REPRESENT POSSIBILITY OF SECURING [illegible]AN IN INTO KURDISH MOVEMENT
IN IRAN USING TEHRAN-BASED FOREIG[illegible]ER WHO MAY HAVE SOME FAIRLY
GOOD CONTACTS IN THAT MOVEMENT. [illegible]TE. MARTIN MAY BE ATTRACTIVE
IN SEVERAL OTHER WAYS IN THAT, AC[illegible]ORDING TO BURNS, HE SPEAKS
EXCELLENT FARSI, NATIVE FRENCH AN[illegible] ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH ENGLISH
HEAVILY ACCENTED. ACCORDING BURN[illegible], STE. MARTIN WOULD BE WILLING
COOPERATE RTACTION IF BURNS GIVES[illegible] WORD, AND INTENDS REMAIN IN
IRAN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WE, OF [illegible]COURSE, WOULD NEED GO THROUGH
PROCESS SECURING CORPORATE AND CA[illegible]NADIAN APPROVALS USE OF STE.
MARTIN AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE AT[illegible] LEAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS
BEFORE WE WOULD BE ABLE COMPLETE [illegible]NECESSARY PAPERWORK/APPROVALS.
IF THIS INTERESTING TO YOU, WE WI[illegible]LL BEGIN PROCESSING NOW. WE
ENVISION INITIAL CONTACT WITH STE[illegible]. MARTIN AT SOME POINT OUTSIDE
TEHRAN FOR INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND[illegible], IF FEASIBLE, RECRUITMENT AND
TRAINING PRIOR TO TURNING OVER ST[illegible]ATION, BUT OTHER OPTIONS MAY
BE AVAILABLE, INCLUDING INITIAL [illegible]ONTACT IN TEHRAN. WOULD
APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS.

5. FILE: DCD CASE 62638. [illegible] RVW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T



6 SEP 3 2

S E C R E T 2515322 SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STUTTGART 17957 SECTION 1 OF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHERAN, ANKARA, ISTANB

WNINTEL RUEPAT AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: BONN 84660 (NOTAL)

1. KEITH L. TOHLERNY HAD INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1830 HOURS IN ROOM 1005 COLOGNE INTER TINENTAL, AS ARRANGED. MEETING LASTED FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS. AND T/19 WAS PAID DM 7500 FOR PERIOD MAY 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1979 AT RATE OF DM 1500 MONTHLY FOR EXPENSES, FOR WHICH HE SIGNED HAND RECEIPT IN USUAL ALIAS. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MEETINGS WOULD CONTINUE FOR THREE MONTH TRIAL PERIOD, I.E., OCTOBER THROUGH DECEMBER, WITH DM 1500 MONTHLY AS EXPENSES. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE ON 27 SEPTEMBER. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE APPARENT.

2. ATMOSPHERE: TOHLERNY BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING HIS AGE (SLIGHTLY INCREASED) AND HIS LONG BACKGROUND IN AREA, POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD VISITED KURDISTAN, IHA KNOWLEDGE OF KURDISH HISTORY, ETC. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TALK TO T/19 LIKE A FATHER WHEN NECESSARY AND THAT IT WOULD BE FOR T/19'S OWN GOOD. HE THEN STARTED TO QUESTION T/19 ON HIS SERIOUSNESS ABOUT KURDISH PROBLEMS, GENTLY POINTING OUT THAT T/19 HAD HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH KURDISH NATIONALISM DURING HIS ADULT LIFE AND AT THE SAME TIME PRAISING T/19'S FATHER AND HIS CAREER. TOHLERNY CLOSED THIS INTRODUCTION BY NOTING HIS PERSONAL REGARD FOR THE KURDS AND SYMPATHY FOR T/19'S DESIRE TO ASSIST HIS PEOPLE. ALL THIS WAS WELL RECEIVED BY T/19.

3. GOALS: TOHLERNY THEN RAISED QUESTION OF WHAT HE WANTS FROM T/19. DESPITE T/19'S DESIRES, WE HAVE NO INTENTION AT THIS TIME OF ASSISTING KURDISH NATIONALISM WITH ARMS OR MONEY AND T/19 MUST BE AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS. FURTHERMORE, WE DID NOT WANT T/19 TO RETURN "BLACK" TO KURDISTAN, EVEN FOR VISIT AS THAT WOULD POSSIBLY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR EVERYONE. HE COULD BEST SERVE HIS COUNTRY BY SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS

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ING THERE AND HOW EVENTS WERE CONTROLLED. THIS WAS FIRST
SIC STEP. T/19 AGREED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY,
OUGH HE DIDN'T LIKE IT, AND HE AGREED THAT THREE-
TRIAL PERIOD SHOULD BE GOOD TEST. E THEN LAUNCHED INTO
DISCOURSE ON FACT THAT HE WAS GRADUALLY BEING SEPARATED
IS SOURCES AND WOULD SOON HAVE NOTHING TO REPORT. HE THEN
THAT HE IS ABLE TO ENTER KURDISTAN SUCCESSFULLY AND SET UP
URCES AND ROUTES. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
LD ASSIST HIM IN TWO MATTERS: (A) SUPPLYING HIM WITH SAFE
ICATION, I.E. POUCH FACILITIES, BETWEEN GERMANY AND IRAN
) WHETHER WE WOULD HELP HIM SEND EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER TY
INTO KURDISTAN "BLACK" IN ORDER TO PUBLICIZE TRUE STATE OF
S THERE. TOHLERNT REPLIED THAT HE WOLD HAVE TO CONSIDER
UESTIONS BEFORE REPLYING BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS. T/19 CON-
THAT HE HAD CORRESPONDED PRIMARILY THROUGH (A) COURIERS AND
ONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SISTER IN TEHRAN, WHO IS MARRIED T
IN JAF TRIBE AND SHE IN TURN HAD CONTACT WITH KURDISTAN BY PH
TER. NOW SISTER'S CONTACTS IN KURDISTAN HAD FLED TO HILLS
SHE HAD MOVED TO BONN. MOREOVER, PUBLIC COMMO IN
AN WAS INCREASINGLY CONTROLLED AS WAS THAT IN TEHERAN.
SISTED THAT HE STILL HAD PLENTY OF POTENTIAL SOURCES
DISTAN BUT HE HAD NO WAY TO REACH THEM FROM GERMANY AND
OF NEW ROUTES AND COURIERS.

INTEL: T/19 HAD NO INTEL OTHER THAN GENERAL STATEMENT
18 SEPTEMBER THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN MANY KURDISH
BUT HE HAD NO NAMES OR NUMBERS. TOHLERNT SYMPATHIZES
19'S PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TRY TO EXTRACT MORE
TION FROM TRUSTED KURDS IN GERMANY WHO ALSO HAD THEIR
RCES. HE AGREED TO DO THIS.K

TARGETS: TOHLERNT TOLD T/19 THAT FIRST THING WAS TO
LISTS OF NAMES, ADDRESSES AND BIO DATA ON KURDS IN
WHAT T/19 TRUSTED AND THOUGHT CAPABLE OF OBTAINING
T INFORMATION FROM KURDISTAN. HE ALSO ASKED FOR SIMILAR
KURDS IN TEHERAN AND KURDS IN KURDISTN. DEPENDING ON
ISTS, WE COULD THEN HELP T/19 DETERMINE (A) WHO WAS
AND (B) IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ASSIST HIM
RATLINES. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHOM WE MIGHT BE DEALING
WHAT THEIR BACKGROUNDS WERE. T/19 AGREED READILY TO THI

AFTER THINKING IT OVER CAREFULLY AND AFTER BEING ASSURED HE WOULD HANDLE INFORMATION IN SECURE MANNER. HE PROMISED TO HAVE SOME INFORMATION AT NEXT MEETING.

6. SOVIET INFLUENCE: T/19 HAS NO HARD INFORMATION ON SOVIET CONNECTIONS WITH NATIONALIST FORCES IN KURDISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN RECENT WEEKS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALMOST ALL KURDISH LEADERS HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS, USUALLY FOR A PURPOSE. QASEMLU, FOR EXAMPLE, HE KNEW AS COMMUNIST AND TUDEH MEMBER. QASEMLU THEN BROKE WITH SOVIETS AND PERHAPS NOW IS BACK WITH THEM. IN ABSENCE OF HARD AND CURRENT INFORMATION, ALMOST ANY KURD COULD BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME SOVIET CONNECTIONS. EVEN HIS FATHER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN AND STRONG KURDISH NATIONALIST, HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE HIS PURPOSE. T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET INFLUENCE.

7. T/19 SOVIET CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT, TOHLERNY ASKED T/19 ABOUT HIS SOVIET CONTACTS. HE HAD INVITED SOME MONTHS AGO SOVIET THIRD SECRETARY ALEXANDER S. KULIN TO HIS PARTY AND KULIN RETURNED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO UNEXPECTEDLY AND ASKED IF THERE WERE ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO HELP T/19, REFERRING TO T/19'S LOSS OF DIPLOMATIC POST. ACCORDING TO T/19, THEY TALKED AND KULIN LEFT SAYING HE WOULD BE BACK, BUT HAS NOT YET RETURNED. T/19 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A FEELER FOR FUTURE PITCH OR NOT, BUT EXPECTS KULIN TO RETURN AND TALK ABOUT T/19 AND KURDISH SITUATION. T/19 PROMISED TO REPORT ANY CONTACT IMMEDIATELY AND IN DETAIL. HE WAS ALSO WARNED OF POSSIBLE TELEPHONE AND PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE. T/19 THEN ASKED IF TOHLERNY THOUGHT KULIN WAS CONNECTED WITH SUBJECT MENTIONED TO T/19 BY HIS COUSIN, RAHIM SAIF G H A Z I, PROFESSOR KURDISH HISTORY AND CULTURE IN BAKU. T/19 MET COUSIN FOR FIRST TIME IN YEARS SOME MONTHS AGO IN BERLIN AND COUSIN MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT KNOW SOMEONE TO T/19, WHO DIDN'T THINK ABOUT IT AT TIME. LATER WONDERED HOW COUSIN WAS ALLOWED TO COME TO BERLIN, AS HE HAS NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO TRAVEL PREVIOUSLY OUTSIDE SOVIET UNION. T/19 IS NOW NOT SURE WHETHER COUSIN MEANT BY "SOMEONE" A KURD WHO WOULD INFORM HIM ABOUT KURDS IN SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET CONNECTIONS WITH KURDS OR WHETHER COUSIN MEANT SOMEONE REPRESENTING SOVIET AUTHORITY. TOHLERNY SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW AND T/19 ASKED IF HE

STUTTGART 7937 S E C R E T

ASK COUSIN TO SEND "SOMEONE". TOHLERNY ADVISED WAITING.

T/19 REQUESTS: T/19 MADE SOME REQUESTS. (A) HE WANTED TO
BONN COULD ASSIST SISTER NOW IN BONN IN EDUCATION AT
N SCHOOL, SINCE CHILDREN HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AMERICAN
IN TEHERAN. TOHLERNY SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF BONN SCHOOL
LD ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH SITUATION. (B) T/19 WOULD LIKE
BOOK BY (FNU) EGGLETON ABOUT KURDS AND (C) COPY OF
T ARTICLE IN MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ABOUT KURDISH REPUBLIC
45. HE MADE NO MONEY REQUESTS, AND ALMOST FORGOT TO
MONIES OWED HIM.

IM GENERAL MEETING WENT VERY WELL WITH GENUINE CORDIALITY
S AT END OF MEETING AND A SEEMING EAGERNESS TO GET ON
INESS. T/19 SUGGESTED MOVING NEXT MEETING UP TO 27TH FROM
D 4 OCTOBER. JUST AS LEAVING, IT/19 QUI ENTIONED THAT ON
EMBER HE WAS GOING TO REGISTER IN BONN A GROUP TO BE
"THE COUNCIL FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY". HE ALREADY HAD THE
DRAWN UP AND IT WOULD BE A BEGINNING OF HIS ATTEMPT TO
ETHER AN ORGANIZATION HE COULD USE. TOHLERNY WILL
COPY OF PAPERS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS AT NEXT MEETING.

COMMENTS: IN PRESENT SITUATION AND WITH PRESENT GUIDELINES
M HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER T/19 AND HAS LITTLE TO OFFER
EREFORE, WE SHOULD GET OUT SOON BEFORE WE GET BACK IN
PLY THAN WE WANT TO BE. THREE MONTHS TRIAL SHOULD BE ADEQUATE
THER HAND, TOHLERNY BELIEVES THAT IF WE ARE WILLING TO TAKE
IVE ROLE, BASED ON REWARDING ONLY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT,
9 MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. THERE SEEM TO BE NO
RDS WITH FAMIL BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
MAKE STRONG HI FOR KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS T/19
NOT. BUT EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS IN BOTH IRAN AND
N HAVE HAD A DEEP EFFECT ON HIM, PERHAPS ENOUGH TO ALLOW
UT IT ALL TOGETHER FOR ONCE. TOHLERNY TOLD HIM BLUNTLY THAT
AS GOING TO AID HIM UNLESS HE EARNED IT AND HIS TRACK
S KURDISH NATIONALIST WAS VERY WEAK. HE HAD TO MAKE
INTO SOMEONE OTHERS WOULD COME TO, BOTH KURDS AND
RS, RATHER THAN BEG FOR AID. T/19 TOOK THIS VERY SERIOUSLY
LLY AGREED THAT HE HAD TO WORK AND WORK HARD TO GET
WANTED. HE NOTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD DONE MUCH WITHOUT

29SEP7[illegible] 7342

S C R E T 2816532 SZJZPB FTAFF

C BONN 34952

TO DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANB

WN TEL AJAJA CATOMIC

EF A. STUTTGART 17937
B. BONN 34942

IG (19).

1. REF B REPORTED INTEL FROM 27SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC

2. SARDAR J A F, ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS,
I M RIED TO T/19'S SISTER (PARA EIGHT REF A). AFTER FLEEING
THR HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD WHERE HE BECAME
INVO D IN WORKING WITH IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTING
IR KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQ. JAF TRIBE WAS
PR T URING IRAQI-KURDISH FIGHTING IN 7[illegible]S AND SADAR APPARENTLY
A C AN SLATE. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO COME TO GERMANY ABOUT 21
SE W H IRAQI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET T/19 AND HIS SISTER.
AT LA MINUTE TRIP WAS POSTPONED SO SARDAR COULD MAKE TRIP
TO U STAN, AND HE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BONN 5 OCT.
TA L WI L ARRANGE FOR TOHLERNY TO MEET SARDAR.
AG RD TO T/19, SARDAR'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN
RO A ICAN SCHOOL, BUT WITH COST RUNNING OVER $5,000
(THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE.
IN CONSULTATION WITH BONN, TOHLERNY PROPOSES USING SCHOOL
PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A PAY-AS-YOU-GO
IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS
BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METHOD OF COMMO WOULD
TIME ALLOWS TRAINING. OTHERWISE, WILL ARRANGE FOLLOW-
WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE) TO GERMANY TO SEE FAMILY.

3. REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS
PROPOSAL BY 5 OCT.

4. FILE: 201-0306414. RVW 29SEP99 DRV DOC.1

110CT79 05 09Z

R E T 1817552 OCT 79 STAFF

BONN 85222

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRA

AKT.

L AJAJA CATOMIC

BONN 85221

1. PURSUANT REF OPS INTEL CABLE, KEITH L. TOHLE MET
TOMIC/19 (T/19) AND SARDAR J A F 10 OCTOBER 1 79 FOR
RS, WHICH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SORT OUT ALL OP MATTER
MAXIMUM TIME JAF AVAILABLE. NEXT MEETING SCHED LED
19 ON 24 OCTOBER.

2. TOHLERNY ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS JAF WHILE EXTRAC ING IN
M, PRIMARILY BY ASKING HARD QUESTIONS. JAF CAME ACROSS
KEY, WITH STRONG IDEAS ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW AND IDN'T
D ON DATES (WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON), VERY CAREF L WITH
AND ALTHOUGH HE DROPPED A FEW, HE WAS N T SELLIN HE
LID, STOCKY MAN WITH ALMOST A DISTINGUI RED APPE .
OWN SKIN AND GRAY HAIR AND AN AIR OF
SENSED THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEE
ATION TO T/19, WHO HAD PROMISED HE WOU
USSION CONTINUED, HE BECAME MUCH MORE
NO PLEA FOR ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE, EV N FOR HIS
HOOLING, WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED, IN FACT BY T/1
RAISED THE ISSUE TO OFFSET THEIR RAISI G IT, AN
IATELY TOLD THAT JAF HAD DECIDED TO TA E HIS FA
BAGHDAD WITH HIM, THAT HE COULD NOT AFF RD TO KE
BONN. TOHLERNY POINTED OUT THAT IT WOU D BE BET
HERE -- THAT IRAQ COULD BE DANGEROUS. JAF AGRE BUT
AD NO CHOICE AND TEAT TOHLERNY DIDN'T AVE TO W ON
E. THANK YOU JUST THE SAME. HE MAY E CLEVER GH
WHAT WE MIGHT WANT TO TRADE AND DIDN'T WANT TO VOLVE
Y. TOHLERNY CLOSED BY SAYING THAT IF HINGS DI T
WELL FOR HIS FAMILY IN BAGHDAD, TO PAS THE WOR

53

JUL 7

S E C R E T 114007Z JUL 79 TIA

CITE FR LOS ANGELES 20589 (MAGRUDER ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR

WNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORREST STRAIT

REFS: A. FR LOS ANGELES 20588
B. FR LOS ANGELES 20553

1. FINAL BRIEF MEET WITH SOURCE/I (T/I) ON 9 JULY RESULTED IN T/I ADVISING THAT HE WOULD BE DEPARTING LOS ANGELES UNTIL 15 JULY. ALL MEETING ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN THE SAME. REASON FOR DELAY WAS CALL FROM ONE OF T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS WHO ADVISED HIS FATHER HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER, GENERAL (POLICE) FNU S H A H R [illegible] T A N I WAS RECENTLY RETIRED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WHEN HE BECAME 55. THIS IRANIAN IS ONE OF THREE COUSINS; ALL OTHER WITH SAME FAMILY NAME WAS THE RECENT MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER POSITIONS AS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 REF B. THIRD T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY THE CHIEF OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL. MOST IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIEND OF THE PRESENT CHIEF OF POLICE [illegible]OM ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 REF B AS FRIEND OF T/I FAMILY. T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER 20 JULY. HE WANTED TO POSTPONE DEPARTURE UNTIL NEXT IRAN AIR FLIGHT SO HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRODUCTION AND RECOMMENDATION FROM [illegible]RRESTANI TO THE POLICE CHIEF IN QOM.

2. I/I SAW NO PROBLEM IN MAKING HIS FIRST CAR PICKUP 20 JULY AND WILL BE AT SITE.

3. FILE: 201-0961045. RW [illegible]L99 DRV D90. ALL SECRET.

E C R E T

S E C R E T 251650Z JUL 79 STAFF 26 Jul [illegible] Z

CITE DIRECTOR 482379

TO: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WINTEL AJAJA FORBES SDTRANSIT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53765
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 20581
C. TEHRAN 53506

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS SDTRANSIT/1. FOLLOWING WAS CONTACT PLAN:

A. TELEPHONE COMMO: T/1 WILL CALL STATION OPS NUMBER 830399 EST 830399 AND WILL SAY "HI, THIS IS MIKE. CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES." WHEN CHARLES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE AMENITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PICKUP SITE LISTED BELOW. ANY OTHER PLACE MENTIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BECAUSE IF INCLUDED IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE DATE/TIME CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND WORKED OUT ON THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE TIME WILL BE TWO DAYS AND TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON; I.E., IF IT AGREED MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200, THE CAR PICKUP WOULD BE SATURDAY NIGHT AT 2000 HOURS. IN EVENT STATION SHOULD WANT TO CALL T/1, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY SW OR AT PERSONAL MEETING. THE TIME OF CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO/TWO SYSTEM. IF T/1 IS ADVISED THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WILL ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED. THE NUMBER TO CALL IS IDEN A AND CALLER SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN B EST IF CALL MADE IN FARSI.

B. CAR PICKUP: T/1 HAD REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY TO HIS CAR PICKUP BE 20 JULY EST 20 JULY AT 2100 WITH ALTERNATE OF 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOT MADE HE WILL REVERT TO THIS AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH, USING WESTERN CALENDAR. THIS WILL BE SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING 2100 AND 2200 HOUR, HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN MINUTES. T/1 WILL

2 TEHRAN 53827 S'E C R E T

Y, 30 JULY. T/I'S FAMILY HAD KNOWN FOR 2- ARS THAT
UD WAS A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN (CHARIKS), ID NOT KNO
ING SPECIFIC ABOUT HI ACTIVITIES. THEY D T KNOW EXAC
E DIED, ALTHOUGH THEY O NOT BELIEVE A VER OF SUICIDE
H HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE PASDARAN KREVOLU ARM GUARDS O
HIMSELF IS A SUPPORTER OF THE MUJAHEDIN, BU OVE SOME OF
FEDAYAN WHO WERE HIS BROTHER'S CONTACTS. H S A TENTATIV
FROM THESE FRIENDS TO ACCOMPANY THEM TO STAN TO
OW THE FEDAYAN ARE SUPPORTING THE KURDISH OPATIC PART
. C/O TOLD T/I THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO L THER ISSUES
ACT HIM FROM GOAL OF OBTAINING JOB IN NIOC EFFECTIVELY IN
STAN. HOWEVER, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KU ANTI THE FED
E AN IMPORTANT REPORT, IF HE COULD ARRAN UIE FEELINGS O
IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT CESSING
ELIEVES THAT HE CAN DO SO AND WILL REPORT. DETAILS OF
FEDAYAN INVOLVED AND THEIR PLANS AT THE NEX TIME. TIME
WOULD LAST ABOUT ONE WEEK AND COULD NOT TA PLACE BEFORE
OF AUGUST. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, C/O LEA THAT TEHR
KURD HIMSELF.

5. FROM HIS BROTHER AT THE KOMITEH IN A N, T/I WAS
ABOUT LABOR PROBLEMS AT NIOC. THE WORKER VERY
NED ABOUT RATION PRIVILEGES FOR FOOD WHIC EY HAD HAD
ST YEARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. COOP TION WITH
NIOC GUARD FORCE AND THE PASDARAN GUARDS IS IC PROBLEMS
T/I WILL BE RETURNING TO ABADAN ON 2 AUGUST TO T HAMILY A
CE (IDENTITY) BEFORE RETURNING TO TEHRAN VI M. C/O
SIZED THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ALL T PROBLEMS HA
BROTHER IN ABADAN AND THAT T/I SHOULD PA NTIFY TO
OF HIS BROTHER'S REMARKS ON LABOR PROBLEMS, REPORT THEM
. T/I ALSO KNOWS AN ARAB SHEIKH, WHO WAS NOW PO
IN KHUZESTAN IN THE SHAH'S ERA. C/O TOLD THAT
STED IN LEARNING ABOUT ARAB ATTITUDES AN ITICA
S, CONCENTRATING ON ARAB-PARSI POLITICAL D ENCES IN
INGE.

S. FOR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 15 , T/I IS
ED TO REPORT ON HIS ~~STAGE~~ JOB PROSPECTS OOD, OR INFO
HIS BROTHER AT THE ABADAN KOMITEH, AND ON INTERVIEW



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C R E T 091220Z OCT 79 STAFF

BONN 85 IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, C

INTEL JAJA SDFICKLE

REF: BONN 8436

1. SDFICKLE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKI
IRANIAN KURDISTAN. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVE
OCT AND SET UP A DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE

2. ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICKLE'S RETURN WA DEL
THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY)
AUTHORITIES IN SALMAZ
(SHAHRIAR) AND DETAINED FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED
ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAI
HAVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS. SDFICKLE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT
PORT OF PURPOSE IN TURKEY, FORTUNATELY
THE LOCAL JUDGE AND THE AUTHORITIES
IN IRAN WERE KURDS AND FRIENDS OF SDFICKLE'S FATHER
FORE, LET HIM GO. A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "SON OF SHAH
ARRESTED" APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN DAILY "KEYHAN," NO.
DATED 18 SEPT. WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLI
CONCERNING SDFICKLE'S ARREST TO HQS VIA TM NUMBER 44

3. RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WIL BE
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. FILE: 0960901, DRVW 09 OCT 99 DRV 09 OCT.

S E R E T

13 SEP 79

C C R E T 1223042 STATE STAFF

TE DIRECTOR 312232.

: PRIORITY WESTPORT AND PRIORITY GERMANY BONN MUNICH.
UTINE TEHRAN, ANKAR

INTEL HYBAT AJAJA

F A. WESPORT 48610
B. DIRECTOR 31146

1. FOLLOWING ARE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH SUBJ
201-872561):

A. WHAT SUPPORT IF ANY ARE THE IRAQI KURDS GIVING THE
RANIAN KURDISH GROUPS. WHAT EFFECTS ARE THE KURDISH DISTURBANCES
AVING ON THE IRAQI REGIME AND COMMUNITY. SPECIFIC REPORTING ON IRAQI-
URDISH OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS IN AREAS OF INTEREST AND, IF
OSSIBLE, SOME KIND OF APPRAISAL OF HOW REALISTIC THESE OBJECTIVES
RE AS WELL AS DETAILS OF KURDISH PLANS TO GAIN MORE AUTONOMY, ETC.

B. OMITTING BARZANI'S, WOULD LIKE LIST AS WELL AS BIO
ATA OF ALL KDP LEADERS WE CAN PROVIDE.

C. SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY THAT BARZANI AND
TALABANI FACTIONS MIGHT MERGE, PLUS DETAILS OF ANY RECENT MEETINGS
BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS AND A RUN DOWN OF ANY POSSIBLE SUPPORT THEY
MAY BE EXTENDING TO EACH OTHER.

D. DETAILS OF ANY POSSIBLE LIAISON BETWEEN THE KDP AND
THE IRAQI SHI'A GROUPS.

E. DETAILS ON NUMBER OF KURDISH FORCES, WHERE CAMPS ARE
LOCATED AND COMMENT ON HOW WELL ARMED THEY ARE, AS WELL AS ANY INFO
THEY GETTING OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND IF SO WHAT TYPE.

F. WHAT IF ANY SUPPORT ARE THE KDP OR TALABANI FACTIONS
GETTING FROM THE KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT.

G. DETAILS PLUS DOCUMENTATION CHARGES THAT SOVIETS ARE



19 SEP 79

S E C R E T 09 1SZ SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ISTANBUL 33765

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM INFO TEHRAN

WNINTEL INTEL

1. BASIS REQUEST ANY AVAILABLE HQS AND ADDEE INFO RECENT ESTABLISHMENT IN STOCKHOLM OF A KURDISH ASSOCIATION AS SPOKESMAN FOR KURDISH SEPARIST MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY IRAN. BASIS IS CURRENTLY PREPARING INTEL DISSEM ON TO THIS ASSOCIATION AND WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ASAP.

2. NO FILE REVIEW 9 SEP 99 DRV D9G3 ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

29 Sep 7 7 Z Z

C R E T 2923492 SEP 79 STAFF

E DIRECTOR 523487.

ANKARA. TEHRAN.

NFEL AJAJA RTWINNER INTEL

1. HQS CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
IBLE SUPPORT OF KURDISH AND OTHER MINORITIES IN IRAN WHO
AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. WE CONTEMPLATING POSSIBLE
ION TO EXPLOIT SUCH SUPPORT. HOWEVER, AS THIS I DEFINITELY
EDGED SWORD SITUATION. WE INVITE STATIONS COMMENTS/OPINION
POLICY AUTHORITIY IS CONTAINED IN PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET
FERENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES' AFFAIRS. AND NO NE PRESIDENTI
ING WOULD BE REQUIRED.

2. NO FILE. RVW 28SEPT99 DRV D90-3 ALL SECRE

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

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INTEL BYTIKO

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M: IRAQI MILITARY ATTACHE, LONDON

M-OLD, BAGHDAD

TED: ARCA/I IS; ROME

FROM 'AYED(I) TO 'ALI (I)

SHAFUR BAKHTIAR HAS SENT HIS COUSIN RUSTAM BAKHTIAR T
ON TO MEET SIRDAR(I) TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OF THE CONTACT
H TOOK PLACE WITH BAKHTIAR ON THE PART OF BARZAN(I)
THIS MEETING OF BAKHTIAR BY BARZAN TOOK PLACE ONE DAY AF
MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR.
THE MEETING WITH BARZAN LASTED THREE HOURS, AND BARZAN
ED TO FACILITATE BAKHTIAR'S MISSION IN EVERY WAY.
BAKHTIAR AGREED TO TAKE THIRTY OFFICERS WITH HIM TO IRAQ.
HE WILL LEAVE FOR IRAQ DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS.
NOTE (1) NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.
(1) POSSIBLY MASOUD BARZANI, HEAD OF KURDISH DEMOCRA
PARTY OF IRAN. RVW, 02NOV79 DRV CISR ALL TOP SECRET

A.
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